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Arianna Andreangeli, ‘EU Competition law in times of crisis: between present 
challenges and a largely unwritten future…’
DRAFT—NOT FOR CITATION
1. Introduction
Since late 2007 and to this day, a broad ranging crisis has swept through a growing number of 
economic sectors; starting from the banking and financial sector, the crisis has invested numerous 
manufacturing industries and has triggered sometimes “convulsive” reactions by the public 
authorities, the economic operators and many of the stakeholders. According to the EU Commission 
the effective application of the competition rules is an essential tool to rebuild a fragile economy:  
as Neelie Kroes argued in 2009, competition law is a vital part of the solution to the crisis.  Thus, 
despite an initial impasse, the Commission endeavoured to adopt measures designed to “cope” with 
the impact of the crisis on the single market and to pave the way out of this predicament in several 
segment of the economy, first and foremost, in the financial and banking industry.  However, it is 
clear that overcapacity threatens a number of economic segments, calling for prompt and effective 
responses: the shockwaves of the US subprime mortgage crisis, which have been felt in Europe 
since 2007, have led to the nationalisation of several banks and to the restructuring of others, thus 
changing significantly the face of this market.  
             Against this background, it is legitimate to ask what this all has meant for the current 
approaches and the future prospect of competition enforcement in the EU.  Have the merger rules 
and the principles governing the supervision over state aids provided effective tools to tackle the 
challenges presented by the crisis, without threatening the integrity of the single market? And has 
the Commission lived up to its reputation of “tough cop” when it comes to upholding the Union 
interest in the field of competition policy? This paper will attempt to address some of these 
questions.  It will touch upon three main themes: first of all, it will consider which tools the 
Commission has deployed to tackle the challenges of the crisis.  In this context, it will be argued 
that reliance upon Article 101(3) TFEU, as a means to providing a “safe harbour” to forms of 
coordination designed to ease restructuring has largely been replaced by other forms of 
intervention, such as the application of the merger control regulation and the supervision of state 
intervention in the economy.  It will be suggested that this shift seems largely consistent with the 
outright, almost total condemnation of cartel behaviour and more generally with the mistrust of 
forms of collusion, shown not just by the Commission, but also by the Court of Justice.
         Second, the paper will examine the role of state aids’ rules as a tool to “bust” the adverse 
impact of the crisis.  It will be argued that the same desire to uphold the integrity of the single 
market and to apply these principles coherently with the overarching design of a competitive and 
open economy pushed the Commission to exercise hitherto rarely invoked powers for the oversight 
of state intervention aimed at preventing threats to economic stability: in this context, the 2008 
ECOFIN guidelines will be especially discussed.
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         Thereafter, the paper will examine the approach to merger control adopted by the Commission 
to deal with the restructuring of key industrial areas in response to the credit squeeze: it will 
illustrate that, after an initial impasse, which de fact allowed Member States to adopt unilateral 
decisions concerning mergers and acquisitions in key sectors of their economy, the Commission 
was able to devise and implement a convincing strategy in this area.  In particular, it will be shown 
that, out of a concern for maintaining the integrity and the competitiveness of the single market 
against protectionist pushes, the Commission relied on the substantial and procedural rules 
contained in the Merger regulation to provide timely and effective responses to the competition 
concerns arising from these transactions.  However, at the same time, it will be argued that the 
consequences of these mergers are still likely to present a number of challenges for ex post control, 
thus calling for a careful vigilance over “financially significant” entities.
          Finally, the paper will discuss some general issues concerning the current status of both 
competition law and of the Commission as competition watchdog.  The paper will illustrate that the 
desire to maintain the integrity of the single market was especially apparent in the supervision of 
state aids and in the flexible, realistic application of the merger rules in specific cases, with a view 
to securing timely and principled clearance to key proposed concentrations.  However, it will also 
show that so far no overall response has been adopted with a view to dealing with the aftermath of 
the impact of the crisis as well as with the consequences of the Member States’ and EU intervention 
designed to respond to it.  It will be argued that, although the Commission endeavoured to use 
existing tools flexibly and thereby maintain continuity with its long-standing policies and 
consistency with key principles, the concentration arising from the restructuring operations 
occurred in a number of sectors represents a challenge for future competitiveness.  It will be added 
that state intervention, despite having played a central role in salvaging key undertakings, could 
have significant and potentially irreversible effects on market access especially by discouraging 
new rivals from attempting to enter certain economic segments.  
         The paper will conclude that competition policy remains an important component of the 
Commission’s agenda and especially of its response to the economic crisis.  However, the need to 
deal with its aftershocks not just in the financial and banking markets, but also in “real economy” 
segments and especially the demands posed by the integrity of the single market have thrown in 
question a number of “established ideas” and tools that had hitherto been part of “traditional” EU 
approaches.  While it is still unclear whether this shift is permanent, it is undeniable that the legacy 
of the economic crisis for the competitiveness and openness of the single market is both wide-
ranging and liable to create further challenges for the years to come.
2. Competition law responses to times of crisis: leaving “obsolete” tools behind?
2.1. The EU Commission and the financial and economic crisis: a short summary...
The historical development of the financial crisis which unfolded from the US subprime 
mortgages’ crack and swept large swathes of the financial and banking sectors throughout not just 
the Americas but also here in Europe has been addressed far more competently in other sessions of 
this conference and it is not the purpose of this contribution to do so. It is however interesting to 
identify roughly two phases characterising the Commission’s response to the crisis: the “water-
shed” moment can be identified with 2008, a year in which the Economic and Financial Ministers’ 
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Committee ECOFIN openly recognised the “systemic” nature of the crisis, thereby paving the way 
for greater and deeper involvement of the EU institutions.1  In the first phase, i.e. the years 
2007/2008, started by the run on the British bank Northern Rock and culminating with the crash of 
Lehmann Brothers, the Commission was regarded by many as being very much a “witness” of 
unilateral measures adopted by the Member States individually in order to tackle the dramatic 
unfolding of the crisis:2 the Commission was either prepared to avoid interfering with the domestic 
authorities or was ready to examine and authorise mergers and other “packages” of national 
measures designed to deal with the consequences of the crisis on an “as and when” basis.3 
          It may be suggested that this “wait and see” approach was particularly evident in relation to 
the UK Government’s intervention relating to the Lloyds TSB/HBoS merger, which in turns was 
triggered by the near downfall of HBoS: the Commission de facto accepted the British 
Government’s decision to “go it alone” and to allow the merger to go ahead, on the ground that “in 
light of the extraordinary circumstances of the financial markets (…) [it] would benefit financial 
stability and (…) be in the public interest.”4  At the same time, the British Parliament, upon a 
proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, amended the applicable legislation in order to exclude 
that a “relevant merger situation”, capable of triggering a referral to the Competition Commission, 
could arise in similar “public interest” circumstances that may occur in the future.5  
           The type of approach adopted in respect to Lloyds/HBoS was seen as perhaps the “only way 
forward” to avoid the financial collapse of a major financial player in a timely fashion.  However, it 
highlighted the risk that a targeted action could de facto become a “dangerous precedent” allowing 
the Member States to privilege “national champions” to the detriment of non-domestic players 
which may find themselves in equally choppy waters.  It also raised concerns as to the “aftermath” 
of the concentration, given the sheer size of the resulting merged entity and the resulting increased 
concentration within the market.6  It is undeniable that in 2007/2008 all authorities, whether at EU 
or at national level, were navigating unchartered waters as far as the demands of dealing with the 
consequences of the crisis were concerned.  Nonetheless, the lack of any precise guidelines as to 
how national “salvaging” operations should be conducted and overseen, together with the 
uncertainty as to the “aftermath” of the state-led restructuring and to the impact on the accessibility 
of individual geographic markets of “targeted” financial state intervention prompted the EU 
10
1 See e.g. Gerard, “Managing the financial crisis in Europe: why competition law is part of the solution, not of the 
problem”, (2008) Global Competition Policy, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330326, 
pp. 2-4; also Mateus, “The current financial crisis and state aid in Europe”, ( (2009) 5 Eur. Comp. J, available at: http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1500532, pp. 1-2..
2 Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 7-8.
3 Ibid.
4 See OFT report, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/2008/LloydsTSB, 
para. 19; see also para. 4 ff.
5 See Commission Press release of 13 October 2008, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/08/1496&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also OFT report, 31 October 
2008, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/mergers/decisions/2008/LloydsTSB, and Conclusions of the 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-law/
competition/mergers/mergers-with-a-public-interest/maintaining-the-stability-of-the-uk-financial-system;  for 
commentary see e.g. Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 5-7.
6 See Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 11-12.
institutions and especially the Commission, in its capacity as competition watchdog, to jump in the 
driver seat.7  
          2008 was a rather momentous year, since it saw the ECOFIN ministers setting out the 
guidelines concerning emergency state intervention by Member States in the banking and financial 
sectors.8  Perhaps more importantly, in 2008 there was a widespread recognition of the “systemic” 
nature of the crisis, namely of the circumstance that what started as a financial phenomenon, 
impacting on banks and other financial institutions, was now having ripple effects on the “real 
economy”.  This watershed moment led to the Commission taking a far more “structured” and 
active role in responding to the crisis: in 2008, Neelie Kroes announced that competition law and 
policy would be “part of the solution” to the crisis, starting a season of greater and closer 
involvement on the part of her Office.9  The powers of state aid supervision were exercised flexibly 
and pragmatically, often in close cooperation with other Commissioners, and decisions were usually 
adopted rapidly to cope with the “timetable” of the financial markets.10  Importantly, as will be 
explored in more detail below, the Commission relied on a hitherto infrequently used (if at all) 
clause, namely Article 107(3) TFEU, allowing the authorisation of aid designed to cope with 
serious economic disturbances.11
          Merger control rules were also applied in a more “creative” and flexible manner: the 
Competition Commissioner endeavoured to grant Phase I clearances rapidly, sometimes within 24 
or 48 hours of official notification and to speed up the implementation of specific transactions by 
waiving the suspension effect following notification via a decision adopted according to Article 7 of 
the Merger Regulation.12  At the heart of the Commission’s renewed resolve was however a desire 
to maintain the integrity of single market principles, an objective which was increasingly under 
threat and would have been even more so if the Member States had been allowed to continue “going 
it alone”: for this reason, Commissioner Kroes not only ensured swift responses to notifications 
motivated by restructuring; she also declared that her Office would use existing legal and economic 
tools to their fullest extent.13  For instance, the “failing firm defence”, flexible merger negotiations, 
both in procedural and in substantive terms, and the exhaustive abut at the same time speedy testing 
of merger remedies emerged as effective instruments to deal with the crisis’ shockwaves.14
11
7 For commentary see Mateus, cit. (fn.1), pp. 4-5; see also Weitbrecht, “Mergers in an economic crisis”, (2010) 31(7) 
ECLR 276 at 278; see also p. 284.
8 See Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council held in Luxembourg on 7 October 2008 (Doc. No 13784/08); also 
Declaration on a concerted action plan of the Euro area countries, 10 October 2008, European Council of 15/16 October 
2008, Presidency Conclusions, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/
103202.pdf. 
9 See Commissioner Kroes’s briefing to the ECOFIN Ministers on the financial crisis, 2 December 2008, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/
08/757&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
10 See e.g. Kapsis, “The impact of the recent financial crisis for EU competition policy in the banking sector”, (2010) 
9(3) Int’l J for Trade Law and Policy 256 at 263-265.
11 Id., pp. 264-265; see also Zimmer and Blackschocz, “The role of competition in state aid control during the financial 
market crisis”, (2011) 32(1) ECLR 9 at 10-11.
12 See e.g. Weitbrecht, cit. (fn. 6) at 282-283.
13 Kapsis, cit. (fn. 9), pp. 261-262.
14 Ibid; see also Zimmer et al., cit. (fn. 10), p. 14.
         In light of the above, it is argued that the Commission’s role, from this “second season” of the 
crisis and onward, evolved from that of a spectator and occasional participant to one of major 
protagonist: out of a concern for avoiding protectionist “torpedoes” on the part of individual 
Member States and, more generally, for maintaining the integrity of a competitive and open single 
market, the Commissioner for Competition engaged more frequently and more directly with dealing 
with the crisis and its challenges.15  In doing so, the Office was also backed by the renewed resolve 
of the Member States, apparent in the 2008 ECOFIN Guidelines on state aid, to move from 
unilateral, occasionally coordinated crisis management to a more principled approach to this task, 
which would rely on the EU institutional architecture.16  This marked change also led the 
Commission to become more closely involved not just in the overall response to these dramatic, 
choppy times; it could be argued that it also encouraged it to “micro-manage” the economic 
government of individual Member States, raising concerns for the democratic legitimacy (or lack 
thereof) of specific measures’ packages.17  
         What the forgoing has meant, and is still likely to mean, for the role of the Commission itself 
and for the EU institutions as a whole will be examined briefly at the end of this contribution. At 
this junction, it can be concluded that the financial crisis of 2007/2008, which continues to haunt 
Europe and whose effects have now become systemic and entrenched in the “real” economy, posed 
great challenges for competition policy as well as for the whole European project of a single, open 
and competitive market.  Despite initially sitting on the sidelines, the Commission became and 
continues to be closely involved in dealing with the challenges of the current economic predicament 
in which the EU Members find themselves: it could be argued that its increasing activism was both 
a reaction to the dangers posed by unilateral state actions to the integrity of the Common Market 
and the outcome of a realisation of the need to reassert its leadership in a scenario in which 
multilateralism was “creeping” to the detriment of the efficacy of the EU’s supranational decision-
making and implementation dynamics.18  
            However, what became increasingly clear was that the Commission carefully selected the 
competition tools with which it endeavoured to structure its response: merger control and state aid 
supervision emerged as core instruments in this task.  By contrast other hitherto relatively 
“traditional” tools for assisting restructuring, such as the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
“crisis cartels” were not on the agenda.  The next section will attempt to analyse, albeit briefly, the 
rationale for the choice of tools made by the Commission and will concentrate especially on the 
question of whether “crisis cartels” may have become increasingly obsolete, in the face of the 
almost total condemnation of cartel behaviour and of other forms of collusion.
2.2. Applying Article 101(3) TFEU to restructuring deals: are crisis cartels just “museum 
material”?
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15 Inter alia, see Gerard, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 8-9.
16 Napolitano, “The two ways of global governance after the financial crisis”, (2011) 9(2) Int’l J Const’l Law 310 at 
314; see also 320-321.
17 See e.g. Kapsis, cit. (fn. 9), pp. 269-270.
18 For commentary, see Mateus, cit. (fn. 1), pp. 4-5; also Napolitano, cit. (fn. 15), pp. 319-320.
The previous section sought to provide a short sketch of the “phases” (such as they can be 
identified) in which the financial and later “systemic” crisis unfolded and to highlight the main 
traits characterising the response of the Commission to the challenges posed by it.  It was argued 
that, despite initially being “reactive” to the unfolding of these rather dramatic circumstances, the 
Commission soon adopted a far more involved, purposeful stance to addressing the consequences of 
the financial crisis: it sought to respond to the demands of industrial restructuring in an industry 
whose instability could have potentially dangerous aftershocks for the real economy, while at the 
same time trying to reconcile this task with its responsibility for upholding single market principles.  
However, what became clear was that the Commission took on this task by relying mainly on two 
of its policy tools, namely state aid supervision and the exercise of its merger control powers.  Other 
“traditional” crisis-busting tools, such as crisis cartels, did not feature in its tool box, thereby 
prompting the question of whether the application of the legal exception to forms of coordination 
designed to bring about industrial restructuring that had hitherto been employed in many economic 
sectors, may have become “relics” of the past.
          The limited purvey of this contribution does not allow for any in-depth analysis of the issues 
arising from the practice of the Commission, mainly developed in the 1980s and 1990s, to “exempt” 
prima facie anti-competitive agreements destined to deal with the consequences of systemic 
overcapacity (namely over capacity owed to the consequences of demand downturn and not to, e.g., 
inefficiencies inherent to the conduct of individual undertakings) from the sanction of nullity 
provided by Article 101(2) TFEU.19 As is well known, there have been cases in which rivals were 
allowed to jointly agree cuts of production if the dynamics of demand and supply cannot restore 
“normal” market conditions.20  However, in similar cases, since they result in concerted output 
reductions,21 the arrangements in question have been regarded as incompatible with the guiding 
principle of Article 101, namely that each undertaking must be able to determine independently its 
conduct on the market.22  Accordingly, the Commission’s practice developed in the sense of 
allowing restructuring deals to benefit from the legal exception of Article 101(3) TFEU only in 
limited circumstances.23  
       Paramount to this approach was the objective finding of the existence of industrial downturn; in 
addition, these arrangements were only allowed to be stipulated for a transient period.24  It must be 
shown that no lasting improvement can be forecast in the medium term in “normal” market 
conditions and that the cooperation entailed by the arrangement does not unduly restrain the 
freedom of the parties beyond what is strictly necessary to shed the overcapacity.25   In relation to 
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20 Ibid.; see also pp. 237-238.
21 See e.g. Commission Decision 84/380/EEC, Synthetic Fibres, 4 July 1984, [1984] OJ L207/17, para. 25-27.
22 See e.g. joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73, Suiker Unie and others v Commission, [1975] ECR 
I-1663, para. 173-175.
23 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
[2001] OJ C2, para. 25; see also para. 18-19.
24 See e.g. Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-41. For commentary,  inter alia, WHISH, 
Competition Law, 6th Ed., 2007: OUP, p. 600.
25 Commission XII Report on Competition Policy, para. 38-39. See also Commission XXIII Report on Competition 
Policy, para. 85.  
the first condition of the legal exception,26 it must be demonstrated that these practices are capable 
of eliminating excessive capacity and, consequently, of restoring efficiency and competitiveness in 
the industry.27  As to the second condition that the arrangement afford consumers a “fair share” of 
their benefits, the parties must prove that any negative impact of the arrangements is at least offset 
by its positive outcomes and thus overall “neutral” for consumer welfare.28  
         To satisfy the third condition of “indispensability”, it must be established that the alleged 
benefits of the agreement cannot be secured through any less restrictive means: the arrangement 
must be limited in its duration and geographic scope and must not hamper the freedom of action of 
the parties beyond what is required to achieve its goals.29  Finally, the agreement must not entail the 
elimination of substantial competition from the relevant market by weakening any existing rivalry 
to the point that the latter is no longer capable of restraining the parties’ freedom of action,30 e.g. by 
conferring on them significant market power and/or foreclosing the market vis-à-vis actual or 
potential rivals.31   
         The legal exception clause was applied by the Commission in a handful of cases, mainly in 
the 1980s and early 1900s, in order to “exempt” from the sanction of nullity a number of 
agreements designed to attain a concerted reduction in production in industries characterised by 
“structural oversupply” (as opposed to overproduction owed to inefficient behaviour of the 
undertakings concerned), so that greater efficiency and more “normal” competition patterns could 
be restored within a reasonably short period of time.  In cases such as Synthetic Fibres and Dutch 
Bricks, the Commission was prepared to accept that a number of rivals could agree on a plan of 
production cuts, despite these arrangements constituting a very serious infringement of Article 
101(1) TFEU by reason of their object, provided that strict requirements were met: first of all, the 
market had to be in a situation of ongoing crisis caused by factors beyond the control of the 
concerned undertakings and which could therefore only be resolved by concerted output 
reductions.32 Second, the arrangement must be limited in its duration and geographic scope33 and 
should not have been capable of totally curtailing any remaining competition.34  The Commission 
was especially concerned with ensuring that the arrangement preserved a certain degree of 
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28 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
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29 Ibid.; see also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 89.  For commentary, inter alia, FIEBIG, 
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at 614-615.
30 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, 
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31 Ibid.; see also Commission XXIII Report on Competition Policy, para. 89.
32 See e.g. Commission decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984—Synthetic Fibres (IV/30.810), [1984] OJ L207/17, para. 
28-29; see also para. 31-35.
33 Inter alia, Commission decision 94/296/ECof 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten (IV/34.456), [1994] OJ L131/15, 
para. 32-34.
34 Id., para. 39-40.  See also, mutatis mutandis, Commission decision 87/3/EEC of 4 December 1986—ENI/Montedison 
(IV/31.055), [1987] OJ L5/13, especially paras. 7-8, 21-22, 33-35.
“uncertainty” as to the parties’ future behaviour and did not prevent totally any residual competition 
originating from the conduct of other rivals.  
       Thus, it was held in Synthetic Fibres, for instance, that since the “market forces” had been 
unable to “achieve the capacity reductions necessary to re-establish and maintain” the long term 
competitiveness of the market, the agreed capacity reductions were likely to lead to the “needed 
structural adjustment”, thereby benefitting the industry’s performance in the long term.35  The 
Commission emphasised that these reductions would not have impacted on existing supply patterns, 
since any remaining capacity could have been operated more intensively, without leaving “gaps” of 
unmet demand.36  It also highlighted the circumstance that, by implementing the agreed cuts, each 
of the parties could have adopted more efficient industrial strategies, such as specialisation in 
specific types of supply, thus improving their performance in the long run.37  It was added that this 
would have been likely to benefit consumers as well, especially in as much as it could have allowed 
suppliers to produce better products as a result.38  
        As to the other “negative” conditions, the decision highlighted the circumstance that the parties 
remained free to determine future output and deliveries and that the agreement, in any event, was of 
limited duration and geographical scope; thus, the “indispensability” requirement was regarded as 
being fulfilled.39  As to the fourth condition, the Commission placed significant emphasis on the 
existence of other rivals vis-à-vis those affected by the agreement and on the relevant degree of 
product substitutability with other fibres, such as cotton and other natural materials, which in turn 
meant exposure to additional competitive pressure.40  Similar remarks were also made in the later 
Dutch Bricks decision: the Commission took the view that due to the ongoing, permanent state of 
over-capacity, none of the parties to the agreement could have, without the agreement of the others, 
restored more efficient supply conditions within the Dutch brick industry.41  In addition, and due to 
the same over-capacity, the agreed cuts could not have led to demand being unmet and, 
consequently, to appreciable price increases.42  
         The decision also found that the restrictions on the freedom of the parties were both 
indispensable and incapable of eliminating significant competition: in respect to the former 
condition, it was held that the arrangement was of limited duration and scope and did not prejudice 
the freedom of action of the parties beyond those obligations that were integral to it.43  And, as 
regards the latter requirement, the arrangement was found not to hamper the competitive pressure 
originating from other rivals, especially those established in other Member States; the decision also 
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36 Id., para. 34-35.
37 Ibid.; see also para.36-37.
38 Id., para. 39.
39 Id., para. 43-44.
40 Id., para. 51-52.
41 Commission decision 94/296/ECof 29 April 1994—Stichting Baaksten (IV/34.456), [1994] OJ L131/15, para. 19-28.  
42 Id., para. 26-27.
43 Id., para. 33; see also para. 35-36.
emphasised that the arrangement affected only the element of supply, thus not affecting other 
elements of competitive importance.44
          Although the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to mutually agreed output reductions was 
met with concern by some commentators, on the ground that it could have resulted in an 
excessively wide reading of the “efficiency gains” condition and in particular in incorporating “non-
economic” elements in this analysis,45 it has since been considered as an “acceptable” use of the 
legal exception.46  
         In light of the above, it could be argued that, with the advent of the financial crisis, Article 
101(3) TFEU could have provided a flexible and overall effective instrument to cope with the 
aftershocks of the “credit squeeze”, especially when the latter started to adversely affect the “real 
economy”.  However, it is apparent that no decisions such as the one in Dutch Bricks were adopted. 
How can this apparent “gap” be explained? It is suggested that ti may have to do with factors that 
are specific to Article 101 TFEU as well as with reasons that are more related to general trends 
characterising the enforcement of competition law as a whole.  In respect to the latter, it is 
unquestionable that over the past 20 years a clear condemnation of cartel behaviour has been 
inspiring the enforcement activity of the Commission, as well as justifying the closer and more 
active involvement of the national competition agencies: this is especially visible in the 
multiplication of leniency programmes across the Union, a phenomenon which in turn has resulted 
in a far more incisive detection activity, and also in the higher level of fines imposed on the 
undertakings found to have engaged in anticompetitive behaviour.  Additional factors, such as the 
criminalisation of cartel behaviour in a number of jurisdictions, and the strengthening of the 
investigative powers conferred to the competition authorities within the EU, may be seen as 
contributing to an altogether more “sceptical” view that forms of coordination among competitors, 
however “benign” their objectives may be, may actually be seen as “acceptable” from a competition 
law standpoint.  
           It is submitted that this “mistrust” of prima facie “crisis cartel” arrangements was especially 
apparent in the Court of Justice of the EU’s preliminary ruling in the case of Barry Brothers.47  The 
facts of this case are well known: a number of Irish beef producers sought to tackle a long standing 
and externally certified state of over-capacity, characterising the industry, by agreeing a timetable of 
plant closures and decommissioning; in addition, they undertook not to sell their plants to new-
comers, to engage again in processing or production activities.48  They also stipulated to pay those 
undertakings that had agreed to leave the industry altogether, in order to effect the production cuts, 
a certain amount of money per head cattle, thus, in substance, “buying out” the market share of the 
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“leavers”.49  Following a decision of the Irish Competition Authority, which condemned the 
arrangement as a restriction of competition ‘by object’, proceedings were instituted before the Irish 
Courts, with the respondents, the Beef Industry Development Society (BIDS) being successful 
before the High Court: in his judgment, Mr Justice McKechnie opined that since the arrangement 
had been stipulated for a “good cause” and could not be “fitted” into any of the agreements 
identified by the Treaty as ‘by object’ violations, no such infringement could be found.50
           However, on appeal a reference was made to the Court of Justice who rejected the “literal” 
approach to Article 101(1) suggested by McKechnie J and took the different view that each prima 
facie anti-competitive agreement should be examine in its own context and having regard to its 
object and purpose;51 in this respect, the fact that the arrangement pursued, along with anti-
competitive goals, other legitimate objectives, or that the parties had no intention to curb 
competition, would not be sufficient to exclude it from the scope of the prohibition.52   
        The Court of Justice examined the agreement and found that the latter allowed the parties, who 
together controlled 90% of the market, to ‘achieve their minimum efficient scale’ and boost 
profitability53 via a ‘common policy’ designed to reduce the industry’s structural overcapacity by 
25% and based on incentives aimed at encouraging some rivals to leave the market, with inevitable 
increases in its concentration.54  It therefore took the view that the agreement permitted them to 
swap concerted action to the “fierce rivalry” that could have been expected of “normal” market 
dynamics, and therefore shielded them from the effects of normal competition, which overtime 
would have allowed them to “shed” the excess capacity by excluding less efficient rivals.55   In the 
Court’s view, the anti-competitive nature of the content and purpose of this arrangement was further 
reinforced by the clauses concerning the limitations on the freedom of the parties as regards the 
utilisation and the sale of decommissioned plants and by the imposition of levies on the staying 
undertakings, designed to “compensate” the parties that had accepted to leave the market.56  It was 
held that these clauses resulted in the Irish beef market being foreclosed to external pressure—by 
preventing new comers from entering it via the acquisition of existing plan—and in the market 
shares per each of the party being “frozen” artificially for the time stipulated in the agreement.57  
         It is suggested that Barry Brothers constitutes a “milestone” in the evolution of the Court of 
Justice’s approach to Article 101 TFEU since it confirmed that the analysis of each restriction of 
competition within the spectrum of the “prohibition clause” should take place having regard 
exclusively to its content and purpose and therefore without referring to the “intention of the 
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51 Id., para. 16-17.
52 Id., para. 21. 
53 Id., para. 32.
54 Id., para. 33.
55 Id., para. 33, 35.
56 Id., para. 36-37.
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parties” or indeed to any “external” considerations.58  In this context, the Court emphasised that 
certain restraints, such as those resulting in output restrictions, should be regarded as unlawful by 
their object since they were contrary to the very goal of Article 101 (i.e. the protection of the 
freedom of action on the market, recognised to each undertaking) and affected a key aspect of 
competition, namely supply patterns.59  Perhaps most importantly, it reiterated that any “non-
economic” considerations, such as inter alia the need to pursue industrial restructuring, should only 
be relevant to the extent that they fitted the “paradigm” of the four conditions of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.60
            Against this background it may be queried what significance, if any, Barry Brothers could 
have for the legal treatment of prima facie “crisis cartels” today.  It is acknowledged that, due to the 
scope of the reference made by the Irish High Court, the Court of Justice did not deal with the 
question of whether the arrangement, despite featuring all the hallmarks of a “serious” infringement 
by reason of its object, could have benefitted from the application of the legal exception.61  It may 
also be wondered whether, in this specific context, cases such as Dutch Bricks or Synthetic Fibres 
still constitute “good law” to that effect.62  In respect to the question of whether the BIDS 
arrangement could in principle have been “redeemed” through the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU, two considerations can be made: the first is that in principle implementing “successful” 
industrial restructuring could be regarded as constituting a form of technical or economic progress, 
within the spirit of the first of the four conditions, and could potentially also benefit consumers, 
since it may lead, over time, to more efficient processes and better products.63  
         The second point, however, is that whatever “benefits” of these kinds the arrangement could 
have led to, they would appear unlikely to fulfil also the two “negative” conditions of the legal 
exception, i.e. the requirements of “indispensability” and of “non-elimination of competition”: in 
respect to the former, it could be argued that the provision for “compensation fees”, provided to 
“leaving firms” as an incentive to stay away from the market, taken together with the scope of the 
agreement and the resulting increase in concentration, were clearly disproportionate to the aim (i.e. 
restructuring of the market into a more efficient structure) that the BIDS sought to achieve, a goal 
which could have been attained through less restrictive means, e.g. without a compensation 
mechanism.64  As to the latter, it is clear from the ruling that the agreement resulted in the Irish beef 
market being de facto insulated from the rest of the single market for a significant period of time, 
due to the wide-ranging limitations placed on each of the parties as to their ability to dispose of the 
decommissioned factories.65  Although it was argued that they remained free to determine their 
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market strategies within the Irish market, and could also compete reciprocally as regards important 
aspects of their business,66 it is undeniable that the BIDS members had succeeded in freezing their 
market shares and in “locking out” any external competitive pressure, thus shielding their position 
from any remaining actual or potential competition.67
           In light of the above, it is argued that Barry Brothers represents a strong restatement of a 
rather “orthodox” view of Article 101(1) and especially of the notion of “restriction by object” 
contained in it, as encompassing all restraints that, by reason of their “content and purpose” and 
having regard especially to the underlying aim of Article 101 TFEU as a whole, are so serious as to 
merit being caught by the prohibition without any assessment of their impact on the market:68 it is 
suggested that in Barry Brothers the Court of Justice was struck by the serious nature of the 
arrangement (i.e. one entailing a concerted restriction of output, coupled with clauses designed to 
protect a national market from outside pressure) and was guided by the concern for upholding the 
“economic freedom” rationale of the Treaty competition rules, a factor which, in turn, could be 
regarded as consistent with the strong condemnation of cartel behaviour as well as with a clear 
mistrust of all forms of collusion that had an “appreciable” impact on rivalry.69
        It is submitted that the above considerations provide us with the material for an answer to the 
more general question of whether the old case law on crisis cartels could be considered still as 
“good law”, which may be usefully deployed in order to provide an additional competition law tool 
to tackle the effects of the economic crisis.  It may be argued that while it may be tempting for 
undertakings operating in “ailing industries” to seek to engage in forms of coordinated output 
rationalisation, the BIDS ruling does not seem to encourage similar arrangements, in as much as it 
appears to put the “reasons of rivalry” before any considerations for the “viability” of specific 
sectors that may be going through “tough” times characterised by overcapacity.70  It could be argued 
that, in light of the Court’s decision, the “preferred way” for dealing with the “dire straits” of any 
industrial crisis would be for each competitor to engage in independent, unilateral rationalisation as 
opposed to rivals “agreeing their way out of recession”.71  Accordingly, it is suggested that while 
decisions such as Synthetic Fibres and Dutch Bricks could have been justified in light of their 
factual circumstances and could have been consistent with the demands of crises peculiar to specific 
industries at the time in which they were adopted, they may no longer be consistent with the trends 
and the needs of competition policy as the latter has developed to this day.  Thus, it may be doubted 
that their approach may constitute a useful “blueprint” for competition policy tools to be deployed 
to deal with the aftershocks of the economic crisis for “real” sectors of the economy.72
        It is concluded that while Article 101(3) provides in principle a framework within which the 
positive effects of prima facie anti-competitive arrangements, including public policy objectives, 
can be assessed with a view to waiving the sanction of nullity of Article 101(2), it may not provide 
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a suitable answer to the need to deal with the effects of the economic downturn in Europe: as the 
brief analysis conducted so far has shown, the almost unanimous condemnation of cartel behaviour 
and consequently the more general distrust for any form of collusion having appreciably restrictive 
effects on competition support the view that allowing rivals to “agree their way out of a crisis” may 
not constitute an appropriate instrument for competition policy when it comes to tackling the effects 
of the credit squeeze on the “real economy”, and could therefore explain the preference of the 
Commission for other tools, such as state aid oversight and the application of the merger control 
rules.  Thus, the next section will analyse the approach adopted by the Commission in these areas 
with a view to assessing the overall effectiveness of its role of “guardian of the single market” albeit 
in challenging times.
3. New challenges, new responses? Adapting the existing "toolbox" to the demands of the financial 
and economic crisis
3.1. State aids in times of crisis: “rescue and restructuring” banks and beyond…
The previous section analysed briefly the question of whether Article 101 TFEU and especially the 
legal exception provided by its paragraph 3 can provide tools to tackle the consequences of the 
economic crisis.  It was argued that, while “crisis cartel” could have been regarded as an 
“acceptable” option in the 1980s and 1990s, they no longer appeal consistent with current trends 
and approaches underlying the application of the cartel prohibition to specific cases.  As was 
illustrated in relation to the Barry Brothers preliminary ruling, any arrangement aimed at allowing 
rivals to “agree their way out of recession” is likely to be met with considerable scepticism, if not 
with an outright condemnation, by the authorities competent for the application of the competition 
rules.  This section will instead be concerned with addressing the questions arising from the 
application of state aid rules to the rescue and restructuring of undertakings in crisis, not just in the 
financial sector, but also in the “real economy”.
           The limited purvey of this work does not allow an examination of the framework provided 
by the Treaty for the purpose of overseeing the involvement of the Member States in the economy 
and more specifically of the rules designed to prevent the granting of aid, via state resources, that 
may distort competition within the single market.73  Suffices to say that, according to Article 107(1) 
TFEU, any form of assistance, coming from public funds which may favour specific undertaking or 
the production of certain goods or services, thereby adversely affecting, actually or potentially, 
competition on the common market, is incompatible with the rules of the Treaty and therefore, with 
limited exceptions, prohibited.74  However, as Article 107(2) and (3) make clear, there are some 
types of aid that are compatible with the common market: financial assistance designed, for 
instance, “to make good the damage caused by natural disasters” is automatically considered lawful. 
Other types of aid can nonetheless regarded as compatible with the Treaty: it will be up to the 
European Commission, upon notification on the part of the Member State concerned, to decide 
whether the aid in question, whether granted via a “scheme” or via “individual” assistance, to 
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decide whether this is the case.75  Article 109 further empowers the Council to enact measures 
designed to “exempt” specific forms of aid from the duty to notify in issue; the Commission is also 
entrusted with the necessary powers of implementation in relation to the categories of “exempted 
aid”.76
        Importantly, Article 108(3) imposes a duty on the notifying Member State to abstain from 
giving effect to the aid until such time as the procedure designed for its control has been 
completed;77 according to Article 108, this procedure is articulated in a “preliminary” examination, 
to be completed within two months, at the end of which the Commission may decide that either the 
assistance does not constitute “aid” within the meaning of the Treaty, or that it does not appear to be 
anti-competitive.  In any other case, the Commission will initiate a formal procedure, entailing a 
full examination of the proposed measure, and assisted by inter partes procedural guarantees.78  
         As to the actual approach to the assessment of the aid, the case law indicates that the 
Commission enjoys a certain degree of discretion when approving aid under Article 107(2) and (3) 
TFEU.79  In this context, it will not take into account the “intention of the parties”, i.e. whether the 
state, in granting the aid, pursued deliberately the goal of giving “targeted” financial assistance to 
the recipient, in whatever form.80  Nor will it take into consideration, for the purpose of considering 
a certain form of assistance ‘aid’, whether the latter pursued a “good cause”, i.e. the attainment of 
public policy goals.81  What is, instead relevant is the extent to which any form of financial 
assistance is such that it favours the recipient by conferring to her advantages that she could not 
have obtained according to normal market conditions.82  At the heart of this assessment is the 
“ordinary investor” concept, according to which financial support only constitutes aid if the terms 
under which it is granted by a public body would not be acceptable for a private entity operating 
within the free market.83  
        If these conditions are met, aid will be considered contrary to the Treaty if it is “selective”, i.e. 
if it favours the recipient vis-à-vis other entities that are in a comparable position, thus conferring to 
the former a competitive advantage.84  This will be the case especially if the measure results in 
“mitigating the charges that are normally included in the budget of an undertaking”, thus putting it 
in a more favourable financial position than non-recipients.85 By contrast, financial advantages 
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stemming from the implementation of “general schemes” will not be regarded as aid that can distort 
competition, provided that they are “open to all economic agents” and operated in accordance with 
“proper objective criteria”.86  In this context, the manner in which the individual measures were 
construed and in particular the extent to which they result in specific undertakings or economic 
sectors being favoured will be especially important.87  
       As to whether aid is capable of distorting rivalry on the market or it threatens to do so, the 
Court of Justice held in Commission v Italy that this assessment must be conducted bearing in mind 
the goal of the relevant Treaty rules, i.e. the objective of preventing Member States from favouring 
certain undertakings or the supply of specific goods or services and thereby seeking to interfere 
with the “normal” functioning of competition within the common market.88  In this context, whether 
the measure sought to achieve goals of public interest, including, e.g. social protection, was not 
regarded as relevant:89 what was, instead, central was the extent to which the financial assistance in 
question could reduce the ability of rivals to the recipient to expand their position on the market or 
new rivals to attempt to enter the market.90  For this purpose, the Commission will have to conduct 
a counterfactual analysis, by comparing the conditions of competition that characterised the relevant 
market before to those occurring after the aid was granted.91  
       According to Article 107(2) TFEU, some forms of aid are compatible with the Treaty: such is 
the case for, inter alia, certain forms of financial assistance targeted at social objectives, aid aimed 
at compensating the consequences of natural disasters and assistance for certain areas of Germany 
affected by the reunification: in authorising aid under this provision, the Commission enjoys very 
limited powers of appreciation, being able only to scrutinise the notified measures to ensure that 
they meet the criteria provided by the Treaty and are not disproportionate to the goals they seek to 
achieve or contrary to the general principles of EU law or other rules of the Treaty.92    Article 
107(3) provides a further basis for approval of notified aid: in light of this provision the 
Commission can authorise state financial assistance aimed at supporting "development of certain 
regions or certain areas of the economy", at allowing the realisation of "projects of common 
European interest" and at preserving and promoting culture.93  In addition, the Commission may 
authorise aid that is necessary to prevent and limit the impact of a "serious disturbance" in the 
European economy.  Unlike under Article 107(2) TFEU, however, the Commission enjoys wide 
discretion in examining the impact of the aid on competition and the extent to which any distortion, 
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whether actual or threatened, is limited to what is indispensable to achieve the aim pursued by the 
notifying Member State.94    
         The role and scope of state aid control has evolved overtime, to respond to the changing 
economic conditions across the EU and to the challenges posed by globalisation and by the ensuing 
need, expressed in 2000 with the Lisbon strategy, to secure efficiency, openness and 
competitiveness of the European economy.95  Consistent with this goal was therefore the resolve of 
the Member States to reduce the scope of their intervention in the economy and to destine public 
resources to "more horizontal objectives of common interest" as well as the call for a stricter 
scrutiny of notified aid.96  As a result, the Commission reshaped its approach to the scrutiny of aid, 
by privileging financial assistance destined to support, inter alia, innovation as well as boosting the 
activity of small and medium sized enterprises;97 in addition, it sought to identify more "virtuous" 
forms of aid by means of Notices and Guidelines as well as via the enactment of Block Exemption 
Regulations, in accordance with Articles 108 and 109 TFEU.98 
         The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy had also a significant impact on the approach to 
aid destined to facilitating the "rescuing and restructuring of firms in difficulty".99  Already 
perceived as distortive by the Commission, on the ground that it could be used to "prop up" 
artificially inherently "inefficient" competitors, to the detriment of more "virtuous" market players, 
this form of financial assistance was strictly limited to "exceptional" cases.100  According to the 
2004 Guidelines, the Commission had to be satisfied that any State assistance was aimed at a "firm 
in difficulty", i.e. an undertaking that is unable with its own wherewithal to "stem losses which, 
without outside intervention (...) [would] almost certainly condemn it to going out of business in the 
short or medium term".101  In this context, whereas "rescue aid" is "by nature temporary and 
reversible" and limited to "keeping the firm afloat" for the time required to work out a restructuring 
strategy or a plan for liquidation,102 "restructuring aid" is inherently of a "longer term nature" and is 
authorised only if it is accompanied by a "feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan" destined to bring 
the firm "back in business and to allow it to operate without support.103 
           To deserve approval rescue aid must consist of "liquidity support" such as loans or 
guarantees granted at an interest rate that would normally be charged to "sound" enterprises and be 
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justified on the grounds of "serious social difficulties", as well as being unable to adversely affect 
competition in other Member States to a significant extent; it should also be repaid within six 
months of the first rata being paid to the recipient and its amount should also be strictly limited to 
what is necessary "to keep the firm in business" for the required period.104  In addition, the Member 
State concerned is obliged to provide, within the same six month period, the Commission with a 
"restructuring plan or a liquidation plan or proof that the loan has been reimbursed in full" or that 
the guarantees have been terminated by the same deadline.105
        The approach to "restructuring aid" is, instead, more complex: according to the Guidelines, aid 
will only be authorised once in ten years and if the notification is accompanied by a restructuring 
plan detailing "appropriate" measures destined to bring the firm back to operating viably on the 
market within the shortest time possible.106  In addition "compensatory measures", such as, inter 
alia, the divestiture of assets or reductions of capacity or of its market share must be adopted in 
order to ensure that any distortions of competition are kept to a minimum and that in particular "the 
positive effects outweigh the negative ones".107  The aid recipient is also obliged to make a 
"significant own contribution" to the restructuring costs (50% at a minimum).108  In all, the Rescue 
and Restructuring Guidelines, in light of the objectives set in Lisbon in 2000, sought to achieve 
greater competitiveness in the EU economy and to respond to the need to limit the intervention of 
the Member States only to cases in which aid was truly "the only way out of a crisis" for 
undertakings which it can be demonstrated are capable of returning to long term viability within a 
reasonably short term.109  In particular, it was emphasised that to keep distortion of competition to a 
minimum the recipient is normally required to make "painful sacrifices" not just via the obligation 
to make a "significant own contribution" to the costs of its own restructuring, but also via the 
acceptance of often pervasive limits on its business freedom, such as, inter alia, the undertaking to 
close down "profitable branches" or to divest key assets, in order to limit its transient competitive 
advantage vis-a-vis other rivals.110
            Paramount to the scrutiny of rescue and restructuring aid was, as was apparent from the 
Commission’s own communications, a clear distrust for financial assistance targeted at failing 
undertakings and, more generally, the concern for limiting state intervention only to the most 
“critical” (especially due to the potential social drawbacks) and at the same time more “promising” 
cases.  It was against this background that the Commission was faced with the demands and the 
concerns posed by the unravelling of the financial crisis.  As was explained in section 2.1, after 
initially adopting a “spectator” position vis-à-vis the crisis developments, the Commission sought to 
intervene more actively in managing its consequences not only for the financial and banking sector, 
but also (as will be illustrated in the following subsection) in the “real economy”, which was also 
increasingly challenged by the poor availability of credit.  
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       In the first phase of the financial crisis, following the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and leading 
up and including the fall of the investment bank Lehmann Brothers, the Commission had witnessed 
several Member States taking direct action to rescue banks and financial institutions, ranging from 
the grant of guarantees and loans for recapitalisation to the outright nationalisation of some of the 
most distressed institutions. Thus, for instance, in the Northern Rock/Bank of England case the 
Commission de facto avoided adopting a decision on the liquidity line granted by the UK central 
bank to the financial institution Northern Rock on the ground that this type of financial assistance 
did not constitute “aid” within the meaning of the Treaty.111  The Commission took the view that 
since Northern Rock was still able to meet its liabilities at the time in which the line was granted 
and the latter had been provided at the Bank of England’s own initiative, this measure did not 
trigger the application of Article 107 TFEU:112 it was emphasised that, in any event, the grant of this 
short term credit facility had been backed by “high quality” guarantee and was accompanied by the 
obligation on the part of the recipient to pay “punitive interest rates”.113  
         However, the initially “conservative approach”, characterised by the application of the Rescue 
and Restructuring Guidelines discussed so far, was replaced by a far more proactive attitude to 
dealing with the consequences of the crisis.  In this respect, the “turning point” was represented by 
the conclusions adopted by the ECOFIN ministers on 7 October 2008.114 At that meeting it was 
agreed that state financial “interventions should be timely” and of limited duration; Member States 
should remain “watchful regarding the interests of taxpayers” as well as capable of determining a 
change in management; and shareholders of institutions in crisis should “bear the due consequences 
of the intervention”.115  Paramount to these conclusions was the recognition that the crisis had 
become “systemic”, i.e. had become capable of not only leading to the downfall of “unstable” 
banks, but also to adversely affect “fundamentally sound” financial institutions.116  At the same 
time, however, the Ministers expressed the view that any aid targeted at supporting failing banks 
should, despite being granted at national level, be inspired by “common EU principles” and in 
particular uphold principles of openness and non-discrimination, especially vis-à-vis non-European 
institutions.117
        Thus on 13 October 2008 the Commission issued a Communication concerning the application 
of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current 
global financial crisis (hereinafter referred to as the Banking Communication).118  The 
Communication laid down the approach that the Commission would apply in scrutinising the state 
aid measures destined to troubled financial institutions occupying a “systemically relevant” position 
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within the market.119   The framework proposed in the Banking Communication was expressly 
regarded as a derogation from the generally applicable Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and the 
powers of assessment exercised by the Commission in this specific respect were based on Article 
107(3)(b), i.e. on the provision conferring on the Commission the power to assess and approve aid 
destined to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”.120   According to the 
Communication, this requirement had been fulfilled due to the nature of the crisis and in particular 
to the real and grave danger that the overall financial system of the EU Members could be 
jeopardised as a result of the credit squeeze.121
       On this point, a number of commentators emphasised that this legal basis, which had only been 
relied upon rarely by the Commission, entailed a rather wide power of appreciation when it came to 
examining individual aid proposals: it was argued that by justifying its action in light of this clause, 
the Commission had been able to depart from its general approach, enshrined in the 2004 R&R 
Guidelines, for the purpose of meeting the goals and expectations set at the 2008 ECOFIN Council 
Meeting.122 As a result, it could adopt decisions in accordance with a more flexible set of criteria 
and “wave through” those forms of financial aid that aimed at attaining goals going “beyond 
competition”, such as the “restoration of long term profitability” of a hitherto “troubled” bank,123 
thereby limiting the adverse consequences of the current financial disturbance.124  At the same time, 
however, the Commission was profoundly conscious of the need to carefully “calibrate” the scope 
and the nature of this financial intervention and in particular of the need to send a clear message 
that its approach would be limited only to “genuinely exceptional circumstances” in which the 
financial instability of one institution would threaten the “entire functioning of the financial 
markets”.125  The Commission was especially concerned with preventing individual member states 
from relying on the “serious financial disturbance” ground to “prop up” national champions.126  
          As was anticipated, this cautious attitude had been rather apparent in the practice preceding 
the downfall of Lehmann Brothers in which the Commission had shown significant scepticism at 
the circumstance that the overall stability of the banking sector within a Member State could be 
threatened by the crisis engulfing a single institution.127  Accordingly, it had been slow to authorise 
under Article 107(3)(b) financial assistance targeted at a specific bank, preferring, instead, to apply 
the rather restrictive standards laid down in the general R&R Guidelines.128  However, the events of 
September 2008 brought into sharp focus the fact that even the instability of one operator could 
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provoke bank runs and, more generally, undermine the overall solidity of the banking sector within 
the notifying Member State, in appropriate circumstances.129   
        This change in approach, albeit accompanied by considerable caution, to the application of 
Article 107(3)(b) was made apparent in the Roskilde decision, adopted shortly after he issuing of 
the Banking Communication: in that decision, concerning the grant of liquidation aid to Roskilde 
Bank, the Commission held that this type of financial assistance, which constituted “aid” within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, was compatible with Article107(3)(b), on the ground that it had 
been designed to address the risks arising from the winding up of Roskilde Bank for the overall 
stability of the Danish banking system.130  
         However, the decision highlighted the inherently “exceptional” nature of this type of 
assistance and the ensuing need to scrutinise it carefully, especially as to its “appropriateness” and 
“proportionality”.131  On this specific point, it should be emphasised that, despite not being 
applicable to the case, some of the general principles laying at the core of the “ordinary” R&R 
Guidelines should guide the assessment of liquidation aid to the extent that this is necessary to 
integrate the approach adopted by the Banking Communication.132  More generally, it may be 
suggested that, although the 2008 Communication sought to make the approach to state aid 
supervision in the banking sector more flexible and thereby more responsive to the challenges of the 
post-Lehmann crisis.  Thus, the Commission emphasised at the outset that these emergency 
measures would only be approved within the banking sector and especially to tackle the 
consequences that the crisis could have for the economy of the notifying Member State as a 
whole.133 Also, while “individual” assistance could be granted, subject to approval on a case-by 
case basis, the Communication seemed to prefer “aid schemes” that could be accessed, at least in 
principle, by all institutions, in accordance with objective and non-discriminatory access criteria.134 
In addition, any measure could only be of limited duration and even though it could have been 
difficult to predict the length of time for which it may have been required, it should have been 
subjected to monitoring and review at regular, short intervals.135  
          As to the eligibility for this type of aid, the Commission drew a distinction between “illiquid 
but otherwise financially sound” undertakings and those institutions who were “troubled” due to 
“endogenous” factors.  In respect to the former, it was held that since their instability was owed to 
the impact of the present circumstances on their management, rather than to, e.g. “excessive risk 
taking”, any distortion of competition likely to follow from the grant of aid would have been limited 
and the scope of the intervention itself would have been narrower.136  By contrast, granting financial 
assistance to banks or financial institutions who were experiencing turmoil due to “poor 
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management” or “reckless choices” in respect to assets would have required a far more careful 
examination, due to their greater intensity and, consequently to the greater likelihood that they 
would result in significant distortion of competition.137  On this point, the Communication stated 
that, in principle, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines should remain applicable to these forms 
of aid: consequently, the notifying state would remain obliged to provide a “restructuring plan”, 
whose approval is subject to the existence of appropriate compensatory measures and to the giving 
of a suitable and proportionate “own contribution”.138  
        By contrast, aid targeted at “sound but illiquid” institutions is made subject to the 
Communication’s less stringent conditions.  In principle, according to the 2008 Communication, aid 
should be “well-targeted”, that is, capable of effectively address a serious economic disturbance; it 
should be “proportionate” to the objective being sought and “not going beyond what is required” to 
achieve this goal; and finally, it should be “designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill-
over effects” on rivals, other economic areas or other Member States.139
        To achieve these objectives, the Commission took the view that eligibility for aid, in the form 
of either guarantees or loans aimed at recapitalising the recipient, should be determined in light of 
objective and non-discriminatory criteria and be available to both institutions incorporated in the 
territory of the Member State concerned and institutions which have “significant activities” 
therein.140 These guarantees should only cover certain types of liabilities, such as, inter alia, retail 
deposits, which are to be selected having regard to the nature of the difficulties experienced by the 
institution and to what is “necessary to confront the relevant aspects of the current financial crisis”, 
ostensibly to avoid “generating moral hazard” and thereby aggravate the crisis itself.141  Any form 
of financial assistance should also be granted for a limited period of time: although, in derogation 
from the R&R guidelines, there is no fixed deadline of 6 months for repayment, the Communication 
states that any measure should be subjected to regular review at least every six months.142  
         In addition, any financial contribution should be “limited to a minimum”, that is, it should 
“ensure an adequate private sector contribution from the beneficiaries and/or the sector” to its costs, 
in the form of “adequate remuneration” or, if required, of the “coverage of at least a considerable 
part of the outstanding liabilities incurred” by the recipient.143  Finally, to avoid or at least minimize 
any distortion of competition resulting from the aid, the latter must entail the imposition of 
“appropriate mechanisms to minimise (…) the potential abuse of the preferential situations of 
beneficiaries” and also limiting the risk of moral hazard.144  These “safeguards” can entail 
behavioural constraints, aimed especially at preventing aggressive expansion by the beneficiary, the 
introduction of limits as to the latter’s market share or presence in the industry or as to its ability to 
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engage in “advertising invoking the guaranteed status” or the “prohibition of conduct (…) 
irreconcilable with the purpose” of the assistance, such as, e.g., issuing new “stock options for 
management”.145 
        The Communication also makes clear that, state aid being temporary even in these cases, its 
supply must be accompanied by the provision of “necessary adjustment measures for the sector”, 
including, if appropriate, the liquidation of some of the beneficiaries.146  In this specific respect, 
when assistance is given as part of a recapitalisation scheme, the Commission will ensure that the 
results of the operation are “coherent” with those arising from an “ordinary” recapitalisation, i.e. 
one authorised in accordance with the R&R Guidelines, to account for the circumstance that these 
types of operation are, by their very nature, an irreversible impact on the market.147  
         The Banking Communication was followed by a number of Guidelines dealing with specific 
forms of aid to financial institutions, ranging from recapitalisation to the management of “impaired 
assets”.148  These documents are destined to supplement the discipline contained in the Banking 
Communication and, in that context, provide additional requirements for the purpose of obtaining 
the authorisation of notified aid: for instance, the 2009 Restructuring Communication makes clear 
that the notifying Member States must provide a “viability report” in order to demonstrate that, 
through the provision of the aid, the bank will be restored to long-term ability to conduct safely its 
business.149 
         Thus, in the Aegon decision, for instance, the Commission emphasised that the report should 
explain the weaknesses and the difficulties characterising the aid recipient;150 it should also 
illustrate what measures the latter proposes to adopt in order to address them and show how the 
recipient is going to return to long term viability, that is, which measures it is going to put in place 
in order to become capable, once again, of meeting its liabilities and, in particular, to cover all its 
costs and to secure an “adequate” return on capital.151  Consequently, it was suggested that, while 
the Banking Communication and its “supplementary” documents aim to respond to the demands of 
the crisis by promoting a more flexible and in many ways relatively more “generous” approach to 
aid scrutiny, the Commission is likely to conduct a very thorough inquiry as to how these more 
lenient criteria are met in each case and for this purpose it is going to require the aid recipients to 
provide an exhaustive and sound case in support of intervention, by demonstrating how, in detail, 
they are going to restore their business activities to long term viability.152 
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         Importantly, the Commission also undertook to provide clearance of new aid measures 
destined to prevent spill-over effects stemming from the lack of confidence in the financial sectors 
very rapidly, sometimes even overnight.  A very important example of the quicker and more 
streamlined administrative arrangements was represented by the 2008 approval of the aid scheme 
proposed by the UK authorities for the purpose of propping up its own baking sector, which was 
imperilled as a result of excessive credit exposure and use of leverage.153  The notified package 
comprised a recapitalisation and a guarantee scheme along with the provision of short term 
liquidity.154  In its decision the Commission confirmed the UK Government assessment of the scope 
and the depth of the crisis and took the view that the risks that the lack of liquidity could have for 
the British economy at large were such as to justify the application of Article 107(3)(b).155 
        Thereafter, the Commission assessed the aid package and found that it fulfilled the three 
parameters of “appropriateness”, “necessity” and “proportionality”: first of all, all the measures 
were available to all the “solvent” financial undertakings whose stability may be jeopardised by the 
credit squeeze; second, the assistance was limited in its duration and scope, as well as securing to 
the state an “adequate return on its investment”. And finally, the recipients had to accept significant 
limitations in their business freedom, designed to prevent them from engaging in “aggressive 
expansion” and in strategies that could irremediably distort competition to their advantage.156  As 
was anticipated in section 2.1, the British authorities were especially concerned with reinforcing the 
stability of the Lloyds Banking Group, following its takeover of Halifax/Bank of Scotland.157  As 
will be considered in more detail further below, Lloyds had acquired HBoS, which faced serious 
risks of bankruptcy due to its aggressive lending practices and its excessive use of leveraging: to 
ensure the overall stability of the merged entity, the British Authorities allowed the Lloyds Banking 
Group to benefit from the domestic Asset Protection Scheme, designed to refund part of Lloyds’ 
losses and to provide state guarantees to back the issuing of new shares.  The recipient also 
undertook to provide a significant own contribution toward covering the costs for restructuring and 
to divest significant portions of its portfolio of activities, especially in the retail banking sector, so 
as to allow a new entrant to penetrate this market segment and thereby facilitate the intensification 
of competition.158  
          Following the publication of the Banking Communication, the “impaired asset relief 
measure” was eventually approved, together with a restructuring plan, in December 2009:159 the 
Commission took the view that thanks to the assistance provided by the British Treasury, the 
recipient could have returned to long term viability as well as reacquired the confidence of the 
markets, by “shedding” the riskiest assets and upholding “good management” practices.160  It was 
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emphasised that, both to avoid moral hazard and limiting undue distortions of competition, the 
recipient would undertake to contribute significantly to the value of the aid and also to divest key 
elements of its most profitable businesses.161
           Similar concerns also guided the Commission’s decision in respect to the joint guarantee 
scheme granted by Luxembourg, Belgium and France in order to support the stability of Dexia, 
another financial institution active in the banking and insurance markets: Dexia was heavily 
exposed on the stock market and held risky assets which in turn, due to the impact of the financial 
crisis, could jeopardise its stability and thereby creating a serious systemic risk for the whole 
market.162  
         In November 2008 the Commission, in accordance with the Banking Communication’s 
requirements, approved the provision of the joint guarantee.  It was held that the notified financial 
assistance would facilitate Dexia in accessing the finance required to reinforce its stability and 
thereby restore confidence of the market and of consumers in the recipient’s viability;163 it would 
also be limited in time and scope and remunerated on the basis of an interest rate determined in 
light of the ECB’s recommendations, thus complying with requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.164  Importantly, the aid to Dexia was approved very swiftly for an initial six-month 
period, subject to continuous supervision and, if the requirements in question continued to be 
complied with, to the submission of a restructuring plan securing the bank’s return to long term 
viability.165  Full approval of the guarantee was eventually obtained, subject to conditions, in March 
2009.166
         In light of the forgoing, it is suggested that the framework made up of the 2008 Banking 
Communication and of its “supplementary” Notices are designed to allow the Commission to 
reconcile the integrity of the Common Market principles with the demands of managing the 
aftershocks of the financial crisis in Europe and especially to prevent individual states from 
“championing” domestic financial institutions to the detriment of institutions whose seat was 
located elsewhere in the common market.167    At the heart of the Commission’s effort is a concern 
for limiting the distortions caused by the granting of “selective” aid to banks on the part of public 
authorities, through the imposition of strict time limit as to the duration of the assistance, the 
application of objective and non-discriminatory eligibility criteria and the provision for an adequate 
“private sector contribution” to the costs of recapitalisation and restructuring of financial 
institutions in crisis.168  
           It is however clear that, to attain these objectives, the Banking Communication carved a 
number of exceptions to the approach generally applicable to rescue and restructuring operations 
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and enshrined in the 2004 Guidelines: first of all, the framework established in the 2008 document 
is applicable not just to failing” institutions which may require “rescue aid”, but also to banks which 
were “fundamentally sound but illiquid”, due to factors beyond their control.169  A second 
derogation concerns the nature of the aid: as was noted earlier, under the 2004 Guidelines, only 
rescue aid that is by its nature “temporary and reversible” will be authorised; by contrast, the 2008 
Communication envisages that rescue aid aimed at banks through recapitalisation, which is by its 
own nature irreversible, will be amenable to authorisation.170  And thirdly, the “once in ten years” 
limit is not applicable to aid to financial institutions.171
         In respect to aid targeted at “fundamentally sound but illiquid” undertakings, it should be 
emphasised that, as was anticipated earlier, these recipients, even when they benefit from aid aimed 
at their recapitalisation, are not obliged to provide the Commission with a “restructuring plan” or 
with a plan on the implementation of the notified measures; however, they remain obliged to supply 
a plan detailing how they can “cover [their own] financing needs also in the long term.”172  Thus, it 
could be argued that, despite not expressly requiring the same detailed plans as with “ordinary” 
R&R operations, the Commission has imposed de facto requirements for aid recipients to give 
“genuine assurances” that through the financial assistance they will return to long term viability.173 
         In addition, the circumstance that “compensatory measures” are imposed on all beneficiaries 
and for that purpose are “tailor-made to address the distortions identified on the markets” contribute 
to ensuring that a “level playing field” across the relevant market is maintained for the medium- and 
long-term.174  The 2008 Banking Communication was accompanied by a number of administrative 
“adjustments” to the scrutiny and approval procedure and in particular by an express commitment 
of the Commission to examine notified measures as quickly as possible, and preferably within 24 
hours of submission.175  
          Against this background, it may be queried whether the Commission has succeeded in its 
stated aim to address the challenges of the financial crisis, especially for the banking sector.  It was 
noted earlier that, after initially taking a “back seat” position vis-à-vis the unfolding of the crisis 
itself, the Commission sought to adopt a far more proactive stance with a view to addressing these 
challenges while at the same time maintaining the integrity of the single market principles.  It was 
argued that, on the one hand, the Commission accepted somehow reluctantly to adopt the relatively 
more flexible framework for assessment provided in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (i.e. the “serious 
disturbance of the economy” ground);176 on the other hand, however, it laid down a set of 
requirements, such as, inter alia, the obligation for the notifying Member State to apply “objective 
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and non-discriminatory” conditions, the duty to “offer sufficient guarantees for the aid recipient’s 
long term viability” and the provision for frequent review of the implementation of the 
assistance,177 all of which were designed to secure adherence to, as far as possible, single market 
and genuine competition principles.178
         Thus, in light of the forgoing remarks, it may be concluded that the 2008 Banking 
Communication constituted evidence of the Commission’s “smart pragmatism” in reconciling these 
sometimes divergent objectives.179  Guided by the need to tackle the crisis’ consequences and 
prevent it from spilling over to other areas, the Commission employed the existing state aid tools in 
more flexible, speedier and therefore more responsive ways.  As was aptly put by Gilliams, the 
circumstance that the Commission decisions were hardly even challenged should be taken as a 
confirmation of the fact that, all in all, the approach adopted in the 2008 Communication 
represented a “fair and balanced deal” for banks and for the member states.  However, it is clear that 
the Communication only addressed the challenges posed by the crisis to the banking sector, without 
directly addressing its impact on the real economy and especially the consequences of the “credit 
squeeze”. The next section will therefore deal in brief with the “Temporary Framework to support 
the access to credit” (hereinafter referred to as Temporary Framework)180 during the crisis and in 
that context will examine the question of whether the rules on state aid were effectively applied to 
secure the liquidity of businesses operating in the “real economy”.
3.2. The financial crisis and the “real economy”: the “Temporary Framework” for “real” 
enterprises affected by the credit squeeze
The previous section provided a brief analysis of the approach adopted by the Commission in 
respect to state aid granted to banks and emphasised how, at the heart of these efforts, was a concern 
for reconciling the need to take swift action in order to tackle the adverse effects of the crisis with 
the integrity of the single market: this “balancing” was expressed in the adoption of a relatively 
more flexible and generous approach to state aid, albeit subject to many of the more scrupulous 
requirements that had formed the backbone of the generally applicable R&R Guidelines.  It is 
however clear that the Banking Communication only dealt with the serious disturbances, whether 
actual or potential, arising from the instability of financial institutions; it did not, therefore, lay 
down any measures designed to tackle the “aftershocks” of the crisis for enterprises operating in the 
“real economy”, i.e. those undertakings that ran non-financial activities and which required access 
to credit for the purpose of financing their commercial ventures.  
          Especially after the downfall of Lehmann Brothers it became clear that the financial crisis 
had become “systemic”, in the sense of, inter alia, having spread to the “real economy”.  The effects 
of the credit squeeze were aptly captured by the Commission in its 2011 Communication on a 
“Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current 
financial and economic crisis”:
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 “(…) The financial and economic crisis caused a serious downturn of the real economy, 
hitting households, business and jobs. Expectations on growth rapidly dropped and both trade 
and investments were quickly scaled down. Banks had, on the one hand, to deleverage and 
absorb losses and, on the other hand, to re-price risks, thereby becoming more risk-adverse. 
Even creditworthy businesses faced sudden problems in gaining access to finance.(…)”181
To respond to these challenges, the Commission, once again, derogated from its “traditional” 
approach to state aid, enshrined in the R&R Guidelines, with a view to providing a temporary 
“lifeline” to those undertakings which, despite being fundamentally solid, are faced with serious 
challenges to their viability due to the scarce availability of credit. For this purpose, the Temporary 
Framework Notice, issued in January 2009 and originally in force only until the end of 2010, stated 
that financial assistance targeted at undertakings that find it difficult to access finance through the 
“normal channels” will be authorised under Article 107(3)(b) if it meets certain criteria. These 
criteria concern the type of assistance, the state of the recipient and the conditions at which the aid 
is granted. It is clear from the Communication that the Commission was especially concerned with 
avoiding that the Temporary Framework could be used to circumvent the limits of the R&R 
Guidelines and in particular could be applied in a way that defeated the objectives and the key 
principles of the single market, especially by encouraging a “subsidy race” among Member 
States.182  On this point, it should be emphasised that the Commission was particularly vigilant in 
assessing the measures proposed by the German government to support the stability and restore the 
long term viability of Opel in 2009: 183 Commissioner Kroes, speaking in front of the European 
Parliament, made clear that the provision of financial assistance under the Temporary Framework 
could in no way be subjected to additional conditions, linked, for instance, to restrictions as to the 
location of the investment and to the retention of staff in specific areas of the single market.184
          For this purpose, the Communication made clear that this type of aid could only be offered as 
part of a national scheme, regardless of where they had their seat and could not favour national over 
non-national goods or services.185  In respect to eligibility, only undertakings that are fundamentally 
financially “solid” and who have experienced difficulties in accessing credit after 1 July 2008 can 
benefit from this assistance.186  In addition, the Communication does not prejudice the applicability 
of other instruments, such as, inter alia, aid supplied to support research and development or 
regional aid, if the recipient meets the relevant thresholds governing eligibility for this kind of 
assistance:  however, aid under the Temporary Framework cannot be combined with financial 
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assistance deemed to fall outside the scope of Article 107 on the basis of the “De Minimis” rules 
that is being supplied to cover the same costs.187
        Member States are limited in the number options that they can choose from as regards the type 
of financial assistance that they can provide: the Communication states that, to benefit from this 
“more lenient” regime, aid must be granted in the form of either a loan for up to Eur.500,000 over 
two years, or of a state guarantee for bank loans granted at a special interest rate.188  These 
“advantageous” loans can also be granted directly by the State.189  Importantly, when the aid is 
granted in the form of state guarantees, the latter cannot exceed 80% of the value of the loan, which 
in turn cannot be of a higher value than the value of the wage bill of the recipient; as to the level of 
interest rate, the Communication states that “preferential” rates are set at 15% if the recipient is a 
small /medium sized enterprise, or by the premium rate calculated by the Commission on the basis 
of the “safe harbour” clauses contained in the Annex to the Communication.190  
        The possibility to provide “cheap state loans” is another key feature of the Temporary 
Framework: states can grant “public or private loans” at preferential rates, calculated solely on the 
basis of central bank overnight rates and thus, significantly lower than “normal commercial 
rates”.191  This form of support appears particularly attractive, since it does not seem to be subject to 
the same “wage bill” limit as other forms of assistance:  however, the Commission will be willing to 
supervise closely these measures to ensure that they are “strictly necessary” to overcome temporary 
liquidity problems.192  
        Due to the limited purvey of this paper it is not possible to analyse in any more detail the 
temporary framework.  However, some remarks can be made: it is undeniable that the issuing of the 
2008 Communication sought to provide a “more lenient” regime vis-à-vis the one otherwise 
applicable, in light of the R&R Guidelines to respond to the immediate dangers of the financial 
crisis for the “real economy”.193  The Commission was faced with the challenge of providing an 
effective response to the effects of the credit squeeze on “non-financial” enterprises and at the same 
time of maintaining the integrity of the single market principles, including those of genuine 
competition.194  It is suggested that the long-held view that state aid should be “exceptional” and 
limited only to cases in which it was both appropriate and “necessary and proportionate” was 
reflected in a number of features of the Temporary Framework, such as, inter alia, the limited 
options available to the member states as regards the forms of available assistance and the limits as 
to the value of loans and guarantees.195  
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         In addition, and out of a concern for upholding principles of non-discrimination and market 
openness, the Framework enshrines a clear preference for “general schemes”, as opposed to 
individual aid, and emphasises the need for aid to be applicable to all undertakings operating in a 
specific economic sectors, on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.196  At the same time, 
however, some flexibility is allowed, such as the possibility to “cumulate” aid under the Temporary 
Framework with other forms of assistance and the “benevolent” provisions as regards especially 
“cheap loans”, thus showing the willingness of the Commission to adopt a more generous approach 
to state intervention designed to overcome the consequences of the credit squeeze.197
        The Temporary Framework was however criticised for the lack of flexibility on other 
important aspects. For instance, the Communication does not contain any indication of the criteria 
applicable to determine if the former are “sound but in difficulty” due to the credit squeeze.  Also, it 
is clear that unlike under the R&R Guidelines, Member States are tightly constrained when it comes 
to both the nature of the assistance that they can grant and the amount for which the latter can be 
supplied, especially if it takes the form of guarantees.  On this point, Soltesz argued that the 80% 
rule constitutes a “serious obstacle when it comes to structuring and negotiating financial 
agreements”, since it obliges de facto each recipient to find and provide an additional guarantee to 
cover the risk concerning the remaining part of the loan.198  Also, there is no full legal certainty 
when it comes to granting these types of aid: no formal “notification procedure” is provided and 
consequently the risk is that, when individual Member States wanted to grant aid subject to 
conditions that are not “perfectly mirroring” the Communication, they would notify their schemes 
just to be on the safe side, something that the Framework wanted to avoid.199
        Overall, commentators argued that the Temporary Framework may not always provide a more 
“attractive” option to individual states compared with the ordinary R&R Notice, mainly on the 
grounds that the latter entails greater flexibility, in terms of choosing among the available forms of 
financial assistance, for the Member States, as well as potentially allowing for 100% loans and 
guarantees.200  Also, even though the Temporary Framework does not require the submission of 
“restructuring plans” or indeed the supply of an own contribution, it would appear that the 
Commission tends to “read additional conditions” into it, so as to prevent it from becoming a tool to 
circumvent the limits of the R&R.201  In light of the forgoing it may be concluded that the 
Temporary Framework represented an ambitious attempt to address the shockwaves that the credit 
squeeze has had (and continues to have, even though its period of applicability has now expired) for 
the real economy.  However, it is also apparent that it remains in many aspects relatively inflexible 
and therefore not always able to provide the assistance that is appropriate to meet the needs of the 
firms that are potentially eligible for financial assistance.  It is acknowledged that the Commission 
was faced with the need to reconcile the concurrent, and sometimes diverging demands of 
managing the crisis on the one hand and of “keeping the single market together” on the other, and 
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therefore it could not afford to “sell state aid cheaply”.  However, it is equally clear that on its own 
the Temporary Framework could not give a unitary answer to these challenges which therefore 
required, alongside these “generally applicable” standards, the continuing vigilance of the 
Commission on individual aid measures via the notification procedure.
3.3. Industrial restructuring in times of credit squeeze: the role of EU merger policy in the economic 
crisis
The previous sections briefly analysed the approach adopted by the EU Commission in the 
supervision of state aid measures destined to “cushion” the economy from the consequences of the 
financial crisis: it was argued that, despite maintaining a critical attitude to state intervention in the 
economy, the Commission was prepared to utilise its powers in this area relatively flexibly and 
pragmatically, with a view to responding to the challenges created by the crisis both for the banking 
and financial sectors and, more widely, for the “real economy”.  At the heart of this effort was the 
need to counterbalance the demands of managing the crisis and especially of preventing the credit 
squeeze from damaging fundamentally “solid” companies active in “real” sectors of the economy 
with maintaining the integrity of the single market, in particular with a view to avoiding the 
emergence of “national champions” and, more generally, permanent distortions of competition.  
         It is suggested that similar concerns have guided the Commission in its approach to merger 
policy.  In a speech given in March 2011, Commissioner Almunia observed that although the 
recession had resulted in a drop in mergers and acquisitions overall, the restructuring of certain 
economic sectors (such as, among others, energy and air transport) had continued as the expression 
of “defensive strategies” adopted by companies affected by the downturn and operating within the 
same market.202  This trend toward the “consolidation” of potentially “ailing” businesses into 
stronger and bigger conglomerates is a well-known response to challenging times;203 however, it is 
also liable to have potentially negative consequences for competition, such as an increase in 
concentration and, as a consequence, greater ease of coordination, if not of tacit collusion, among 
competitors and the creation of artificial barriers to entry vis-à-vis potential competitors, who would 
be faced with powerful, often national incumbents.204   At the core of the merger policy agenda was 
a more general concern for upholding single market principles and thereby avoiding “protectionist 
pushes” on the part of the Member States.205  
         It may be argued that the initially “passive” role adopted by the Commission at the onset of 
the financial crisis, coupled with the demands of addressing the challenges that the latter entailed 
for the continued existence of the financial sector, prompted the Member States to act unilaterally, 
especially by “orchestrating” mergers designed to salvage ailing companies:206  but how can such 
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action be justified if the merger in question clearly has a “Community dimension”?  It should be 
emphasised that Article 21(4) of the Merger Regulation, which authorises Member States to adopt 
“appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests”, so long as these measures remain compatible 
with the core principles of EU law and aim to address “non-competition concerns”.207  
          Thus, it was suggested that this provision could not be invoked to overcome the concerns for 
the integrity of competition raised by the Commission and, consequently to “by-pass” its decision to 
declare the merger incompatible with the common market solely for the purpose of, inter alia, 
maintaining the financial stability within one Member State.208  Against this background, it may be 
argued that the concentration involving Lloyds TSB and Halifax/Bank of Scotland presented both 
the European and the British competition authorities with a clear challenge: on the one hand, it 
made the the OFT and the British authorities realise the magnitude of the challenges of the nearly 
looming downfall of a major bank, with clear risks for the overall economy. And on the other hand, 
it prompted the Commission to reflect on how it should react to the risks for the unity and integrity 
of basic EU principles, such as the need to preserve the openness and the rivalry of the internal 
market, especially vis-à-vis the danger of “protectionist” pushes.209
        As is well known, the Commission approved ex post the United Kingdom’s decision to 
authorise the merger in the public interest, despite the concerns for competition that the latter 
raised.210  It should be emphasised that the UK authorities had been confronted with similar 
questions.  However, in the event the British authorities, rather than relying on the domestic 
framework for the assessment of transactions prima facie giving rise to “relevant merger 
situations”, carved an additional “public policy exception”, i.e. the need to maintain financial 
stability, to justify the ministerial approval of the merger without it being necessary for the latter to 
be referred to the Competition Commission.211 
            Although this decision was probably the only way forward to address the predicament in 
which HBoS was, it posed important questions for the future of merger policy in tough times, when 
industrial consolidation had the potential of becoming more and more important as a “way out” of 
the crisis.212  In particular, it became especially clear that in order to prevent the Member States 
from distorting competition and hampering the openness of the single market, the Commission had 
to adopt a far more involved attitude to merger review.213  In 2009, the then Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes argued that the merger control framework was sufficiently flexible to provide principled and 
timely treatment for notified transactions, not just by making full use of the swift procedure 
prescribed by the Regulation, but also by relying on established legal and economic concepts, such 
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as the failing firm defence.214  She observed that the EU merger rules allowed the Commission to 
deal rapidly with the challenges posed by the crisis and especially to take into account the rapidly 
evolving market conditions, without the need for further changes to the present system.215  
        Philip Lowe, then Director General for Competition, commenting on the recent mergers 
occurred in the banking sector, expressed the view that, while financial stability may be the primary 
driver in the short and medium term, it was indispensable to protect and strengthen the competitive 
structure of this and other markets in the long run.216  Thus, he suggested that the Commission 
should continue to rely on its framework for merger control in order to respond to the consequences 
of the crisis and especially to ensure that public interventions in the economy do not have 
irreversible anti-competitive effects.217  In doing so, he argued in favour of the continued 
application of the “general” merger rules to operations resulting in the nationalisation of financial 
institutions, with a view to determining if the latter constituted a “concentration” within the 
meaning of the Regulation.218  If this requirement is met, the question is whether the transaction can 
be cleared under the Merger Regulation: in this context, it was queried whether the “failing firm” 
defence could represent a possible ground upon which to found a clearance decision.219 
         Although the limited scope of this paper does not allow a detailed discussion of this defence, it 
is reminded that, according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission can declare a 
prima facie anti-competitive merger compatible with the common market if one of the merging 
entities is a “failing firm”. This requirement is meant to be fulfilled if “the allegedly failing firm 
would in the near future be forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken 
over by another undertaking”; in addition, it must be shown that there would not be any “less anti-
competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger” and, finally, that without the 
concentration, “the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market (…).”220  At the heart 
of the defence is the need to satisfy the Commission that the market structure would deteriorate to 
the same extent regardless of whether the merger itself was allowed to go ahead.221
         Despite being couched in relatively flexible terms, the defence has been notoriously difficult 
to invoke: decisions such as, inter alia, BASF/Pantochem/Euridiol and Kali & Salz show that the 
Commission was prepared to accept it only in very limited circumstances. Thus, in BASF it was 
emphasised that there was a “clear cut” risk of bankruptcy and, due to the circumstances in which 
the target undertaking had been, no “alternative purchaser” could be identified.222 And in K&S the 
Commission emphasised the peculiar circumstances of the industry, in which only another 
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undertaking was active and therefore found it “inevitable” that the acquiring firm would have 
acquired the market share of the target company, whether the merger had taken place or, instead, 
whether the former had exited the market due to the financial and industrial “dire straits” in which it 
was.223  On this point, it was often argued that such a restrictive interpretation of the defence 
reflects the Commission’s concern for ensuring that mergers can be cleared on this basis only if 
there is a clear lack of causality between the transaction and the worsening of the competitive 
structure of the market.224  
          This restrictive approach was however criticised, largely on the ground that it may withhold 
approval for mergers that could limit the wider social and economic aftershocks of industrial 
restructuring.  It was also suggested that preventing mergers concerning failing firms, by slowing 
down exit, could affect the decision of new entrants to attempt to establish themselves on the 
market.225  On this point, Kokkoris argued that since “(…) a way of entering in a market is the 
acquisition/merger with an incumbent”, allowing undertakings to rely on the failing firm defence to 
seek to establish themselves on a new market may actually result in an increase in competition in 
the long run, since it would  permit new entrants to rely on the customer base and infrastructure of 
an existing, albeit ailing, company, thus reducing, to a degree the impact of fixed and other start-up 
costs.226   
          Against this background, it is not surprising that Mr Lowe was not entirely convinced of the 
possibility of authorising mergers in the banking and financial markets on this ground, even in 
times of crisis.227  He accepted in principle that concentrations involving “unsound” banks or 
financial services’ providers could fulfil the conditions of the defence in certain cases.  However, he 
argued that the lack of reliable information as to the existence of, inter alia, an “alternative 
purchaser” for the failing business would be especially problematic not only due to the “sensitive” 
nature of the evidence, but also due to the effects that a “collapse” of the market could have on any 
remaining competitors.228  In addition, the delays often characterising the “testing” such a complex 
defence could jeopardise the success of similar mergers since it could contribute to market 
volatility.229
          As was pointed out by the former Commissioner, another challenge for the merger control 
framework in times of crisis is that posed by the need to provide a swift decision on proposed 
operations: while the merger control framework is famous for its tight time-limits, it soon became 
clear that, especially in respect to transactions involving banking and financial undertakings, time 
was of essence for the viability of the whole concentration.  This issue became apparent, for 
instance, in the context of the takeover of Fortis, a Belgian bank whose stability had been thrown in 
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question as a result of the financial crisis, on the part of BNP Paribas.230  The Commission cleared 
the transaction, subject to the obligation for the merged entity to divest its credit card business, for 
the purpose of allowing the entry of a new rival on that market segment, two weeks before the 
deadline: according to Ms Kroes, “this decision is a perfect example of the Commission's ability to 
reconcile a rapid response to the credit crisis with the need to ensure that competition law plays its 
role in the defence of legitimate consumer interests."231  It was emphasised that the Commission 
had succeeded in delivering clearance of a key transaction for the viability of the Belgian financial 
market, within a tight time frame without “economising” in the scope and integrity of its 
appraisal.232
        Allied to the questions concerning the time scale within which mergers should be cleared in 
times of crisis are also issues concerning the market testing of remedies that may be required to 
secure clearance: it was suggested that ensuring that modifications to proposed transactions are 
properly and thoroughly examined remains very important, in as much as it ensures that markets, 
even when going through periods of restructuring, remain open and competitive.233  In Lufthansa/
Austrian Airlines,234 for instance, the Commission cleared the notified transaction, which affected 
competition on key routes within continental Europe, subject to a complex set of remedies, both 
structural and behavioural.  In that decision it was recognised that the crisis affecting the aviation 
industry was likely to depress the incentive of airlines to enter the routes in question.235  
Consequently, the Commission took the view that relieving “slot congestion” was indispensable to 
ensure that the market would not only remain open and competitive in the short and medium term, 
but would also attract new entry in more florid times.236  
        Commenting on this decision, the then Commissioner Neelie Kroes expressed the view that 
even when individual industries were going through “consolidation phases”, the assessment of 
remedies would be necessary to protect consumer interests and secure rivalry in the long run.237  It 
was added that the relative flexibility of the requirements applicable to the testing of remedies in the 
EU rendered the merger regime extremely responsive to change and especially to the need to 
countenance any detrimental effects of industrial restructuring on competition and market access.238
          In light of the above, it can be concluded that the financial crisis and especially its aftershocks 
on the “real economy” have challenged many of the “established” principles and legal and 
economic approached guiding the Commission’s approach to mergers.  Despite adopting an initially 
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passive posture toward industrial restructuring, as was the case with HBoS/Lloyds, the Commission 
soon sought to adopt a more proactive stance, by seeing to “stretch” the existing legal and economic 
framework for assessment in order to ensure that the integrity of the common market and especially 
that the openness and rivalry of the EU markets would not be jeopardised.  Quicker procedure, 
extensive and at the same time flexible remedies’ testing and a limited but at the same time 
“responsive” use of the failing firm defence emerged as key tools to deal with these challenges 
within the merger context which, overall, proved to be, once again, a reliable tool to uphold the 
internal market’s principles.  However, it is also clear that, just as in the area of state aid, the 
Commission’s central role in the wider context of competition policy was challenged by the 
unfolding of the crisis.  The next section will conclude by reflecting on the wider implications that 
dealing with these events have had on the Commission’s actual role as well as on the overall 
framework for the enforcement of EU competition law.
4. Bruised and battered? The implementation of EU competition policy and the economic crisis: 
tentative conclusions
The forgoing sections sought to provide a snapshot of some of the responses given by the tools of 
EU competition law to the challenges posed by the 2007 financial crisis and by its aftershocks for 
the "real economy".  It was illustrated how the EU Commission, after having been caught in some 
way "unawares"  by the unfolding of the crisis, thus remaining passive, to some degree, to its 
demands, soon was capable to develop its own response to it.  From the adoption of the Banking 
Guidelines to the publication of the Temporary Framework regulating state aids in, respectively, the 
banking and financial sector and in the wider context of the "real economy" to the adoption of more 
flexible, quicker approaches to the scrutiny of mergers, the Commission sought to use its own array 
of policy and legal tools to the full.  At the same time, however, it was also ready to "ditch" old 
style instruments, such as the application of the legal exception to "crisis cartels", to remain 
coherent with its commitment to the fight against cartels.  At the heart of this response was a deeply 
felt need to maintain the unity and integrity of the internal market, even in the face of very 
dangerous and disquieting times, and especially to preserve its competitiveness and openness in the 
long term.  In light of these considerations, it may be argued that a picture which mixes continuity 
and change seems to have emerged: it can be suggested that "established" tools have been deployed 
to deal with the demands posed by the crisis.  In doing so, however, the Commission has shown 
remarkable flexibility, both substantively and procedurally.   
         Thus, having regard to the banking sector, it was able to derogate from the rigorous approach 
enshrined in the R&R Guidelines in order to provide a relatively more generous "custom-made" 
framework for the assessment of state assistance to banks and financial institutions, in which aid 
would, for instance, be available to a wider range of eligible entities and its provision be no longer 
limited to cases in which its effects would be "reversible": however, in doing so it refrained from 
giving the Member States a free hand and instead sought to uphold some of its key principles, such 
as the obligation to make aid available to all the eligible subject, without any limits based on, e.g. 
residence or nationality, and the possibility to impose commitments to allow for rivalry to be 
maintained.
         A broadly similar approach also seemed to underscore the Temporary Framework: the 
Commission allowed the Member States to provide several forms of financial assistance, all 
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targeted at addressing the risk of failure caused by a lack of liquidity.  However, it sought to enforce 
upon the Member States to duty to make this aid available subject to principles of transparency and 
of non-discrimination, with a view to avoiding market foreclosure resulting from putting those 
undertakings who did not receive assistance at an unjustifiable competitive disadvantage.  It is 
submitted that merger policy is yet another area in which this "continuity/change cocktail" is clearly 
visible: faced with the need to uphold its exclusive jurisdiction and to prevent Member States from 
erecting "national champions", the Commission confirmed its commitment to a strong, scrupulous 
and, at the same time, "realistic" approach to merger scrutiny.  A greater albeit "guarded" 
willingness to apply the "failing firm defence"; a quicker timetable for the assessment of individual 
transactions and a continuing exhaustive review of remedies were all part of the mix.  However, 
they were deployed while taking into account the timing constraints and the policy demands often 
involved in individual concentrations.
          Against this background, one could legitimately ask whether "all is well" in competition law 
and policy in times of crisis: and again, the answer should be inevitably more nuanced than just a 
straight positive or negative one.  As was anticipated in section 2.1, the Commission did not "dive 
in" immediately in order to deal with the demands of the financial crisis.  The initial phase of the 
crisis saw it taking a back seat and preferring a "wait and see" approach, which in turn allowed the 
Member States to take the lead and deal with the "emergencies" occurring in their own jurisdictions.  
However, the risks that this passive role could have for the whole "European project", for the 
integrity of the common market and, perhaps more pragmatically, for the strength of its own 
leadership contributed to the Commission's "awakening": its proactive role in shaping the Member 
States' policies as regards state aid and in that context the choice of overseeing this type of 
assistance by relying on Article 107(3), whose remit allowed it greater scope for manoeuvre 
demonstrated its willingness to interact more closely with domestic authorities in order to avoid 
protectionist reactions to the crisis.  At the same time, its renewed commitment to a quicker and 
more flexible merger review allowed the Commission to take a leadership-type, more proactive and 
more efficient approach to merger review, whose procedural structure and substantive underpinning 
resisted relatively robustly to the pressure.
          It is however undeniable that, five years on, many of the challenges created by this systemic 
economic and financial crisis remain: Member States may have "trouble-shot" relatively effectively 
when it came to salvage banks.  However, this came at the price of far more concentrated markets, 
in which entry remains difficult and the implementation of divestiture and other remedies is far 
from complete.  Other sectors, ranging from the automotive industry to aviation and other transport 
industries, also remain characterised by a more restricted pool of rivals and by the existence of 
several "alliances" and other loose cooperation arrangements.  
          Thus, it is concluded that competition law comes out of the crisis largely intact but also 
"bruised" by the effects of the crisis.  It is accepted that some of the outcomes of the agenda 
deployed for its "management" may be reversed overtime--e.g. by a careful policy of divestiture of 
assets or the gradual return of governmental funds and guarantees.  However, it is equally clear that 
other effects may be more difficult to "wipe out", such as, inter alia, the perceived difficulty for new 
entrants to challenge incumbents in key sectors, such as aviation.  In many ways, the old adage 
"time heals all wounds" may help summing up what awaits EU competition policy in the post-crisis 
economic era.  Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that time is something which, due to the irreversible 
consequences of the crisis itself and of the responses to it for rivalry and market openness, is now in 
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relatively short supply.  Thus, it may be preferable to think about the future as something which is 
largely unwritten and unpredictable still, as well as confined in a relatively small horizon. 
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Tolga Bolukbasi, ‘European Union and Continuity and Change in Labor Market 
Policies in Pre-Accession Countries: Insights from the Case of Turkey’
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to answer the questions of (i) how we can account for continuity and change in 
labour market policies in pre-accession countries, (ii) whether the European Union (EU) plays any 
role in such processes of continuity and change, and (iii) if so, under what conditions the EU has an 
impact. It does so through an analysis of labour market policies in Turkey as a case study of pre-
accession to the EU. The case of employment policy in Turkey constitutes a ‘crucial case’ due to 
three main reasons: First, Turkish labour markets are characterized by a very high degree of misfit 
with the targets announced in the EU’s European Employment Strategy (EES) given the 
substantially lower levels of labour force participation rates and employment policies, and the 
relatively weaker institutional structure of employment policymaking which, according to the 
Europeanisation research programme, would invite powerful adaptational pressures stemming from 
the EU level. Second, Turkish employment policy is currently undergoing change with frequent 
media coverage on efforts at launching a national employment strategy for the first time in the 
country. Finally, the issue of unemployment features as the most important problem for the public in 
Turkey according to opinion surveys. In order to examine the causal dynamics of continuity and 
change in Turkish labour market policies, the paper is based on a ‘bottom-up research design’ 
relying on case study methods and process tracing techniques. Empirical data is obtained through an 
analysis of legislative acts, parliamentary minutes and print media reporting as well as qualitative 
interviews carried out with key policy makers and social partners. 
The paper is organized as follows. It first reviews the three parallel modes of employment policy-
making in the EU which are comprised of the classic Community method of legislating rights and 
implementation through directives, ‘law via collective agreement’ aiming to promote active 
participation of social partners at both the EU and domestic levels, and most recently, the EES 
based on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) relying on peer learning, persuasion, 
benchmarking and peer review, which are typical examples of ‘soft law’. 
Second, it focuses on the defining features of the EES characterized by ‘flexicurity’ which is 
declared as the ‘EU’s approach to labour markets’ in EU official documents which aims at building 
the foundations of a ‘social investment state’. The paper relies on the ‘policy structure approach’ 
depicting a policy regime through focusing on the principles, objectives, procedures and 
instruments. The principles embodied in the EES are informed by the concept of ‘flexicurity’ which 
has four dimensions: (i) contractual arrangements providing sufficient flexibility to both workers 
and employers; (ii) effective active labour market policies (ALMPs) supporting transitions between 
jobs and from unemployment and inactivity to employment; (iii) life-long learning systems helping 
workers to cope with rapid change, unemployment spells and transition to new jobs, and enabling 
them to remain employable throughout their careers; and (iv) modern social security systems 
facilitating labour market mobility and transitions with adequate income support during absences 
45
from the labour market. In terms of the objectives, the EES aims to activate labour market outsiders 
and promote high rates of employment through setting quantified target rates. The procedures in the 
EES rest on the participation of social partners in policymaking processes both at the domestic and 
EU level. While coordination is secured through the EES for member states, it is carried out 
through the drafting of a ‘Joint Assessment Paper’ for pre-accession countries. In terms of the 
instruments, the EES relies on financial instruments provided through the European Social Fund for 
member states and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) for pre-accession countries as well as 
modernised public employment services institutions. 
Third, the paper reviews the academic literature on Europeanization, which has largely rested on 
top-down research designs. This literature points to contradictory findings in terms of the role that 
the EES plays in domestic labour market policy-making, which range from significant EES impact 
to no impact at all. The paper observes that the current state-of-the-art is marred by two problems. 
First, to the extent that the studies embrace a top-down research design and thereby overlook the 
independent causal impact of the interplay of domestic interests and institutions, they take the 
causal impact of the EES for granted. Second, these studies almost invariably focus on member 
states with the exception of a few analyses on pre-accession countries. 
Fourth, when this Europeanization literature is taken as the analytical lens to extrapolate the 
dynamics of continuity and change in pre-accession countries, we would expect weak adaptation 
not only due to weak adaptational pressures stemming from low levels of credibility of EU 
membership in Turkey and the non-binding character of the EES, but also because of the deep 
segmentation of Turkish labour markets precluding any comprehensive reform attempt in the 
direction of the EES.  
Fifth, the paper summarizes the dynamics of continuity and change in the employment policy 
regime in Turkey by focusing on whether there have actually been changes in the principles, 
objectives, procedures and instruments, and if so, whether the EU had played any role therein. The 
paper concludes that there has actually been greater-than-expected change, albeit variegated across 
different policy areas embodied in the flexicurity approach. In policy areas whereby powerful 
domestic interests (i.e. the ruling government and big business) neither show resistance to, nor 
actively pursue reform (such as in the case of active labour market policies and life-long learning 
systems), the EU appears to play a role in bringing about change in the direction of the EES. The 
outcome, however, is represented by a modest change due to the weak adaptational pressures area 
stemming from the EU in this policy. In other policy areas whereby preferences of domestic 
interests are in line with the intended direction of reform envisioned by the EES (such as in the case 
of labour law and social security systems), the degree of change appears to be conditional on the 
strength of institutional lock-in effects. In this context, should preferences of domestic interests 
remain in accordance with the priorities of the EES whilst facing weaker institutional lock-in 
effects, this study finds significant change. However, while the direction of such change is in 
parallel with the EES priorities, these exclusively bear the imprints of domestic interests as the 
reform outcome proves to be more protracted than in the case where the EES would have bred 
independent causal impact. In contrast, should institutional lock-in effects prove to be strong 
enough to counterweigh the constellation of domestic interests whose preferences remain in line 
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with priorities of the EES, the paper finds very limited change – much less than that found in the 
case of weaker institutional inertia. In these final two cases, the EU functions only as a primary 
leverage by domestic interests rather than having an independent causal impact as the current 
literature may suggest.  
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Annette Bongardt, 'Lisbon, Environmental Policy and Competitiveness'
Summary of presentation
The paper discusses the issue of competitiveness and environmental constraints in general terms 
and proceeds to evaluating the EU objective of a competitive, low-carbon economy as an EU 
industrial strategy.
It sets out the importance of the environment as a basis for economic activity (natural capital / input  
to production, life-support system) and the challenges for sustainability (the planet’s limited 
absorption capacity of waste and pollution; exhaustible vs. non-exhaustible resources; management 
issues). The non-sustainability of current production and consumption patterns in any business as 
usual scenario emerges as a result of global environmental impact (influenced by population, 
affluence, technology). Studies point to limits to growth and the need for a governance system that 
takes a more long-term view (most recently Randers, 2012, for the Club of Rome). This suggests 
the need for adequate policies to correct market failures and unsustainable behaviour.
The EU stance on sustainability is anchored in the treaties. Sustainable development is a treaty 
objective, environmental protection has been granted a special status (cutting across other policies - 
environmental mainstreaming) and the single market has been put at the service of EU societal 
goals, notably sustainability. With the financial and economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
that reinforced the need for growth, the challenge facing the EU resumes to sustainable growth. EU 
growth objectives are of course framed by the competitiveness rationale against the background of 
globalisation. They have come to integrate environmental protection under the headings of a shift to 
a competitive low-carbon economy (in a later phase of the Lisbon strategy) and green growth 
(Europe 2020 strategy). The latter has been defined by Hallegatte et al., 2011) as growth that is 
efficient in terms of natural resource use, minimises pollution and environmental impacts, and is 
resilient (accounting for natural hazards). 
The paper first addresses the question as to whether there is any potential conflict or trade-off 
between environmental protection and efficiency. It reviews economic theory with respect to 
pollution (pollution damages as negative externalities), the issue of internalisation (efficiency-
enhancing, although not always sufficient on its own) and the optimal level of pollution (Pareto 
optimality). It discusses how to implement the efficient level of pollution (and production), either 
through the market (Coase theorem, applicable under certain demanding circumstances, notably 
well-defined property rights and low transaction costs) or policies. The objective can consist in 
implementing the efficient level of pollution (fraught with high information requirements) or else 
aim at cost-effective implementation (selecting the least-cost abatement programme at a given 
pollution level). The instrument mix stretches from communication instruments and voluntary 
agreements to command-and-control instruments (traditional regulation) to market or economic 
instruments. As for the latter two, although both could be least-cost in theory, governments will 
often lack the higher information requirements of command-and-control instruments. Market 
instruments comprise notably taxes (environmental taxes / Pigouvian tax), subsidies, and 
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marketable emission rights. They price the environment and environmental damage costs. They 
have a dynamic effect (promoting innovation), change underlying (unsustainable) behaviour and are 
cost-effective; they are also associated with a double dividend (benefiting the environment and 
providing the state with receipts). Command and control traditional regulation has a static effect and 
tends to be more expensive in terms of abatement, that is, foregoing more output to achieve 
environmental goals. Still, regulation may be more indicated in certain circumstances (e.g., 
similarity of firms’ cost structures, concentrated market structures). The implications for 
competitiveness and growth are that economic instruments, which work with and through the 
market mechanism, are more apt: They promote innovation (in new green goods, services, 
technologies) and have least-cost properties for implementing environmental targets. Given that 
market instruments, which modify incentives, work with the market mechanism, they presuppose a 
functioning market.
It should be noted that environmental protection does not necessarily imply an output loss. 
Environmental protection might give rise to win-win situations but also imply trade-offs. In the 
latter case, the greater freedom of choice of abatement solutions afforded by market instruments 
lowers abatement costs for society, as firms tend to know better than the government how to best 
and cheapest abate pollution. The concept of green growth implies the idea to shift the production 
frontier outward (through new green goods, services, technologies and sectors). To do so, it is of 
course important to create the right framework conditions (macroeconomic stability, property rights, 
low transaction costs, etc.) as to promote long-term investments.
Environmental policy in the EU addresses coordination needs in the internal market (level playing 
field) and externalities (transnational, but also global). Although the Rome Treaty had not 
mentioned the environment, the EU gained competences with respect to the environment already 
from the 1970s onwards, with an explicit treaty base since the Single European Act in 1987. With 
the subsequent treaty revisions, the EU moved from unanimity voting to qualified majority voting 
and from the cooperation procedure to co-decision. The Lisbon treaty confirmed environmental 
policy as a shared competence and extended it to climate change. Energy, where the EU had had no 
competences, became a shared competence. However, important exceptions persist, notably in 
regard to taxation and energy sources, where the unanimity requirement applies. Climate change 
and energy policies are of course linked, as it is fossil energy sources that cause climate change. 
However, the energy section in the Lisbon treaty comprises just one article outlining objectives (i.e., 
supply security, competitive pricing, sustainability, plus European networks). Although two out of 
the three original Communities had been about energy (European Coal and Steel Community, 
1952-2002) and Euratom), the EU does not have any specific energy instruments. As a result, 
energy has been dealt with through the prisma of the single market (liberalisation), associated with 
the need for regulation of the sector (network industries). 
Environmental governance has been brought under the logic and rationale of the single market, 
which is also reflected in the philosophy of regulation. From a command-and-control approach it 
moved (from the 5th Environmental Action Programme onwards) to a bottom-up approach, with 
new flexible instruments and market instruments. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), an 
economic instrument, which became the EU’s flagship environmental policy, is a case in point. 
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Regulatory concerns had shifted from the regulation of acute problems (1972-) to the harmonisation 
of regulation to assure a level playing field in the internal market (1987-), to the use of framework 
regulations with a view to efficiency and policy effectiveness with integration and implementation 
cost concerns (1992-) to networks and policy learning with a view to sustainable development 
(1998-). However, the EU ETS marks a break with the latter approach, in that the instrument is 
characterised by the (re-)centralisation at the EU level. 
The ETS is the EU’s principal instrument for effecting a shift to a low-carbon economy (covering 
about half of CO2 emissions, the remainder resting on (weaker coordinated) member state action). 
As a cap-and-trade carbon scheme, the EU ETS prices greenhouse gas emissions in the market. 
Prices reflect economic scarcity, determined by supply (fixed but adjustable caps) and demand. If 
sufficiently high, they provide an incentive for pollution abatement (with least-cost characteristics). 
Emissions trading makes use of the market mechanisms to implement environmental targets: it is 
the most efficient firms that abate more pollution (least-cost properties with minimisation of 
foregone output), while less efficient firms will have to buy licences, which aggravates their costs, 
and will be penalised (out-priced) in the market. 
The EU ETS is the first regional carbon market in the world and the EU is first in moving to a 
polluter-pays-principle logic. The ETS (presently in its second phase, 2008-12) has become 
increasingly centralised at the EU level: it came to feature EU targets (rather than national 
allocation plans), a common registry, centralised auctioning platforms (although Germany notified 
an exemption) and a (gradual) implementation of the (treaty-based) polluter-pays-principle, notably 
in its third phase (2013-2020). There is a recognition that supply caps need to be controlled for 
prices to be sufficiently high as to provide adequate incentives for investments in greener goods and 
services and in technologies (experience of member state over-allocation of licences in a first, 
experimental pre-Kyoto commitment phase, 2005-7, with a collapse of carbon prices; the effect of 
the crises in the second, Kyoto commitment phase, 2008-2012, has also depressed prices). Three 
problems remain. First, due to the crisis impact, carbon prices are too low to incentivise abatement 
(need to tighten ceilings). Second, there is uncertainty as to what happens beyond 2020 in the fourth 
phase; the absence of intermediate targets between 2020 (-20%) and 2050 (EU Council agreed 
80-95% cuts) is claimed by some industry to discourage medium- to long-term investments in less 
carbon-intensive technologies. As a result, the EU ETS review is to be brought forward from 2018. 
Third, there is a need to rethink other policies (e.g. renewables) for efficiency in function of the 
ETS instrument, to the extent that those could have an impact on demand and thus prices. Under a 
cap-and-trade scheme, those would depress demand, but with a fixed supply this would just depress 
prices, whereas that pollution levels would remain the same (at lower prices some inefficient firms 
would get back into the market).
As for the international competitiveness issue (carbon leakage) and the issue of a competitive low-
carbon economy as an EU industrial strategy, the paper concludes that the EU is committed to (and 
set to fulfil) its Kyoto commitments and that it has set in motion a legislative climate and energy 
package that is to cut CO2 emission by 20% until 2020 (extensible to 30%, depending on the 
commitments of other major polluting countries). Given the uncertainty surrounding a possible 
Kyoto successor global agreement, the question resumes to whether the EU shift to a low-carbon 
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economy is viable in isolation or whether it is compatible with the need for competitiveness in a 
globalised economy. The paper analyses the EU industrial low-carbon economy strategy in terms of 
costs and benefits. It puts forward that benefits accrue in terms of a first-mover advantage and in 
terms of signalling a country’s long-term commitments, with trade and foreign direct investment 
benefits. As for the costs, employing the ETS, a market instrument, it is argued that: First, not all 
firms but only carbon-intensive firms (using fossil energy sources) and those exposed to 
international competition may be affected; second, that thus far only a hand-full of sectors were 
covered and that the firms received emission rights for free (transfer from tax payers to polluters); 
and third, that even if firms start to (gradually) pay for their pollution rights this is precisely the idea 
behind the scheme to incentivise green growth (and hence not an undesirable side-effect). Also, the 
EU can make recourse to various instruments should there be distortions of competition in the 
international arena due to carbon leakage. Of course, if there was a global climate agreement and a 
global carbon market (in fact, some countries are implementing carbon trading, such as Australia, 
China, California in the US) this would facilitate a cap on global emissions (through a global 
monopsony).
In conclusion, the benefits of a EU low-carbon economy appear to outweigh the costs. The EU ETS 
is a market instrument and as such assures least-cost implementation of environmental targets and 
stimulates innovation and growth. As for the issue of international competitiveness, the risk of 
carbon leakage is over-rated and the EU has instruments at its disposal to deal with possible 
international distortions.
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Paul Copeland and Mary Daly, 'Social Policy under Europe 2020: Ungovernable 
and Ungoverned'
Abstract 
This aim of this paper is to analyse recent developments in EU social policy under Europe 2020, 
notably the target to reduce the number of individuals living in poverty by 20 million. It does so by 
developing an analytical framework that situates the ideas or policy substance, the role of politics 
and governance mechanisms at the centre of analysis and searches for the inter-relations among 
them. We suggest that policy areas are subject to conditions of governability relating to:  ideational 
coherence; degree of prioritization within the policy hierarchy; and adequacy of governance 
mechanisms. Using these as a test of the policy target on poverty and social exclusion reveals that 
EU social policy, as conceived by Europe 2020, is both ungovernable and ungoverned. The target is 
ungovernable because Member States have adopted approaches that draw from very different 
philosophies and their level of ambition is much below that of the EU, which means that on present 
numbers the target is some 5 to 8 million short of the 20 million targeted.  And it is ungoverned 
because of uncertainty around its legal status, and ambiguity over who is to govern it and exactly 
how it fits in the Europe 2020 process.      
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Introduction
This paper focuses on EU social policy as it is configured in relation to poverty and social exclusion 
by the Europe 2020 programme. The purpose is, through a case study of the poverty target, to 
critically review the ideational and policy substance, the politics and the governance mechanisms. 
The paper also aims to develop insights pertaining to social policy in an EU context at the present 
time and how it should be studied.  For at least a decade now social policy has been a most 
innovative field of EU governance. The Lisbon Strategy in particular heralded new methods, 
procedures and resources for social policy and provided a new impetus for social Europe. Under the 
new Europe 2020 programme, the main objective for the EU with respect to social policy is to 
reduce the number of individuals living in poverty and social exclusion by 20 million. In contrast to 
the qualitative approach taken during the Lisbon decade, the first quantitative target for EU social 
policy appears to signify significant progress in the construction of social Europe and combating 
poverty. The aim of this article is to assess whether this is the case.  
Theoretically, the analysis positions itself within the new modes of governance literature (e.g., de 
Búrca and Scott 2006; Héritier and Rhodes 2011; Zeitlin and Trubek 2003). Drawing from Borrás 
and Radaelli’s (2011) concept of governance architecture, we probe the interaction between ideas or 
policy concepts, politics and governance mechanisms. This framework is then used to identify and 
examine empirically the conditions of governability in the domain of poverty and social exclusion 
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within the EU context. The case study reveals the complexities involved in maintaining the 
momentum in EU social policy that was generated during the Lisbon Strategy, as well as the 
fundamental complexities of policy-making and politics within the sphere of EU social policy. It is 
insightful also about the problems facing European societies and a European Union which itself 
features huge diversity with respect to poverty, material deprivation and joblessness. The paper 
makes the argument that because of weaknesses in the way the poverty target in Europe 2020 is 
constructed it is effectively ungovernable and, furthermore, that the particularities of the governance 
architecture as a whole mean that social policy is to all intents and purposes ungoverned. The claim, 
then, is of a double set of weaknesses that interact. The explanation offered centres on ideational 
incoherence (at a number of different levels), insufficient prioritization, and significant 
inadequacies in the governance procedures. 
The paper is organized into four main parts. The first offers a short overview of Europe 2020, 
focusing on introducing the content and governance procedures for the social policy/poverty 
measures. The second part briefly considers the literature on EU governance using it as a base upon 
which to develop the approach adopted here. The third part of the paper presses the argument about 
the ungovernability of the poverty measures, considering in turn the coherence of the ideas and 
policy focus in light of Member State diversity, the place of poverty and social exclusion in the 
political and policy hierarchy of the EU, and the nature of the governance process in place. The 
fourth section brings the paper to a close by highlighting key elements of our analytic approach and 
the most significant insights yielded by its application to the poverty and social exclusion target. 
1. Social Policy in Europe 2020: A Brief introduction 
As the successor to the Lisbon Strategy which ran from 2000 to 2010, Europe 2020 is the vehicle 
that takes forward the EU’s policy commitments for the next decade. It rests on three economic 
reform objectives that are designed (in theory) to be mutually reinforcing: ‘smart growth’ based on 
a knowledge economy; ‘sustainable growth’ promoting resource efficiency; and ‘inclusive growth’ 
focusing on high levels of employment and social cohesion. ‘Integration’ is the middle name of 
Europe 2020 (European Commission 2010a). It aims for two types of integration. In the first 
instance, it aims to bring four different areas of policy - economic policy, employment policy, social 
policy and environmental policy - into a single process.  Secondly, Europe 2020 aims to 
synchronize governance processes and procedures by the creation of a business cycle for EU 
matters - the European Semester. This refers to the streamlining of policy co-ordination into a six-
month cycle.  The cycle is started each year in January when the Commission publishes the Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS) which then provides the basis for the Spring Council’s strategic advice on 
policies. Taking this guidance into account, the Member States present and discuss their medium-
term budgetary strategies through Stability and Convergence Programmes and, simultaneously, 
draw up National Reform Programmes setting out the action they will undertake in areas such as 
employment, research, innovation, energy and social inclusion (taken to refer to poverty and social 
exclusion, pensions, and health and social care). Then, based on the Commission's assessment of 
these two documents, the Council issues country-specific guidance by June and July. On this basis 
and the policy advice from the European Council and the Council of Ministers, Member States 
finalize their draft budgets for the following year. 
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In terms of policy substance or content,  targets, flagship initiatives and guidelines are the key 
elements of Europe 2020. Starting with targets, five areas are selected for policy integration and 
reform through quantified targets: employment; spending on research and innovation; climate 
change and energy use; early school leaving and participation in tertiary education; and poverty and 
social inclusion. In the case of the latter – the focus of this article -  Europe 2020 commits to a 
poverty target whereby Member States will together lift some 20 million EU citizens out of poverty 
by 2020 (out of a total of 120 million people in such a situation). The EU has never seen anything 
quite like this before. Lacking a legal competence and a strong mandate in social policy, the EU has 
only ever engaged with poverty in a ‘light touch’ kind of way (Bauer 2002). 
 In a second tier, the Europe 2020 programme  consists of 10 integrated guidelines. Six of these are 
on economic policy and four relate to employment policy. The latter include a guideline on poverty 
and social exclusion (guideline 10) which refers to ‘promoting social inclusion and combating 
poverty, clearly supporting income security for vulnerable groups, social economy, social 
innovation, gender equality, and the poverty headline target.’ The other three employment 
guidelines relate to increasing labour market participation and reducing structural unemployment, 
developing a skilled workforce, and improving the performance of education and training systems 
and increasing tertiary education participation (European Commission 2010a). 
 The Flagship initiatives form the third element. Jointly undertaken by EU and national actors and 
steered by the European Commission, the Flagship Initiatives centre on thematic priorities intended 
to support the achievement of the five EU-level targets. One of the seven Flagship Initiatives is 
devoted to poverty and social exclusion.  This is the European Platform against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion. The term ‘platform’ is meant to refer to a hub or host of initiatives oriented to bringing 
about social and territorial cohesion. The rhetoric around the Platform emphasizes especially 
innovation and experimentation in social policy – ‘innovative social protection 
intervention’ (European Commission 2010a: 5). The Platform aims to: address the needs of groups 
particularly at risk, tackle severe exclusion and new vulnerabilities; break the cycle of disadvantage 
and step up prevention efforts; and function better and more efficiently in times of budget 
constraints. Five areas of action have been identified (European Commission, 2010b, 2010c). These 
are: 
 Delivering action to fight against poverty and social exclusion across the policy spectrum;
 Making EU funds deliver on the social inclusion and social cohesion objectives;
 Promoting evidence-based social innovation; 
 Promoting a partnership approach and the social economy;
 Stepping up policy coordination between the Member States.
How are these developments to be theorized? 
2. Theoretical Framework:  Governance Architectures and Politics
 The new governance literature is essentially concerned with the changing structure of political and 
administrative authority and, in an EU context, the move to more diverse and less law-bound 
54
methods of collective decision making and policy implementation (as exemplified by the Open 
Method of Coordination - OMC). This is a large and diversified set of literature, but, strange as it 
may sound, the inclusion and conceptualization of politics is not unproblematic (e.g., Borrás and 
Greve 2004; de la Porte and Pochet 2004; Eberlain and Kerwer 2004; Héritier 2003; Héritier and 
Rhodes 2011; Hodson and Maher 2001; Radaelli 2003; Trubek and Mosher 2003; Zeitlin and 
Trubek 2003). When the politics of the Lisbon Strategy is analysed, the analysis is usually located 
at Member State level with a preference for the ‘blocking’ impact of national politics on compliance 
with EU policy. Within this frame, work by Büchs (2007), Graziano (2011), Gwiazda (2011), 
Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008) and Mailand (2008) among others has identified the importance of 
numerous intervening variables such as: the preferences of key institutional and social actors; 
‘goodness of fit’ and ‘misfit’ at the domestic level; government preferences; compliance with non-
OMC EU policy; and the domestic economic situation. Studies concerning the politics of the Lisbon 
Strategy at EU level, particularly that surrounding its formation and re-launch (Apeldoorn et 
al2008; Archibugi and Coco 2005; Begg 2006, 2007; 2009; Sapir, 2007), have developed in a 
largely separate stream to those on the effectiveness of EU public policy. The result is an artificial 
binary in the field between approaches concerning either the public policy of Lisbon, but which 
prioritize politics at national level, or the politics of Lisbon at EU level, but which have few 
connections to the policy content. 
 In an attempt to overcome this and other weaknesses in the literature, Borrás and Radaelli (2011) 
propose the overarching framework of ‘governance architecture’ to conceptualize the politics and 
institutional elements of strategies developed by international organizations. For these authors 
governance architectures, such as the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020, represent ‘strategic and 
long-term political initiatives of international organizations on cross cutting policy issues locked 
into commitments about targets and processes’. In the Borrás and Radaelli framing, governance 
architectures are situated at the meso level between the multi-level governance of an international 
institution and an individual policy programme. They are conceived as comprising ideational and 
organizational components. The ideational component is defined as: a set of fundamental ideational 
repertoires, expressed in notions such as ‘governance’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘sustainability’, 
‘knowledge based society’, the ‘market’ and a discourse that uses the ideational repertoires in order 
to discipline, organize and legitimize the hierarchical relationships between the goals and the policy 
instruments. Taken together, ideas and discourses give shape to the overall attempt to socialize 
actors into a specific frame of reference that is supposed to make sense of a complex world of 
cross-cutting policy problems. The organizational component comprises: formal and informal 
organizational arrangements (politico-organisational machinery) where the ideational repertoires 
and discourses are defined and patterned through complex political processes of a multi-level nature 
and the selection of policy instruments and their procedural requirements. According to Borràs and 
Radaelli, analysing the different components of a governance architecture in combination with 
Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams approach enables the researcher to understand how governance 
architectures emerge and how they are maintained and adapted over time. On a second level, Borrás 
and Radaelli argue that Member State compliance with a governance architecture should be 
analysed through the Europeanization lens.   
 This is a major contribution that takes the field forward in several ways. In the first instance, 
Borrás and Radaelli aim to go beyond the existing binaries which have proven to be a major 
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difficulty in EU studies (see also Jenson and Mérand 2010). One of the biggest advances of the 
governance architecture approach is to offer an integrated or encompassing framework that takes 
account of both the many fields in which the EU is now active and the EU’s attempt to integrate 
these through innovations in governance. Furthermore, analysis of arrangements for governance is 
to be simultaneously considered with and analysed in relation to the ideas and discourses involved 
in the policy portfolio, making for a more interactional and dynamic approach. In many ways its 
integrated framework – melding ideas, culture and norms with material and organizational factors – 
mirrors the breadth and degree of integration of the Europe 2020 programme itself. 
 We agree with Borrás and Radaelli in fundamental respects and see what we are about here as an 
early attempt to apply their framework to a specific policy domain. However, we believe their 
framework has to be further developed to analyse concrete policy areas within the EU. The Borrás 
and Radaelli framework is generic and global (and arguably too abstract). It also has a thrust 
towards stasis, implying that a policy area is to be conceived as being structured by the prevailing 
ideational and organizational components at any one moment in time. They are interested in ‘big 
moments’ - usually the launch/re-launch of a strategy. Our reservations with the approach extend 
also to politics in that in our view it underplays the role and place of politics and the 
conceptualization of the EU as a political system. While Borrásand Radaelli integrate politics in a 
horizontal manner into their framework (in the sense that politics is seen to be implicit in the 
ideational repertories, the strategic use of discourses, the organizational arrangements and the 
selection of policy instruments), their framework has a structuralist bias. Among other things this 
imbues it with a tendency to view the instruments and governance arrangements in a politically 
neutral and somewhat homogeneous way. 
We suggest the utility of bringing in insights from the political sociology approach (Kassim and Le 
Galè2010; Lascoumbes and Le Galè2007). In essence, this perspective problematizes the selection 
of policy instruments and calls for a move beyond the limited sense of social and political factors 
that pervades existing work in this regard. Among the main critiques advanced are that norms tend 
to be reified and treated apart from the actors who use them to guide their actions, that the selection 
and operationalization of instruments tend to be treated on functional rather than political grounds, 
and that scholarship is more focused on institutions in and of themselves (institution centric) rather 
than institutions as a vector of power built through socio-political  processes (Jenson and Mérand 
2010; Kassim and Le Galès 2010; Favell and Guiraudon 2011). underlying point, then, is that ideas, 
discourses, governance instruments and arrangements are inherently political, the subject of 
ongoing power struggles between actors, and are continually being remade (rather than fixed). 
Moreover, instead of being politically neutral, instruments and governance arrangements confront 
actors with structures of opportunity and privilege certain courses of action, interests and actors 
over others (Kassim and Le Galè2010: 4). From this perspective, all the elements of governance 
architectures are to be conceived as located in hierarchies of power and privilege. 
This perspective brings the following insights to bear on the analysis of  policy areas : (1) elements 
of the governance architecture always involve a set of meanings which cannot be disconnected from 
the wider social and political context; (2) governance architectures are to be conceived as involving 
a set of political relations that shape the choice and implementation of policy instruments, ideas and 
discourses; (3) policy domains and the procedures whereby they are governed are inherently 
political in nature and both reflect and generate hierarchies of power and authority. 
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These insights lead us to consider the conditions whereby a policy programme can be taken forward 
or not in an EU context. Such conditions centre upon: the coherence and meaning of the elements of 
a policy instrument/domain in an ideational sense, how and where the policy instrument fits 
politically in the policy process, and the nature and strength of the governance arrangements put in 
place.    
The analysis to follow in the next section seeks to address these sets of issues.  
3. Poverty and Social Exclusion within Europe 2020
How meaningful is the poverty target? 
Ceteris paribus, the agreement on the poverty target represents a step forward for the development 
of EU social policy. Targets are in many senses the epitome of rationality and betoken crystal clear 
agreement on policy goals. They imply a plan-led approach to a problem, calling upon a clear set of 
objectives and the achievement of well-specified goals which are realizable and are meaningful 
politically. To what extent is this the case with the poverty and social exclusion target? 
 The Europe 2020 poverty target is exemplary in several respects. For example, it sets a clear time 
deadline and is ambitious (rather than tokenistic). Its ambition may be gauged from the fact that it 
aims  to achieve a reduction of some 17% in poverty prevalence across the EU by 2020. To give 
some idea of the scale of this ambition, over the course of the eight years of relative growth in 
Europe (2000-2008) relative income poverty in the EU remained unchanged (Cantillon 2011). A 
further relevant aspect of the poverty target is that the EU is very specific about its constituents. In 
fact, the term poverty target is something of a short-hand in that it is defined to be based on three 
dimensions: income poverty, severe material deprivation and/or jobless households. For the 
purposes of achieving the target, poverty in the Member States can relate to any one, two, or all 
three of these phenomena. The EU poverty target is, then, a (relatively complicated) construct in 
that Member States have a choice of which of the three approaches to adopt, and they may even opt 
for an alternative approach provided they justify its usage in terms of how it will contribute to the 
EU target overall.   
 Our first reservation begins here and problematizes especially the fact that  Member States have a 
choice of not just the level to set their target at but which indicator or ‘problem’ to use for their 
target’s focus. To be sure, there are justifications for opening up the target – for example the nature 
and extent of the problems facing Member States (in general and on the three poverty indicators 
chosen) vary and so some leeway is advised. However, we suggest that the target risks being 
unworkable because of philosophical and policy incoherence. This directs attention to the 
underlying policy approach, the empirical nature and manifestation of the phenomenon invoked by 
each indicator, and wide variations in the extent to which Member States experience each of the 
three phenomena.    
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 First, in terms of policy approach what seems like a coherent set of indicators actually digs deeply 
into diverse philosophies of welfare and views about the best approach to combat poverty and social 
exclusion.  The first element – being below a 60 percent cut-off of median income – is the classic 
relative poverty measure based on how one’s income compares to the societal average. As an 
approach to social policy it calls for either income redistribution (if poverty is seen in terms of 
falling below a relative income threshold) or the guaranteeing of a basic or minimum income 
threshold below which no one should fall (if an absolute approach is taken). The EU has never 
settled on relative income poverty as a definition of poverty – even though it is the most widely-
used definition of poverty in Member States - and the redistributionist social policy model implied 
by a relative poverty approach has had limited appeal or support at EU level compared with 
minimum income schemes which have secured a stronger consensus. The second component of the 
target – being without at least four items out of a nine-item list of ‘deprivations’ – picks up on 
lifestyle deprivation and access to customary standards and styles of living. It addresses one of the 
weaknesses of the relative income poverty threshold which is that it does not give sufficient weight 
to living standards, especially in countries where living and income standards are low (De Graaf-
Zijl and Nolan 2011: 425). As a policy response, adequate income is important here, too, but so also 
are social services and measures to combat social exclusion (such as for example better educational 
and labour market opportunities for people). The third dimension of the target links into household 
joblessness – the number of people in a household where the adults worked less than 20% of their 
total work-time potential during the reference period. Two concerns underlie this: work intensity on 
the part of individuals sharing the same household or family; the psychological predisposition 
towards employment and the morally corrosive effects of joblessness, especially in an 
intergenerational sense. This does not problematize unemployment per se, then, but rather its 
distribution or concentration among people living in the same household or family. The perceived 
solution is to intervene in what is viewed especially as a family or intergenerational cycle whereby 
people become demotivated, and disadvantage and poor access to the labour market become more 
entrenched as time passes and generations succeed each other. There are three required policy 
actions involved: to make more jobs available; to target these jobs towards people sharing 
households where there is too little engagement with employment; and to make people in these 
households available for employment and wanting to be employed. 
Problems in choosing the right policy approach are compounded by weaknesses or lack of strong 
linkages between the three dimensions of the poverty target in reality. In this regard, research 
suggests that, while there is a strong relationship between income poverty and material deprivation, 
joblessness as a characteristic of households is a very different kind of phenomenon and one that is 
only poorly correlated with either poverty or material deprivation (de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011). 
A jobless household is the odd one out in several respects. First, people living in such households 
are not necessarily poor. Nolan and Whelan (2011: 16) demonstrate that over a quarter of people 
classified as being in jobless households in the EU as a whole are from professional and managerial 
classes and only 43% are drawn from the working classes, suggesting at a minimum that this 
population is highly differentiated and that people live in jobless households for a host of reasons 
among which may not be a shortage of money. Their findings lead them to suggest that joblessness 
might be better thought of as a factor leading to income poverty or material deprivation than as an 
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indicator of poverty per se (ibid: 18). Hence, measures to address household joblessness will not 
contribute hugely to reducing poverty and material deprivation and vice versa. 
 A further set of challenges is posed by the fact that poverty, material deprivation and jobless 
households vary widely in their prevalence within the Union and across Member States. Of the 
three, income poverty is the most extensive problem. Affecting some 17% of the EU population in 
2008 – this is equivalent to at least 80 million people. In comparison, around 8% of the EU’s 
population experience severe material deprivation and a similar proportion of people live in so-
called jobless households. In addition the prevalence of each varies widely among Member States. 
Hence, income poverty in 2008 varied from a low of 8.6% in the Czech Republic to a high of 
25.7% in Latvia. Similarly material deprivation is a very rare phenomenon in some Member States 
(such as the Netherlands and Sweden where it affects fewer than 2% of the population) but a very 
common one in others (like Bulgaria and Romania with respective prevalence of 41.9% and 
32.2%). Variation is extreme also in the jobless household’s phenomenon (encapsulated by a rate of 
4% in Cyprus and 19.8% in Ireland).  This variation helps to explain the catholic nature of the 
agreed definition of poverty and social exclusion for the purposes of the target and underlines how 
the constitution of the poverty target might be political. But reality hits home in other ways as well. 
For not only does the nature of the most pressing problem vary by country but so too does the 
overall scale of the problem. When the three elements of the target are assembled together, the EU-
wide variation is such that the population for the target varies from 14.8% of the total population in 
the Netherlands to 44.3% in Romania (Nolan and Whelan 2011: 15). So addressing the target is a 
much bigger problem in some countries than others. And it is the new Member States as well as 
those in the Mediterranean region together with the UK and Ireland which face the greatest 
challenge in meeting the target. The underlying point to be emphasized, then, is that what seemed 
like a rational idea at the time of agreeing the target – to have it diversely constituted - has profound 
implications. These exist both at national level - in regard to how the poverty target fits with the 
national social policy model and the scale of the response required to meet the EU target – and at 
EU level – in terms of whether such a diversely-constituted approach to poverty is meaningful as a 
political goal. . What seems like a coherent target, therefore, masks great incoherence and huge 
differences in the nature and scale of challenge. 
Where does the target sit in relation to other policy objectives and the policy hierarchy? 
One of our main claims is that governance architectures are not value-free arenas in which agreed 
objectives and policy instruments are given an equal weight. Rather they are embedded in political 
strategies that privilege certain interests and actors over others, create hierarchies of priority, and 
reflect a broader set of socio-political relations between actors and interests. Furthermore, given the 
dynamics often surrounding the aims and objectives of governance architectures, such relations are 
continuously in flux and the subject of ongoing power struggles. Given this, to fully understand the 
significance of a policy objective within a governance architecture, it is necessary to locate the 
objective in the hierarchy of priorities. 
 The re-launched Lisbon Strategy institutionalized a historical and structural separation between 
social policy on the one hand and economic, monetary and employment policy on the other 
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( Tholoniat 2010). This has always been a source of criticism on the part of social actors, and has 
left a lingering suspicion that poverty and social exclusion are afterthoughts or ‘add-ons’ to the 
process of European integration. Therefore, the integrative ambition of Europe 2020 was trumpeted 
as one of its strengths, especially in relation to establishing more formal linkages between the 
different policy pillars (economic, monetary and employment) and the inclusion of poverty and 
social exclusion into the mainstream governance process (via its incorporation into the employment 
pillar). This notwithstanding, we consider that the hierarchy of priorities and objectives within 
Europe 2020 is such that the ‘integrated’ nature of Europe 2020 does little to improve the ‘add-on’ 
status of social policy within the EU. The poverty target is situated low in Europe 2020’s priorities 
and its achievement is derivative of progress in other policy areas.  
Europe 2020  privileges activity and progress within the macro-economic pillar over other pillars 
and thereby empowers actors within DG Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), as well as 
those operating in Finance Ministries at the national level, over any other grouping of decision-
makers. At the heart of Europe 2020 are two aims: first, to modernize and increase the 
competitiveness of the EU; and second, to reduce Member State budget deficits and total levels of 
debt (i.e., fiscal discipline). Member States are to abide by the concept of fiscal sustainability in 
their monetary policies and developments within the economic and employment pillars (which 
includes the poverty target) are to demonstrate an appreciation of this principle. In other words, 
developments in the thematic components of Europe 2020 are rendered a function of progress in the 
macro economy. This principle has been further emphasized by the Commission which has 
proposed that selected thematic issues “could also be addressed to the extent that they have 
macroeconomic implications through the recommendations under the BEPGs” (European 
Commission 2010c: 28). In other words, despite the Commission arguing that Member States “must 
find room in their budgets” for thematic issues (European Commission 2010a: 3), if 
macroeconomic conditions become unfavourable, i.e., excessive government deficit or debt level, 
then spending on the thematic components of Europe 2020 should be restricted until ‘sound’ public 
finances are re-established.
 Moreover, the EU’s response to the euro-zone crisis exacerbates these tendencies and reinforces the 
hierarchy of priorities within Europe 2020 (Leschke et al 2012). That is, the various reforms to the 
EU’s broader economic governance reinforce the objective of macro-economic discipline. This 
further disadvantages social actors and their ability to make progress on the poverty target. In all, 
the EU has implemented a so-called ‘six-pack’ of measures. The two most important reforms have 
been the strengthening of the fiscal rules under the Stability and Growth Pact, known as the Euro 
Plus Pact, and the Excessive Deficit Procedure to address the issue of current account deficits. The 
Euro Plus Pact is designed to be a more stringent successor to the Stability and Growth Pact which 
had not been consistently adhered to across the Member States. The Pact continues to use the OMC 
but has come under criticism for promoting fiscal austerity while simultaneously seeking to reduce 
unemployment by implanting market-oriented structural reforms (Leschke et al 2012). 
Although these two developments do not directly address the poverty target, indirectly they 
reinforce the hierarchical relationship among both priorities and different socio-political groups 
within Europe 2020.  Therefore, as the Euro zone crisis has continued to gather momentum, the 
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broader set of reforms to the EU’s economic governance has reinforced the low priority of the 
poverty target. Moreover, since 14 of the EU’s 27 Member States currently have government debt 
levels above the 60 per cent of total GDP threshold (Eurostat 2011: 1) raising the possibility of a 
‘fine’, there are strong incentives for such Member States to reduce their government debt via 
spending reductions, leaving few resources to address the poverty target. Furthermore, EU/IMF 
lending programme countries are not required this year to submit full National Reform Programmes 
but a letter of update outlining the state of play and possible updates of the national Europe 2020 
targets and Euro Plus Pact commitments. One could say, then, that the normal process of Europe 
2020 is being suspended for these countries. It is hard to interpret this other than that these countries 
– with poverty levels among the highest in the EU - are not bound by the 10 guidelines and five 
targets of Europe 2020. The hierarchy of priority within the objectives of Europe 2020 therefore 
weakens the progress social actors can make with respect to achieving the poverty target.  
How adequate are the modes of governance? 
During the Lisbon decade, the OMC in poverty and social exclusion operated outside of the 
mainstream governance cycle. It formed its own logic centring on policy review and learning  
which did not feature Country Specific Recommendations by the Council/Commission for the 
Member States as a tool of governance. In this respect, the OMC social inclusion was one of the 
weaker OMC governance processes. The incorporation of poverty and social exclusion into the 
employment pillar suggests a strengthening in its governance, since employment is generally 
considered to be an advanced and developed sphere of the OMC (Tholoniat 2010). This is because 
the employment pillar features an annual governance cycle of commonly agreed guidelines, the 
reporting of progress in the form of National Reform Programmes, and peer review with the issuing 
of Country Specific Recommendations. However, this shift in the governance of poverty and social 
exclusion does not necessarily signify an improvement to the mode of governance in the poverty/
social exclusion and could actually signify the opposite. 
The first point to note is that the full incorporation of poverty and social exclusion into the 
employment pillar creates legal uncertainties surrounding its governance. Employment policy has 
an explicit place in the Treaty under Article 148 and this provides the legal mandate for the 
governance of the employment strategy, including the issuing of Country Specific 
Recommendations. In contrast, the Treaty grants the EU loose and inchoate powers in relation to 
poverty and social exclusion. The issuing of Country Specific Recommendations in this domain is 
therefore contentious and a source of dispute between the Commission and some Member States. 
Three countries in particular are vehemently opposed to its use for social purposes (DK, Pl and 
UK). The legal basis of the incorporation of poverty and social exclusion into the employment pillar 
is therefore in doubt, undermining its legal status and thereby governance. In sum then, although 
social exclusion and poverty are now subject to an annual cycle under Europe 2020, Member State 
engagement remains voluntary and the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations contentious 
and to date little utilized.  
 The second issue concerns the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the governance of the 
poverty target, particularly with respect to who governs it. Under the auspices of the Council, both 
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employment and poverty/social exclusion are the responsibility of the Employment and Social 
Policy Council (EPSCO), but within EPSCO they are governed separately by the Employment 
Committee and the Social Protection Committee respectively. Moreover, following the launch of 
Europe 2020 the OMC social exclusion, which had centred around the Social Protection 
Committee, was suspended. This has left a high degree of uncertainty as to both the process and 
who is responsible for monitoring and encouraging progress towards the poverty target in the 
Member States. The reintroduction of some elements of the OMC has not clarified the situation. If 
anything, the agreement that Member States must now produce National Social Reports in addition 
to National Reform Programmes has led to confusion even if such reports are to be synchronized 
with the European Semester and the National Reform Programmes. It is difficult to see this as a 
major development which improves the clarity as to who is responsible for the poverty target. First, 
the modalities of reporting and review – and in particular what status the National Social Report 
will have re Europe 2020 – are unclear. Second, the re-launching of a social reporting procedure  
appears to result from a minority of EU-level social actors, especially the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Employment (DG EMPL), attempting to regain some control and input into 
the EU’s economic reform strategy. In sum, there remains continued uncertainty as to who is 
responsible for the governance of the poverty target and such uncertainty undermines the progress 
that can be made. 
 The third and final point is that the ambiguities surrounding the governance of poverty and social 
exclusion within Europe 2020 have been further heightened by the uncertainties of the purpose and 
function of the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion. The aim of the Platform is 
to create a commitment among the Member States, EU institutions and the key stakeholders to fight 
poverty and social exclusion. In doing so, it intends to identify best practice and promote mutual 
learning, establish EU-wide rules, and make necessary EU funds available. However, the purpose of 
the Platform remains unclear, particularly with respect to the supposed difference between the 
Platform and the OMC social exclusion developed during Lisbon.  
Overall then, the governance of poverty and social exclusion is based on a voluntary agreement 
between the Member States in which there is a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity.   
 
4. Conclusion
Essentially, any EU target is only as good as the targets that are uploaded to the EU level.  When it 
comes to the poverty and social exclusion target it is subject to two main risks:  that Member States 
will choose a focus that is not consonant with the EU’s way of conceiving poverty; or that they will 
choose a target that is too low to make a sufficient contribution to the EU-level target. The 
achievement of the Europe 2020 poverty target rests, therefore, on a double jeopardy. 
 Regarding the actual definitions chosen by the Member States, the latest information suggests that 
the first jeopardy has come to pass. Seven Member States (CZ, DE, DK, EE, FR, SE, UK) have 
exercised the choice implicit in the framing of the target and opted for a different set of indicators to 
that of the EU and an eighth country - Luxembourg - has set no target at all. This makes for some 11 
different kinds of target in all (seven from the aforementioned Member States, plus the four implicit 
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in the EU target). This underlines our claim of imperilled governability because of incoherence. In 
terms of the actual targets set, the second jeopardy has also occurred in that the estimates available 
to date point to a great shortfall in the EU target. In fact, the EU target is short by between 5 and 8 
million. The ‘lost millions’ are a casualty of the impossibility of ensuring that the Member State 
targets and priorities cumulate appropriately to those at EU level.
 The framework that we constructed and applied here, drawing both on Borrás and Radaelli’s 
concept of ‘governance architecture’ and insights from political sociology about the political 
underpinnings of ideas, agency and institutions treated ideas, politics and governance mechanisms 
as inter-related but contested. Governance architectures are not value-free arenas, but are sites of 
political struggle between various social actors which construct hierarchies of priorities and power, 
and thereby serve to determine whether a policy programme can be taken forward in an EU context 
or not. Furthermore, rather than being ‘static’ entities or institutions, governance architectures are 
dynamic and continuously being remade. The framework therefore unpacks the hierarchy of 
objectives, instruments and positioning between various groupings of socio-political actors and 
policy domains, highlighting that there are conditions of governability for any policy area. These 
conditions relate to: ideational consistency; political and policy prioritization; and the adequacy of 
the governance mechanisms. 
Applying the framework reveals that EU social policy, as conceived by the poverty target in Europe 
2020, is both ungovernable and ungoverned. First, the target is ideationally incoherent representing 
a patchwork of different, and often competing, ideologies with respect to poverty and social 
exclusion. While the target may make sense in terms of the diverse set of factors that contribute to 
poverty at Member State level as well as diverse national approaches to dealing with it, as an EU-
level entity, the target – covering as it does income poverty, severe material deprivation and jobless 
households among other problem areas – subsumes very different perspectives and represents such 
an uncertain, and unclear, compromise with respect to how poverty and social exclusion should be 
defined and addressed that it is effectively ungovernable. A second factor contributing to its 
ungovernability is that  not only does the poverty and social exclusion target have a low place in the 
hierarchy of priorities and objectives within Europe 2020, but it has been further marginalized as a 
result of the EU’s response to the financial crisis which has set in stone fiscal discipline and 
spending limits. Rather than being an independent policy area that is ring-fenced from other 
developments, its achievement is dependent upon progress in other policy areas, particularly the 
macro economy. A third set of factors highlights the ungoverned nature of the target - not only is 
there legal uncertainty as to whether Country Specific Recommendations can be issued for the 
target (unlike the employment area with which it is conjoined), but ambiguity remains over who is 
responsible for its governance and the exact purpose and function of the mechanisms for its 
implementation (including the Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion and the OMC).      
All of this leads us to the view that Europe 2020 does not represent significant progress for EU 
social policy. Europe 2020 rests on an expectation that a ‘joined-up’ governance process (which is 
to be realized by targets, integrated guidelines and the European Semester) will lead to the 
upgrading of social policy and increase the chances of poverty and social exclusion being part of an 
integrated approach. What we have demonstrated in this paper is that Europe 2020 is incapable, 
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because of ideational, political and institutional weaknesses, of bringing social policy in from the 
margins of the European integration process. While it is novel in an EU context to have a target for 
poverty and social exclusion, and the target itself has some innovative and ambitious elements, it 
does not signify a strengthening of the EU’s commitment to social policy.       
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David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, 'Economic Governance and the chimera of 
financial system stability: The political economy of new capital requirements in 
the European Union’
Abstract 
The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems’ was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the 
global financial crisis. Its adoption into European Union (EU) legislation has, however, been met 
with considerable member state reticence and intra-EU negotiations are ongoing. This paper 
investigates the domestic political economy of new capital requirements in the EU, arguing that the 
institutional features of the domestic banking sector convincingly account for the divergence in EU 
member state preferences on capital rules. 
Introduction
Since the global financial crisis delivered a major blow to the financial stability of much of the 
European Union (EU), financial regulation has moved to the centre stage of debates about the future 
of EU economic governance (for an overview see Buckley and Howarth 2010; Mügge 2011; Posner 
2009; Quaglia 2012). Capital requirements for banks have traditionally been regarded as one of the 
main instruments to ensure the stability of the banking sector and hence financial stability tout 
court. In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued the Basel I Accord on 
‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards’, which was updated by 
the Basel II Accord in 2004 (revised in 2005, see BCBS 2005).  Over time, these ‘soft’ international 
rules have been incorporated into (legally binding) national legislation. In the EU this was done 
through the capital requirements directives (CRD) (see Underhill 1998; Christopoulos and Quaglia 
2009). 
The Basel III accord (hereafter Basel III) was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the 
international regulatory response to the global financial crisis (BCBS 2010). Its adoption into EU 
law has, however, met with considerable member state and EU institutional reticence. The EU 
directive and regulation to be adopted (referred to collectively as CRDIV) will likely qualify the 
application of the Basel III capital requirements in the EU. The EU is one of the largest financial 
jurisdictions worldwide and some scholars have indeed pointed out its ‘market power’ (Damro 
2012). In terms of total banking assets and liabilities, the EU’s internal market is larger than that of 
the US. Hence, the implementation of Basel III into EU legislation will be consequential not only 
for its large internal market and the 6000 European banks therein, but also for the stability of the 
international financial system. Third jurisdictions, first and foremost the US, which is the main 
counterpart of the EU in international financial fora, are also concerned about potential regulatory 
arbitrage and competitive advantages accruing to European banks as a result of the ‘distinctive’  
implementation of Basel rules in the EU. 
This paper investigates the implementation of the Basel III accord into EU legislation with a view 
to make sense of two (related) issues. First, despite financial integration in Europe and the rise of 
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pan-European banking groups, profound differences remain in both national banking systems and 
national regulatory frameworks. Hence a heated intra-EU political debate erupted on the proposed 
legislation. Second, the UK, which in the past had supported ‘light touch’ regulation (Hodson and 
Mabbett 2009; Posner and Veron 2010), favoured new strict rules on capital. By contrast, France 
and Germany called for a ‘looser’ definition of capital and lower capital requirements, contradicting 
their ‘market-shaping’ approach to financial regulation, which predominated since the financial 
crisis on a range of financial issues in the EU (Quaglia 2010; Zimmerman 2010), internationally 
(Fioretos 2011) and especially in government discourse (Buckley and Howarth 2010). However, the 
positioning of EU member states on EU legislation implementing Basel III deviates from these 
expectations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the politics of EU financial 
regulation. Section 3 provides an overview of the negotiations and the content of the new capital 
rules in the EU. Section 4 investigates the domestic political economy of these rules in the main 
European countries. It is argued that the institutional features of the domestic banking sector and 
other domestic political economy considerations convincingly account for the divergence in EU 
member state preferences on Basel III. This section demonstrates the incomplete nature of European 
economic governance and accounts for the intergovernmental character of many EU negotiations in 
this policy field.
2.  The State of the Art
The political economy literature on financial services regulation in the EU has developed differing 
views on the subject. Story and Walter (1997) stressed the intergovernmental character of the 
negotiations on financial market regulation in the EU in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. As the 
title of their book suggests, their work regarded financial market integration as the ‘battle of the 
systems’, whereby the member states were keen to set EU rules that were in line with their domestic 
regulatory approach and did not create comparative disadvantages or adjustment costs to national 
industry and the public authorities. However, they also stressed the importance of ‘ideas’ about 
regulation, the state and financial services (for a similar argument, see also Grossman 2004). 
Underhill (1997), like Story and Walter, highlighted how the ‘triangle’ of the three main financial 
systems in the EU – the British, the French and the German – played out and shaped EU financial 
regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s. These accounts tend to be intergovernmental, overlooking 
the role of other important actors, such as the European Commission and industry. This chapter 
builds on and develops further this line of enquiry by examining the ‘battle’ of the systems on a key 
piece of financial legislation: capital rules. 
A second body of scholarly work has viewed the Commission as the core supranational actor 
driving financial market integration (Posner 2005; Jabko 2006).  Posner (2005: 20) stressed the 
‘intended and unintended bureaucratic actions’ of the Commission in the creation of new stock 
markets in Europe in the 1990s. By contrast, Jabko (2006) showed how the Commission was able to 
‘construct’ the single market by emphasising different meanings of the word ‘market’ to different 
audiences, forming a coalition that pushed through financial market reform in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. These accounts somewhat overemphasise the role of the Commission in the making of 
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financial regulation. This policy area is still jealously guarded by the member states. Moreover, the 
Commission has seen its influence reduced in the EU policy process since the time of the 
charismatic Presidency of Jacques Delors.  Yet, the Commission has been activist in its efforts on 
financial regulation, in particular since the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008.  
A third stream of literature has focused on the role of the private sector in promoting European 
financial market integration (Bieling 2003; Mügge 2006, 2010; Macartney 2009, 2010; Van 
Apeldoorn 2002). These works emphasise either the structural power of transnational capital or the 
lobbying activities of financial institutions which ‘captured’ the public authorities in various ways 
(Baker 2010; Underhill, Blom and Mügge 2010). Amongst the most prominent were the 
‘economic’ or ‘material’ capture, given the size and importance of the financial sector in certain 
countries and the economic resources available to industry for lobbying, and the ‘intellectual’ 
capture, based on the high level of expertise and technical knowledge at the disposal of the private 
sector and often tapped into by the regulators themselves. This literature tends to underplay the fact 
that the financial industry, even the main transnational players, often have competing interests. This 
chapter investigates the preferences of the financial industry (mainly banks) on capital rules in the 
main member states on the basis of their capital positions and business models.
Other scholars have focused on networks of supervisors in the EU (Coen and Thatcher 2008; De 
Visscher et al. 2008; Quaglia 2008), an approach which, however, has limited explanatory power in 
the making of level 1 legislation (or framework legislation), because the ‘technical’ authorities (i.e., 
financial supervisors) are only consulted during the legislative process, whereby legislation is 
proposed by the Commission and co-decided by the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. The network based approach is more successful when applied to level 2 legislation in 
which the so-called ‘committees of supervisors’, recently transformed into EU agencies, are the 
main players. 
Other studies have applied a constructivist analysis to the subject, pointing out that in the 1980s and 
1990s a dominating paradigm for financial services regulation emerged internationally and in the 
main jurisdictions, including Europe. They have referred to it as the ‘neoliberal’ paradigm (Best 
2003; Gamble 2009) or as a ‘governance light’ approach, which favoured ‘market-based 
governance’, based on a benign view of financial markets and grounded in efficient market theories 
(Underhill et al. 2010: 10). This regulatory paradigm was sponsored by the US and the UK, which 
prior to the crisis exercised considerable influence in international regulatory fora (Baker 2010; 
Helleiner and Pagliari 2010).  
In the EU, regulatory liberalism came to dominate EU financial regulation from the mid-1990s 
onwards until the outbreak of the global financial crisis (Mügge 2011). Over time, according to 
Donnelly (2011), there was a gradual convergence, which he refers to as ‘collusion’, amongst 
member states’ norms of financial market regulation, paving the way to an agreement to delegate 
functions at the supranational level in the early 2000s – the so-called Lamfalussy architecture (see 
Quaglia 2007). In a similar vein, but with more emphasis on persisting differences of regulatory 
approaches, Quaglia (2010a, b) pointed out two main competing coalitions of interests and ideas 
struggling to shape financial regulation in the EU in the 2000s: the ‘market-making’ coalition, led 
by the UK, also included Ireland and the Nordic countries; and the market-shaping coalition, led by 
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France, also included Italy, other Mediterranean countries and, in several instances, Germany (see 
also Zimmerman 2010). 
This paper investigates member states and financial industry preferences on capital rules through a 
comparative political economy (CPE) analysis. In so doing, it addresses the apparent contradiction 
in EU member state broader regulatory preferences mentioned in the idea-based literature and their 
specific preferences on EU capital requirements legislation. The CPE analysis embraced here sees 
member state preferences determined by a combination of political economy factors and, notably, 
the institutional features of the domestic banking sector (see Allen and Gale 2000, Hardie and 
Howarth 2013). Our analysis involves digging into the balance sheets of banks in the main EU 
countries, their assets and liabilities (i.e., how banks are funded). The impact of state intervention 
during the recent financial crisis on banks’ capital position is also considered. 
3. The content and negotiations of the new EU capital legislation
The Basel III accord was signed by the BCBS in December 2010 (BCBS 2010). The new rules: 
provide a more restrictive definition of what counts as capital; increase the risk weight of several 
assets in the banking book and introduce capital buffers; set up a recommended and potentially 
obligatory leverage ratio; and outline international rules on liquidity management. All in all, the 
new rules increase the proportion of capital that must be of proven loss absorbing capacity (going 
concern), i.e., core tier one (equity) capital, over Basel II requirements, and will be phased in 
gradually from January 2013 until 2019. The Basel III accord is an agreement between national 
regulators gathered in the BCBS, hence it has to be implemented into national (and / or EU) 
legislation in order to become legally binding. 
In July 2011, after extensive consultation conducted in parallel with the work of the BCBS, the EU 
Commission adopted the CRDIV legislative package designed to replace the CRDII with a directive 
that governs the access to deposit-taking activities (Commission 2011a) and a regulation that 
establishes prudential requirements for credit institutions (Commission 2011b). After its approval, 
the proposed directive (Commission 2011a) will have to be transposed by the member states in a 
way suitable to their own national environment. It contains rules concerning the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of banks, the conditions for the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services, the supervisory review process and the definition of competent authorities. The 
directive also incorporates two elements of the Basel III accord, namely the introduction of two 
capital buffers on top of the minimum capital requirements: the capital conservation buffer identical 
for all banks in the EU the countercyclical capital buffer to be determined at national level. The 
proposed EU regulation (CRR) (Commission 2011b) contains prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms. The proposed regulation covers the definition of capital, 
increasing the amount of own funds that banks need to hold as well as the quality of those funds; it 
introduces the Liquidity Coverage Ratio — the exact composition and calibration of which will be 
determined after an observation and review period in 2015; and the need to consider a leverage 
ratio, subject to supervisory review. 
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The Commission’s CRDIV draft, which would implement Basel III into EU law, is the most 
substantial of all the post-financial crisis regulatory measures entertained to date at the EU-level but  
its draft also involved watering down or modifying the Basel III guidelines in ways to meet EU 
member state demands (IMF 2011; Financial Times 30 January 2012). Table 1 outlines the main 
differences between Basel III and CRDIV. 
Table 1:  CRDIV versus Basel III
Basel III EU Commission draft (20.7.2011) CRDIV 
Definition of 
Capital 
Core Tier-1 defined as common shares – 
strict criteria set – and retained earnings 
only. Hybrids banned in Core Tier-1 and 
restricted in non-Core Tier 1. 
Marginally broader definition of Core Tier-1: to 
include ‘silent participations’. Broader use of 
hybrids in non-Core Tier 1.
More detail on the required characteristics of CET 
1 instruments for mutual and cooperative entities, 
including potential derogations from specific 
requirements.
Level of 
Capital
Total regulatory capital (tier-1 and tier-2) 
must be at least 8 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). Core tier-1 at 4.5 per cent and 
total Tier- 1 at 6 per cent of RWA. Total 
regulatory capital with capital conservation 
buffer set at 10.5 per cent and up to 13 per 
cent with countercyclical capital buffer 
(which can include some hybrids). Up to 10 
per cent of insurance subsidiary capital can 
be double counted.
Same ratios but double counting of insurance 
subsidiaries allowed and more flexible rules on 
hybrids.
Single rule book / maximum harmonisation 
approach adopted.
Leverage ratio Set as a backstop to risk-based capital. To 
test a minimum Core-Tier 1 leverage ratio of 
3 per cent (non-risk based) from 2013-2017; 
with possible inclusion thereafter.
Leverage ratio to be considered.
Liquidity Net Stable Funding Ratio introduced; and 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to cover 30 
day period of ‘acute market stress’. Strict 
criteria as to what counts as an eligible 
liquid asset.
NSFR seen as an option: may be imposed after an 
observation and review period.
Less prescriptive language on what counts as an 
eligible liquid asset under the LCR.
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Transition 
periods
Capital: 2015
Capital buffers: Phased in between 2016 and 
2019.
Liquidity: LCR by 2015; NSFR by 2018.
Capital: same as in Basel III
Capital buffers: same as Basel III.
Liquidity:  LCR by 2015; NSFR may be adopted 
from 2018.
The CRDIV draft was criticised by many regulators and by the IMF for failing to incorporate key 
Basel III elements (IMF 2011). The Commission ‘softened’ its definition of Core Tier I capital 
relative to the Basel III recommendations in some areas — effectively allowing ‘silent 
participations’, that is, state loans that make up a significant part of public Landesbanken capital. 
The Commission’s draft limits the role of the leverage ratio designed to limit risk-taking at banks. 
The almost unique reliance on the risk-weighted core tier 1 ratio in the Commission’s draft CRDIV, 
which was in line with what agreed in Basel IIII, was criticised for inadequately representing the 
health of the European banking sector (Financial Times 30 January 2012). On liquidity, the 
Commission adopts the less prescriptive definition of liquid assets for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) to include ‘transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and credit quality’ and 
‘transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality’. The Commission’s draft lacks of a 
firm commitment to implement the Net Stable Funding Ratio by 2018 called for in Basel III. The 
proposed regulation also sets higher capital requirements for Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives 
that are not cleared though Central Counterparties (CCPs). The use of a regulation, which once 
approved is directly applicable without the need for national transposition, is designed to ensure the 
creation of a single rule book in the EU. The regulation eliminates a key source of national 
divergence. In the CRD II, more than one hundred national discretions (differences in national 
legislation transposing the EU directive) remained. Yet, the Commission also proposed a maximum 
capital ratio which was opposed by many who argued in favour of EU standards that exceed the 
Basel minimum because of prevailing balance sheet uncertainties in the EU, the lack of EU-wide 
resolution arrangements and a fully unified fiscal backstop. The analysis below will demonstrate 
that most of these modifications to Basel III in CRDIV owe to French and German demands. 
Following the agreement on Basel III and during the intra-EU negotiations on CRDIV, some of the 
compromises reached in the BCBS unravelled. Several EU member states, the European Parliament 
(EP) and even the Commission itself called for the taking into account of ‘European specificities’ in 
incorporating the Basel III rules into the CRD IV, reopening some of the issues that had caused 
friction within the BCBS. Basel III applied to internationally active banks, whereas EU legislation 
was to apply to all banks, making some Basel III provisions — notably the calculation of tier 1 — 
impossible to apply in EU member states without a massive shift in the structure of a large range of 
banks and banking systems. The EP also emphasised competition concerns and the need to ensure 
an ‘international level playing field’. Of particular concern was the fact that in the US, the Basel III 
accord would be applied only to financial institutions with over (US)$50bn in assets, whereas the 
new rules will be applied to all banks in the EU, as in the case of Basel I and Basel II (EP 2010, 
2011).
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3. The domestic political economy of new EU capital rules
This section engages in a domestic political economy analysis of national preferences on EU capital 
requirements. These preferences reflect three factors: the capital, and thus competitive, position of 
national banks; national banking and financial system structure; and related macro-economic 
considerations (the impact of Basel III on the wider economy). 
Capital position
The first explanation focuses specifically on the capital position of banks and relates to the likely 
impact of recapitalization upon their market share and competitiveness. Basel III / CRDIV will 
force banks to hold 6 per cent tier-1 and 8 per cent tier-1 and tier-2 capital by 2015 and four years 
later, with the capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent to be phased in by 2019, 8.5 per cent and 
10.5 per cent respectively. The obligation to raise a bank’s tier-1 capital ratio can have one or both 
of two effects. To get to those requirements the banks either need to reduce lending (i.e., decrease 
the RWA denominator) or retain earnings (i.e., increase the capital base numerator). If the former is 
undertaken then profits will be lower; if the latter then discretionary payments such as dividends on 
equity will decrease. Ceteris paribus, both developments make the bank less attractive to investors. 
However – it might also be noted – some investors will be focused more upon long-term stability of 
banks, especially in the difficult market conditions of the early 2010s. For internationally active 
banks without equity capital, such as German Landesbanken and French mutuals, Basel III menaced 
a significant overhaul of their capital structure and their legal status — although exceptions could 
have been allowed which did not apply to commercial banks with listed equity. While the capital 
position of national banks varies, systemic patterns can be detected. The studies and impact 
assessment of the BCBS of new Basel III rules were conducted at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, 
even the BCBS warned about differentiated effects across countries, without identifying those with 
banking systems most affected (BCBS 2010). Of the three large EU member state governments 
considered here, the German was most determined in its opposition to the ban on hybrids — that is, 
capital which has some features of both debt and equity and notably ‘silent 
participations’ (Financial Times, 10 September 2010) and the introduction of a leverage ratio. The 
German government was the most in favour of maximum harmonization rule in order to prevent 
better capitalized banks from gaining competitive advantage and expanding market share at the 
expense of undercapitalized (German) banks. German banks (both commercial and Landesbanken) 
were most heavily exposed to a ban on hybrids. As noted above, the British government, was most 
in favour of tighter capital rules and most opposed to a maximum harmonization rule. A perusal of 
the equity and tier 1 capital for systemically important British, French, German banks shows why 
the German government in particular had good reason to oppose the rigid tightening of capital 
requirements (see Tables 2 and 3). Data on tier 1 capital show that the most of the main British 
banks would have limited difficulties to meet the 6 per cent Basel III standard even in adverse 
conditions. However, most now would risk failing to meet the 8.5 per cent level (which includes the 
‘capital conservation buffer’ required by 2019. The data on French banks suggest their strong 
position but the double counting of insurance subsidiaries — which Basel III recommends banning 
— inflates the tier 1 capital ratio significantly in most cases. Faced with adverse capital conditions, 
the two large German commercial banks would only narrowly respect the Basel III target for 2015.
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Table 2:  Tier 1 capital (as a percentage of total assets) main British, German and French 
systematically important banks*
Recall:  Basel III target of 6 per 
cent / or 8.5 per cent with the 
‘capital conservation buffer’ from 
2019.
2012 baseline scenario 2012 adverse 2011 baseline scenario 2011 adverse
UK non-weighted average 10.4 7.45 9.75 7.95
RBS 9.1 6.3 9.2 7.2
HSBC 10.7 8.5 10.3 8.8
Lloyds (includes HBOS from 
2009)
11.7 7.7 10.2 8.1
Barclays 10.0 7.3 9.3 7.7
FR. non-weighted average 9 7.4 8.5 7.7
BNP-Paribas 9.8 7.9 9.1 8.3
Soc Gen 8.3 6.6 7.9 6.8
Credit Agricole 9.4 8.5 8.8 8.4
BP (BPCE from 2010) 8.5 6.7 8.1 7.2
DE. Non-weighted average 8.8 6.4 7.85 6.75
Commerzbank 8.7 6.4 8.9 7.2
Deutsche 8.9 6.4 6.8 6.3
Source: EBA *Results of the stress test based on the full static balance sheet assumption without any mitigating actions, 
mandatory restructuring or capital raisings post 31 December 2010 / 11 (all government support measures fully paid in 
before 31 December 2010 / 11 are included).
The implications of the new capital rules were potentially greatest for the many non-listed public 
sector and mutual banks (a much more significant element of the German and French banking 
systems than in the UK) which did not use equity, relying on other capital to meet capital 
requirements in the past including hybrids. Table 3 shows the tier 1 capital ratios for the German 
Landesbanken. Proportionately, the ban on hybrids would hit the German banking system and in 
particular the Landesbanken which explains the CRDIV draft provision to continue to allow only 
the one form of hybrid on which they rely to meet the core tier-1 ratio: ‘silent participations’. The 
ban on all other hybrids was also incorporated into the EBA’s late 2011 stress-tests of systemically 
important banks, leading one German bank, Helaba (the Hessen-Thüringen LB) to pull out to avoid 
public failure, on the grounds that it was not consulted on this ban (Financial Times 13 July 2011). 
It is also important to note that the ban on hybrids also hits the two large German commercial 
banks, as witnessed by Commerzbank’s efforts in early 2012 to replace its hybrid capital with 
equity demonstrate in order to improve its core tier-1 position (Financial Times 23 February 2012).
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Table 3 Tier 1 capital of German Landesbanken
Recall: target of 
6 per cent / 8.5 
per cent
2012 baseline scenario 2012 adverse 2011 baseline scenario 2011 adverse
HSH Nordbank 105 55 104 98
NordLB 48 37 48 43
LBBW 77 62 77 67
DZ Bank (Coop) 82 59 81 68
Bayerische LB 90 71 91 81
WestLB 88 61 88 73
Source: EBA. *Results of the stress test based on the full static balance sheet assumption without any mitigating 
actions, mandatory restructuring or capital raisings post 31 December 2010 (all government support measures fully paid 
in before 31 December 2010 are included)
Basel II guidelines and CRDII rules on bank capital allow banks to amass assets with high credit 
ratings without setting capital aside to cover potential losses. This allowed many banks in Europe to 
become highly leveraged despite meeting international rules on capital cushions. European Central 
Bank and several other central bank officials pushed for a leverage ratio as a simple mechanism to 
curb excessive risk-taking (Financial Times, 2 February 2012). The French, German and a range of 
other EU member states governments opposed the adoption of a leverage ratio to determine the 
quantity of capital to be held by banks, which explains why the specific Basel III provision (3 per 
cent or an assets to tier 1 capital ratio of approximately 33) was made more flexible in the 
Commission’s CRDIV draft. French and German opposition reflected the much higher leverage 
ratios of most large banks in France and Germany (compared to the UK) and in particular the 
difficult situation facing German LB and French mutual banks having to respect a new leverage 
ratio (see Table 4) and the fear of the need to force through a rapid de-leveraging of banks. While 
the leverage ratio of British banks increased dramatically in the two years prior to the outbreak of 
the financial crisis, this had been historically amongst the lowest in the EU and it dropped quickly 
in 2009 and 2010. The figures for French banks appear similarly low. However, the Basel III ban on 
double counting the capital of insurance subsidiaries — if adopted in EU legislation — would hit 
leverage ratios for several French banks considerably. The French (and to a less extent Germans) 
pushed to lift the restrictions in Basel III on the double counting of capital in banks’ insurance 
subsidiaries. This hit the three large French commercial banks particularly hard because of the 
longstanding feature the French banking system of bancassurance, in which insurance companies 
(often subsidiaries of banks) make use of banks to market their products. The system predominates 
in certain other EU member states, including Spain and Austria. However, the lifting of the Basel III 
restriction also benefited the part-state owned Lloyds-TSB, which is one of Britain’s largest 
insurance providers.
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Clearly, member states governments — including the British — continued to criticise certain 
elements of CRDIV as excessively restrictive. The British Bankers Association (BBA) challenged 
the harmonisation of the capital treatment of mortgages in arrears (Financial Times, 22 January 
2012). The draft directive declares that all EU loans were to be treated as if they are in default when 
they are 90 days in arrears (which was common practice in most EU member states). However, this 
would overrule existing UK rules that give retail mortgage borrowers up to 180 days. The definition 
change would significantly increase the probability that British mortgage loans would default, a key 
metric in determining capital charges. The BBA estimated that the proposed regulatory changes 
would boost banks’ capital charges on UK mortgages by 15-20 per cent, forcing many institutions 
either to cut lending or charge more to customers. (Financial Times, 22 January 2012). 
The British government has been the most in favour of the big three for closely aligning CRDIV 
and Basel III (IMF 2011). The British and Swedish governments criticised the Commission’s 
CRDIV draft on the grounds that it did not go far enough. In particular, the British opposed the 
move under CRDIV to embrace a leverage ratio for guidance purposes only and sought to keep 
open the possibility of imposing capital requirements higher than those eventually set by EU 
legislation, which the Commission’s CRDIV draft explicitly blocked by imposing a cap. Some 
British policy-makers, including the Governor of the Bank of England, were critical of the 
Commission’s rule on a maximum capital ratio, arguing that the new level of required capital 
should have been many times higher than the levels set out in Basel III (The Financial Times, 26 
October 2011).  The British Independent Commission on Banking recommended that large retail 
banks be required to have a minimum Core Tier-1 ratio of 10 per cent of risk-weighted assets which 
would significantly exceed the Basel III minimum of 7 per cent (Core Tier-1 at 4.5 per cent plus the 
2.5 per cent capital conservation buffer and the proposed surcharge for global systemically 
important banks — possibly up to 2.5 per cent (Financial Times, 13 June 2011). Other (mainly 
continental policy) makers, such as the former Governor of the Bank of France, Jacques de 
Larosière, argued that ‘Basel rules risk punishing the wrong banks’, that is the  ‘diversified’ and 
‘safer’ continental European banks, rather the Anglo-Saxon banks which, he claimed, engaged in 
riskier investment banking activities (Financial Times, 26 October  2010 p. 11).
The structure of banking and financial systems
The second political economy explanation focuses on the structure of banking and financial systems 
and how these structures shape the activities of banks (Allen and Gale 2000; Hardie and Howarth 
2009; Hardie and Howarth 2013). This explanation reminds us that British and French commercial 
banks are better capitalised because, on average, they rely more on equity finance in relative terms 
than banks in most continental European countries (see Table 5). As noted above, many banks on 
the continent such as the publicly owned German Landesbanken, cooperative and savings banks 
and most French mutuals do not have equity finance. Indeed, this aspect proved problematic in the 
incorporation of the Basel III accord into EU legislation, which contains specific provisions for the 
cooperative and mutual banks. Basel III was written having in mind banks funded by equity finance 
(hence the emphasis on common equities in core tier 1 capital), whereas many banks in the EU are 
based on other sources of funding. 
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Table 5:  Bank equity as percentage of total assets (Core tier 1)
UK France Germany
2008 3.7 3.8 2.93
2009 4.87 4.91 3.76
2010 5.37 5.07 3.88
Source ECB Statistical data warehouse. Domestic banking group and stand alone banks only.
The overall equity position of banks in all three countries improved following the financial crisis 
(with increases of 45 per cent in the UK; 45 per cent in France; and most in Germany at 67 per cent 
although from a lower position). In all three countries the equity / capital position improved in part 
because of significant government interventions in the banking system which involved share 
purchases and for the UK, government intervention came far more, in comparative terms, in the 
form of share purchase (6.3 per cent of GDP versus only 1.2 per cent in Germany, where the 
government opted more to purchase toxic assets, and 1.1 per cent of GDP in France — at end 2009) 
(National Central Bank figures). No other national share purchase programme came close to 
reaching the British level, in either real terms or in terms relative to GDP.
There are other, less obvious, features of national banking systems which explain positioning on 
CRDIV. French and German bank and government opposition to the use of a simple leverage rule, 
as opposed to risk-weighted assets, owes in large part to the relative importance of trade financing 
in their operations. Trade financing is high in terms of overall assets but low in terms of risk-
weighted assets. Similarly, different levels of bank and banking system exposure to short-term 
funding on wholesale markets directed national preferences on CRDIV liquidity rules. Basel III 
liquidity rules effectively discourage reliance on short term funding (less than a year) on wholesale 
markets. Clearly British reliance on short-term funding (less than year) was the highest of the three 
countries in 2007, in particular short term funding of less than three months. But by 2010 this 
reliance had dropped dramatically, moving from above 60 per cent of GDP to 30 per cent. In the 
case of French banks, reliance on short term funding moved from 45 per cent of GDP to slightly 
above 40 per cent. For German banks it moved from slightly above 10 per cent in 2007 to slightly 
below 10 per cent of GDP in 2010 (own calculations on the basis of central bank data). UK banks 
have gone the furthest by far to reduce their reliance and increase the resilience of their funding 
positions and thus they and the British authorities are most comfortable with the liquidity rules and 
ambitious phase-in dates. This owed in large part to the early introduction in 2009 of restrictive 
liquidity rules in the UK, on which the Basel III and CRDIV rules were largely modelled. British 
banks thus had a head start on liquidity.
The European Banking Federation (EBF) joined by several national governments, including the 
French, pushed to make liquidity rules less prescriptive (Financial Times, 2 February 2012). French 
bank debt was of a shorter maturity by euro area standards, with 28.3 per cent up to a year at the 
end of 2010 compared to German figures of 2.6 per cent. French short term debt reached a peak of 
36.6 per cent by late 2007 (ECB data warehouse). In Germany, bank debt was issued principally in 
the form of longer maturity covered bonds — itself a reflection of the ‘patient capital’ that 
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characterises the German financial system. Basel III includes a prolonged phase-in period for the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (2015) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (2018), while CRDIV waters 
down the LCR and fails to impose the NSFR. This preference for gradualism and flexibility can be 
explained by concerns about the potential impact of these liquidity measures on lending, in 
particular in bank-based continental financial system, where banks are the main source of finance 
for firms, especially for SMEs. 
Another metric to demonstrate bank exposure to ‘non-traditional’ forms of funding is the customer 
funding gap — the gap between nonfinancial company (NFC) loans and deposits (see Table 6). This 
drop largely stemmed from a massive decline in lending. The major UK banks’ holdings of highly 
liquid assets also almost tripled from 2008 to the end of 2011, accounting for 14 per cent of their 
total assets in November 2011 (Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, 2011). The funding 
gap for French banks also declined but remained far higher than British figures in both real and 
relative terms. French banks remained comparatively reliant upon short-term wholesale funding. 
The figures for German banks help to explain the caution of German government regulators on 
liquidity rules and the less prescriptive definition of liquidity in CRDIV as opposed to Basel III. 
Table 6: Bank customer funding gap (loans - deposits, bn.) and as per cent of loans
UK per cent of 
loans
France per cent of 
loans
Germany per cent of 
loans
2007 770 24 554.2 29.2 853.7 24.5
2008 900 23.8 575 28.6 840 23.1
2009 580 16 495.8 24.5 820.3 22.5
2010 320 10.2 436 20.3 798.7 21.4
2011 270 8 452.5 20.4 640.2 17.4
Sources: Central bank data.  Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (December 2011, p. 17, chart 2.6).  Non-MFI 
lending and deposits.
 
The greater reliance of NFCs in many continental European countries on bank credit finance than 
the UK, the comparatively limited role of equity markets and the strong bank-industry link 
(hausbank / relational banking in Germany) further explains the preoccupation of many European 
governments as to the impact of Basel III on bank lending and the real economy.
Differing macro-economic concerns
This leads us to the third, macroeconomic, factor that explains differing national positions on Basel 
III / CRDIV. The BCBS accepted the negative implications of pushing too hard and too fast with 
capital rules — especially in the aftermath of a deep post-crisis recession in many European 
countries (see BCBS 2010). These concerns were particularly acute in some countries. The United 
Kingdom was not one of them. From the outbreak of the financial crisis, bank lending in the UK 
shrunk dramatically (Table 7). This is part of a more general story about the early deleveraging of 
British banks and the collapse of lending, which had previously relied on securitisation. George 
Osborne spoke of the ‘British dilemma’ – namely the desire to retain Britain’s world leading 
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position in financial services but to avoid placing the British government (and tax payer) in a 
position in which it was forced bail the banks out again. The British government has accepted the 
lending and economic growth implications of restricting bank activities and specifically decreasing 
the bank lending that relied directly on shorter-term unstable funding on the wholesale markets.
Table 7: Monetary Financial Institution lending to Non-Financial Companies 
(National currencies)
 U K t o N F C s 
(domestic only)
France to NFCs (euro area) Germany to NFCs (euro area)
2007 691.3 764.7 859.4
2008 606.1 845.6 947.5
2009 588.7 827.6 901.7
2010 561.5 838.8 893.8
2011 536.2 877.5 906.8
Euro area lending by German and French banks remained comparatively strong in the five years 
following the outbreak of the financial crisis, and was limited principally by growth in the broader 
economy rather than the deleveraging efforts of banks. Forcing French and, more significantly, 
German banks to deleverage during a recessionary period could result in a credit crunch if banks 
reduced their lending (cut their risk-weighted assets denominator) instead of boosting their capital 
(lifting their equity numerator). One IMF study from 2011 on the differential impact of Basel III 
rules on national banking systems echoes the findings in a range of other studies: to demonstrate a 
particularly significant impact upon bank lending in Germany and comparatively small drop in the 
UK, with France somewhere in between (Cosimano and Hakura 2011). The two large German 
commercial banks engaged in a significant de-leveraging from 2008 and shrunk their loan book, as 
did the Landesbanken. Stable bank lending levels in Germany thus owed to a rise in lending from 
Cooperative and Savings Banks, the backbone of the German Mittelstand (Bundesbank figures). It 
is the largest French commercial banks – more engaged in retail banking than their large German 
competitors – and the French economy as a result that were most exposed to deleveraging because 
of higher capital requirements. Indeed, this fact explains why the French led the charge for the 
addition of a maximum harmonisation rule in CRDIV — also supported by the Germans — fearing 
that the British and Swedish push to move beyond Basel requirements would force French banks to 
be just as capitalised because of investor expectations (Peston 2011). As a consequence French 
banks would have to decrease their lending. The French government thus sought to use EU rules to 
try and limit the fall-out from market pressures for greater capital: it did not matter if the markets 
wanted banks to increase their capital, EU rules would not allow it.
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Conclusion: the ‘battle of the systems’ in EU economic governance
More than two decades ago, Story and Walter (1997) argued that ‘the battle of the systems’ 
impinged upon financial integration and regulation in the EU. Despite the progress made following 
the introduction of the single currency and the re-launch of financial market integration in the early 
2000s, the financial systems of EU member states retain distinctive features. These features largely 
explain national positions on CRDIV and the intergovernmental character of the negotiations in this 
field. 
In countries, such as France and Germany, with less developed equity markets and greater reliance 
on bank credit, governments were more opposed to high capital requirements that would restrict 
lending. Banks and more importantly national authorities were worried that tighter capital 
requirements would lead banks to reduce lending to industry. Opposition thus stemmed from the 
relatively high dependence of NFCs (and in particular SMEs) on bank finance in a range of member 
states and, particularly in continental countries, the long-standing close relations between banks and 
industry. For the British government, features of the underlying economy, and notably the 
comparatively heavy exposure of British banks to mortgage lending, determined its only hostile 
positions on revised risk-weighting rules and harmonised arrears rules. Clearly, British banks were 
concerned about the implications of high capital requirements and struggled to raise capital. 
However, they were in a better position — on average — than most of their French and German 
competitors and the British government was less preoccupied with the impact of Basel III rules 
upon the British economy because of earlier deleveraging.
The implementation of the Basel III rules on capital requirements is politically controversial in the 
EU and the negotiations on the new EU legislation are ongoing. Despite thirty years of financial 
integration, national financial systems and preferences on capital rules remain distinct – the battles 
of the systems pointed out by Story and Walter (1997) persists, even though some of its elements 
have been reshaped. The intergovernmental politics of the CRDIV provides a useful case study of 
the importance of domestic political economy explanations that undermine EU-level efforts to 
construct financial regulation that effectively stabilises the EU banking system. A conclusion of this 
chapter of relevance to this volume is that the construction of EU economic governance is bound to 
be less effective than sought because of the diverging implications of EU-level rules for national 
economies. This core economic fact casts doubt on the ability of the EU to satisfy both markets, by 
facilitating cross border financial integration, and politics, through the provision of the public good 
of financial stability.
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1. Logistics and transport in the European Union
Transport is essential in the everyday life of European citizens. An efficient and effective logistics 
and transportation system facilitates the free flow of people, goods and services within the EU 
internal market, thereby contributing to the competitiveness of European industry and the living 
standards of Europe's citizens. The logistics and transport sector accounts for around 7% of EU 
value added and 5% of EU employment. Within this sector, the most important subsector is road 
transport (representing 37% of the total value added) followed by warehousing (32%), post (14%), 
rail transport (7%), air transport (5%) and water transport (5%). As warehousing activities are 
closely linked with activities in the other subsectors, they are not treated as a separate subsector in 
the discussion below.
The transport sector provides essential inputs for other economic activities. On average, 
transportation costs represent 10–15% of the cost of a finished product for European companies. 
Moreover, technological progress in the transport sector can have a strong effect on overall 
productivity growth because of the strong linkages between transport and other economic activities.
2. Stepwise liberalisation of transport markets
In order to increase the efficiency and productivity of the transport sector, the EU has made 
significant efforts to progressively integrate and liberalise EU transport markets which, for the most 
part, had been heavily regulated at national level. The liberalisation process started in the second 
half of the 1980s in the maritime and air transport sectors. Both sectors had been exposed to 
competition already at an early stage due to the international character of their activities. In the 
maritimesector, EU Member State nationals have had the right since 1986 to carry passengers or 
goods by sea between any port of a Member State and any other port worldwide. However, the EU 
still lacks a common regulatory framework defining how to finance port infrastructures and how 
much to charge for the provision of port services. Following the completion of the EU internal 
market in air transport in 1997, EU air carriers have been authorised to operate air services between 
EU airports. As a result, a number of low cost carriers have been able to enter the market and 
develop rapidly, increasing competition and providing a wider choice to passengers. The European 
Common Aviation Area agreement of 2006 extended these benefits to countries in South-Eastern 
and Northern Europe. Transatlantic air traffic is freer too: the 2007 EU-US air transport agreement 
and the 2009 EU-Canada air transport agreement (the so-called "open skies agreements") allow any 
EU airline to fly from any EU airport to any city in the US and Canada, respectively. Road transport 
was liberalised in 1992, when carriers obtained the right to operate passenger and goods transport 
services between Member States without discrimination on the grounds of nationality or place of 
establishment. However, most domestic services are still protected. 
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The liberalisation of the rail freight has progressed gradually with the adoption of several packages 
of EU Directives. The 2001 package opened the Trans European Rail Freight Network up to 
competition amongst international freight service providers, which was followed by packages fully 
liberalising international freight services in 2007 and international passenger transport services in 
2010. A European Commission proposal for the opening up of national passenger transport markets 
is in the pipeline. In 2011, the postal sector was completely opened up to competition in 16 EU 
Member States. In the remaining 11 Member States the sector will be fully liberalised in 2013 only. 
Consequently, effective competition in the rail and postal sectors is still generally weak as reflected 
in high market shares of incumbents and a limited market penetration of new entrants. 
3. Application of EU competition rules to transport markets
Competition policy aims to ensure that markets operate efficiently to the benefit of the end 
consumer. This is especially important in the transport sector where newly competitive markers are 
emerging as a result of the liberalisation process. In this sector there are strong complementarities 
between regulatory and competition policies. On the one hand, regulatory liberalisation offers few 
benefits if incumbents are allowed to use anticompetitive practices to protect their position. On the 
other hand, the application of EU competition rules in the sector needs to take account of the 
regulatory environment. 
In recent years, as more transport markets have been liberalised, they have increasingly been 
covered by the generally applicable competition law framework:
 Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerns 
agreements between companies, which restrict or distort competition within the internal market  
(antitrust enforcement); 
 Article 102 of the TFEU concerns the abuse by one or more companies of a dominant 
position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it (antitrust enforcement). Such abuse 
may, in particular, consists in limitations on production or the imposition of unfair trading 
conditions;
 Council Regulation N° 139/2004 provides a legal basis for the control at the EU level of 
concentrations between companies (merger control);
 Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU permit the monitoring by the Commission of the financial 
support given to companies by EU Member States (State aid control); and
 Article 106 of the TFEU affirms that public companies or companies having been granted 
special or exclusive responsibilities, such as the delivery of services of general economic interest, 
remain subject to the general competition rules.
The implementation of the above Treaty articles is guided by Council and Commission Regulations 
and by Commission Notices and Guidelines. In the area of antitrust, for example, Council 
Regulation N° 1/2003 defines the investigative power of the European Competition Network (ECN) 
composed of the European Commission and the national competition authorities. 
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Historically, services such as air transport to third countries and international tramp shipping were 
excluded from the application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. In parallel with the 
liberalisation process, the EU antitrust rules became applicable to air transport services to third 
countries in 2004 and to international tramp shipping in 2006. Similarly, the liner conference (a type 
of price-fixing cartel) block exemption granted to liner shipping companies in 1986 was repealed in 
2008. As a result there are now only a very limited number of sector-specific antitrust exemptions in 
the transport sector. One exception worth mentioning is the maritime consortia (i.e. joint operation 
of liner shipping services) block exemption, which remains in effect. Agreements to jointly provide 
such services usually allow shipping lines to rationalise their activities and achieve economies of 
scale. However, the block exemption regulation does not permit shipping lines to fix prices or agree 
on output restrictions. 
In the area of mergers, Council Regulation N° 139/2004 sets out the modalities of the European 
Commission control of mergers, acquisitions and other formal agreements between companies. The 
aim of this Regulation is to ensure that concentrations that have a European dimension do not result 
in lasting damage to competition. This Regulation is fully applicable to the transport sector, as 
illustrated by the prohibition of the proposed acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair in 2007 and the 
proposed merger between Aegean Airlines and Olympic Air in 2011. Both concentrations concerned 
airlines based at the same "home" airport with very high if not monopoly market shares on a 
significant number of routes.
In principle, the TFEU prohibits financial support by Member States to companies (State aid 
prohibition). However, this general rule is complemented by a large number of regulations and 
guidelines setting out and clarifying applicable exceptions, thereby allowing Governments to 
intervene if necessary for the well-functioning of the economy. In the area of transport, for example, 
there are guidelines on State aid to ship management companies, maritime transport, railway 
undertakings and airports and airlines departing from regional airports. The European Commission 
has the exclusive responsibility for assessing whether these exceptions to the general prohibition of 
State aid can be applied. Recently, the European Commission has launched an initiative to 
streamline existing regulations and guidelines. The aim of this initiative is to foster growth by 
supporting targeted and non-distortive State aid. It is the European Commission's intention to focus 
enforcement on aid cases with the biggest impact on the internal market and to speed up the 
decision making process.
4. Main competition concerns
The transport sector has a number of sector-specific characteristics, which affect the way the above 
described competition rules are being implemented. This section describes possible competition 
concerns resulting from the particular characteristics of the transport sector. These descriptions are 
illustrated by actual cases being considered by the European Commission (see Table 1 below).
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Table 1: Competition policy issues in transport
The liberalisation of European transport markets over the past two decades has created 
opportunities for new entrants, resulting in a decline in concentration and the emergence of 
competition on fares and services offered between different transport service providers. The recent 
economic and financial crisis, however, has caused a sharp drop in traffic, allowing the strongest 
players to consolidate their position as market leaders. In air transport, for example, some of the 
smaller and less efficient flag carriers have gone out of business, been restructured or merged into 
larger entities. Looser forms of cooperation between airlines have also developed, which range from 
bilateral code share arrangements to alliances or joint ventures. Many European airlines are 
members of one of the three big alliances, oneworld, Star and SkyTeam. The main competition 
concerns relate to the increased concentration of supplyon certain routes resulting from airline 
mergers and the possible anticompetitive impact of cooperation between airlines. On the other hand, 
increased coordination between airlines may lead to efficiency gains that can be passed on to their 
customers. Possible efficiency gains include: (1) economies of density, i.e. reductions in the costs 
per passenger associated with the increase in passenger numbers; (2) reduction of double 
marginalisation; (3) fare combinability; (4) better schedules; (5) a more seamless customer 
experience; and (6) frequent flyer programme integrations. When assessing the merits of mergers or 
other forms of cooperation between airlines, competition authorities need to weigh the 
anticompetitive effects of the increased concentration against possible efficiency gains associated 
with the improved coordination. In the area of mergers, however, it is the merging parties (and not 
the EU competition authorities) that have to bring forward the efficiency arguments. A number of 
conditions have to be fulfilled for these efficiencies to be taken into account, including: (1) the 
efficiencies should be merger-specific; and (2) the efficiencies should be passed on to consumers. 
Until now, no merger at the EU level has been cleared on the basis of the argument that the 
associated efficiency gains outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
Transport is a network industry in which consumers value a wider network reach. To the extent that 
large networks are more attractive to consumers and the marginal cost of adding a consumer is 
minimal, dominant service providers may emerge. In order for smaller players and possible market 
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entrants to compete, it is essential that they can connect to the networks established by the dominant 
market players. Competition authorities therefore try to encourage the cheap and smooth transfer of 
consumers between transport service providers. To illustrate, the emergence of transatlantic joint 
ventures involving members of the three big alliances may make it more difficult for connecting 
passengers from non-alliance members or airlines belonging to a competing alliance to find suitable 
flights. In this respect, the assurance that passengers of non-allied airlines and passengers of 
competing alliances can benefit from a cheap and smooth transfer to or from the transatlantic 
services offered by the joint venture partners would help to alleviate any competition concerns. In 
the transatlantic joint venture involving British Airways, Iberia and American Airlines, for example, 
the parties committed to enter into Special Prorate Agreements (‘SPAs’) with competitors on routes 
of concern. Such agreements allow interested airlines to attract connecting traffic from the parties 
on favourable commercial terms.
According to EU regulation, the provision of transport services and the operation of the transport 
infrastructure need to be managed separately. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the incumbent 
supplier of transport services and the infrastructure manager are part of the same group of 
companies. Moreover, the group to which the incumbent belongs may also offer ancillary services 
that are essential inputs for competing transport services providers. In combination, these two 
factors open up the possibility of input foreclosure giving an unfair competitive advantage to the 
incumbent over its (potential) competitors. The alternative option for competitors to duplicate the 
transport infrastructures can normally not be economically justified. In order to prevent a 
foreclosure scenario from happening, regulations and directives have been adopted to ensure equal 
access to existing infrastructures in the different transport sectors. In addition to such a regulatory 
approach, the application of the EU's competition policy tools may at times be necessary to ensure 
equal access to essential services. For example, the European Commission has been investigating 
allegations that Deutsche Bahn group, and in particular Deutsche Bahn Energie, the de facto sole 
supplier of electricity for traction of trains in Germany, would be giving preferential treatment to 
the group's rail freight arm. 
Having access to transport services is essential to the wellbeing of European citizens. However, 
such access may not always be available without public intervention. For example, the continued 
operation of regional airports or rail lines serving remote areas is often dependent on public support. 
Under certain conditions, transport services are therefore considered as Services of General 
Economic Interest (SGEI), i.e. economic activities of particular importance to citizens that would 
not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there were no public 
intervention. Such public intervention may take the form of compensation given to private 
companies for the services provided. However, overly generous compensation would enable such 
companies to cross-subsidise their other commercial activities, and thereby distort competition. In 
the postal sector, for example, incumbents may receive compensation from the State for the timely 
delivery at reasonable tariffs throughout the territory of the Member State concerned. Indeed, 
Member States are free (except if there is a "manifest error") to define other public services 
obligations, such as press distribution, if they decide to do so. However, in the Belgian Post case the 
Commission found that compensations provided between 1992 and 2010, mainly for press 
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distribution, partly exceeded the cost of fulfilling the public service obligation. In 2012, the 
Commission therefore ordered Belgium to recover the incompatible aid plus interests. 
5. Conclusion
The transport sector is important for the competitiveness and growth of the EU economy. The 
gradual liberalisation of transport markets over the past two decades has been aimed at increasing 
sector productivity and growth. The enforcement of competition policy rules in newly liberalised 
transport markets should reinforce the pro-competitive effect of liberalisation. Fair and strong 
competition brings down fares and encourages innovation, thereby giving EU firms an edge over 
their global competitors. 
There are important complementarities between competition and regulatory policies. Competition 
policy helps ensure that markets that have been opened up to competition operate efficiently to the 
benefit of the end consumer. Such benefits may be reflected in a wider choice of products offered at  
relatively low prices as well as in an improved quality of service provided.
This paper has given a number of illustrations of how the particular characteristics of the transport 
sector may raise competition concerns. Such concerns are being addressed by EU competition rules, 
which try to prevent an undue concentration of supply in the sector and ensure a fair and equal 
access to transport infrastructure and ancillary services. Moreover, in assessing the competitive 
effects of mergers, joint ventures and looser forms of cooperation between transport services 
providers, EU competition rules allow making the trade-off between the anticompetitive and 
efficiency effects of cooperation. The EU experience therefore shows the value of having 
competition rules that can be adapted to the particularities of the transport sector.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the European Union (EU), most especially its 
Eurozone member states, was hit by a number of fiscal (or debt) crises, which began in Greece in 
December 2009 before moving on to Ireland and Portugal in 2010 and 2011, respectively. For their 
part, Spain, Italy, Belgium and even France also ended up facing more or less strong headwinds 
from sovereign bond market investors as contagion in the form of market and political uncertainty 
spread throughout the Eurozone. The EU, with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
worked hard to contain the debt crisis (or crises) and prevent it from propagating itself, but with 
limited success given the political difficulties involved in providing financial assistance to crisis-hit 
governments and banks (for details, see the chapter by Ross in this volume).  In the end, direct 
financial assistance (i.e., bail-outs) had to be provided to Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  In Greece’s 
case, a second bail-out package had to be put together a year and half after the first one, this time 
involving a restructuring of Greece’s public debt in order to avoid an outright (i.e., official) default. 
 These bail-outs and the economic adjustment programmes that have accompanied them have 
been highly controversial politically as well as economically. For instance, there are those who 
claim that no bail-outs should have been forthcoming and that Greece and company should have 
been left to fend for themselves. Then there are those who argue that the austerity packages 
imposed on Greece and others as a result of the bail-outs are too harsh and will only make things 
worse. In light of these controversies, it is worth asking ourselves whether the EU’s (and IMF’s) 
response to the fiscal crises in Europe (i.e. the bail-outs and the accompanying adjustment 
programs) has been appropriate under the circumstances at hand.
 In order to answer this question, the present chapter is structured as follows. First, the 
chapter provides a review of the literature on debt crises in order to tease out the lessons that have 
been learned from past fiscal consolidation and economic restructuring efforts. Second, applying 
these lessons, it analyzes the EU’s response to the fiscal crises in order to determine whether or not 
bail-outs and their associated economic adjustment programs have been appropriate to the situations 
at hand. What we find is that in fact the EU’s response to the fiscal crises has been the right one and 
that the conditions that it imposed on Greece, Ireland and Portugal, in exchange for financial 
assistance, are in line with the lessons offered by past successful fiscal consolidations. However, 
there is an important issue that plagues the Eurozone debt crisis, and it is one that the literature does 
not really address. This is the fact that there have been not one, but many debt crises, with many 
countries in the same region that adopted austerity measures at the same time, including those 
countries that did not receive bail-outs. This has had the effect of making the fiscal consolidation 
process even more difficult, both economically and politically.  Finally, the chapter concludes with 
the implications for the EU and the euro of the fiscal crises in Europe and the way that they have 
been managed. 
92
Lessons from Past Fiscal Consolidations
If the bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal have prevented these countries from defaulting on 
their debts, they must nevertheless cut down their fiscal deficits drastically, and do so for a long 
period of time. Only once public finances are credibly back on a sustainable path will private 
investors be ready to buy these countries’ sovereign bonds at acceptable rates of interest. The need 
for fiscal consolidation also applies to countries like Italy and Spain, which face serious threats to 
their public finances. In the end, the goal is to regain, or maintain, sovereign bond investors’ 
confidence that their investments are safe and, as such, will be paid back in full, with interest. The 
issue of concern here, for policy makers, is to know what the key elements of a successful fiscal 
consolidation process are, in order to design a proper response to the fiscal crises.
 According to studies of past fiscal consolidation efforts, reductions in current government 
spending are more likely to lead to sustained adjustments than increases in tax revenues or cuts in 
investment expenditures (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010; European Commission, 2007, p.196; 
Guichard et al, 2007, p.7). The reason is that cutting government consumption and transfers is more 
difficult to achieve politically than raising taxes and cutting investment expenditures. As such, they 
are less likely to be reversed. Moreover, it sends a credible signal to investors that the government 
is committed to a lasting fiscal consolidation exercise, which will likely lead to a reduction in the 
yields demanded by investors. If the fiscal consolidation exercise is primarily based on increasing 
tax revenues, then government spending has a tendency to grow along with the additional revenues 
that are generated, thereby preventing the desired fiscal adjustment from being achieved (see: 
Guichard et al, 2007, p.16). On the other hand, in a recent study, Paolo Mauro and his IMF 
colleagues find that intended or planned revenue-based adjustments grounded in reforms can also 
sometimes be effective alongside spending cuts (Mauro, 2011).
It is not just the size of the reductions in government spending that matters, their 
composition is also very important. According to Alesina and Perotti (1997), reductions in social 
welfare spending, as well as in government wages and employment, not only lead to more 
permanent fiscal consolidations, but are also beneficial for economic growth, since unit labour costs 
decrease. This is because cuts in government wages and employment influence wage setting in the 
private sector. For example, if the public sector is shedding workers or freezing new hirings, then it 
means that there is more competition for jobs in the private sector, which drives down the price of 
labour. Moreover, cuts in social welfare spending are likely to force more people to seek or remain 
in employment, which also contributes to the labour supply in the private sector, thereby pushing 
wages downwards.239 Such a decrease in average unit labour costs makes an economy more 
competitive, which leads to higher exports and investment and, ultimately, overall economic 
expansion. Combining government spending adjustments with structural economic reforms 
significantly enhances the chances of a successful consolidation, according to the European 
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239 It is true that cutting social welfare benefits is likely to have a negative impact on economic growth as individuals’ 
consumption is reduced; however, if unit labour costs decrease and it leads to greater employment in the private sector, 
then the negative impact on consumption will be nullified. Moreover, lower labour costs are likely to stimulate 
investment in the national economy, which will be beneficial to growth. The real issue is one of timing, in terms of the 
time lag between the removal of social welfare benefits and the positive private sector employment impact following 
reduced labour costs (see below for a discussion of the this issues).
Commission (2007) and Mauro (2011). Since structural reforms entail liberalizing markets for 
labour, products and services in such a way as to improve competition, lower costs and increase 
innovation and investment, they further contribute to improving competitiveness and growth in the 
medium to long run, which in turn helps make the fiscal consolidation exercise durable.
If the right mix of government spending reduction is good for economic growth in the 
medium to long term, tax increases and reduced investment expenditures tend to have a negative 
impact on growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Ardagna, 2004). This is because they usually hurt an 
economy’s competitiveness, which, as argued previously, is bad for exports and investment.240 For 
instance, higher taxes are likely to lead to higher prices for goods and services. This is especially 
true for direct taxes on income (for both individuals and corporations) and social welfare 
contributions paid by businesses, whereby workers will ask for higher wages to compensate their 
loss of purchasing power, and businesses will pass on their increased costs to their customers in 
order to maintain profitability. As for investment expenditures by government, they are also 
important for competitiveness since they help maintain, if not improve, an economy’s infrastructure 
(e.g., roads, ports, railways, etc.). Thus, if lowering public investment leads to a continued 
degradation of a country’s productive public infrastructure, then the cost of doing business for firms 
will only increase, thereby hurting an economy’s competitiveness and growth prospects. Lower 
economic growth also means lower revenues in the government’s coffers, as well as higher social 
welfare expenditures. 
 With regards to improving an economy’s competitiveness, the devaluation of the currency is 
often considered an easy way to make exports cheaper internationally and, thereby, stimulate 
growth. According to Alesina and Perotti (1997), many instances of past fiscal consolidation have 
been preceded by exchange rate depreciations. In fact, Lambertini and Tavares (2005) find that a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate increases the probability of a successful fiscal 
adjustment. This is why they conclude that countries that have adopted the euro may find it more 
difficult to achieve a sustainable fiscal consolidation, because they cannot effect any currency 
depreciation unless they abandon the euro and reintroduce a national currency, which as we will see 
below is no panacea. Fortunately for Eurozone member states, Ardagna (2004, p.1049) finds that 
exchange rate devaluations are not a necessary condition for ‘successful and expansionary fiscal 
contractions’. Hence, a sustainable fiscal consolidation is not impossible for Eurozone countries; it 
may just be a little harder.
In their study of past fiscal consolidations, Paolo Mauro and his colleagues from the IMF 
argue that it is not so much whether fiscal consolidation is expenditure-based or revenue-based that 
really matters; the adjustment must be ‘reform-based’ with a clearly established plan that includes 
contingencies for the fact that things will not turn out as planned (e.g., lower than expected rates of 
economic growth or unforeseen political developments) (Mauro, 2011). This is why the authors 
argue that consolidation plans should have medium term objectives, rather than simply short term 
ones (i.e. three to five years rather than one year). This would provide policy makers with enough 
flexibility in the short term to adjust the plan in accordance with changed economic and/or political 
situations while maintaining the focus on achieving the stated objectives.
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240 There are instances where taxes can actually improve competitiveness, especially if they replace more inefficient 
taxes. According to a study by Widmalm (2001), some taxes have a negative impact on economic growth while others 
can have positive effects.
The experience of the past few decades […] shows that plans face sizable risks and 
often encounter substantial implementation difficulties along the way. Unexpected 
declines in economic growth, upward revisions in the initial fiscal deficit, changing 
priorities, lack of support among the general public, poor plan design, all have the 
potential to derail fiscal adjustment plans. Conversely, when favorable economic and 
political conditions emerge, objectives are often met or exceeded, even when plans 
envisage ambitious reductions in deficits and debts (Mauro, 2011, p.178).
 The final issue concerning fiscal adjustment programs is whether they should be short and 
sharp – akin to the shock therapy treatment applied to a number of Central and Eastern European 
countries after the demise of the Soviet bloc – or more gradual in nature. There are two views on 
this matter. One the one hand, the political window of opportunity to instil fiscal and structural 
reforms in the context of a crisis is narrow before reform fatigue sets in and opposition to reforms 
mounts to such an extent as to make them politically infeasible. That is why it is often 
recommended to adopt painful measures soon after a new government has been elected. On the 
other hand, precisely because of the politically sensitive nature of the adjustments and reforms to be 
put into place, they need to be done gradually over time in order to make them palpable to the 
electorate and their representatives. According to the European Commission (2007, p.196), the 
gradual approach seems to be a better fit with a successful fiscal consolidation exercise, most 
especially when politically-sensitive government expenditures have to be heavily cut and/or the 
economy is in particularly bad shape at the beginning of the process. Although this may be so, the 
general evidence in support of fiscal consolidation exercises leading to government unpopularity 
and ensuing collapse is weak. For instance, Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) find that pursuing 
fiscal adjustment programs does not negatively affect a government’s popularity, or increase the 
probability that it will collapse. In a more recent study, Alesina and other colleagues obtain similar 
results, whereby governments are no more likely than usual to be voted out of office if they quickly 
decrease budget deficits (Alesina, Carloni and Lecce, 2011). These findings are also corroborated 
by those of Mauro (2011). Even when governments lose power during a consolidation process, the 
adjustment program’s implementation usually remains unaffected. This is because what truly 
matters is the degree of support for the reduction of the deficit and debt among the general 
population (Mauro, 2011). It does not mean, however, that austerity measures are not generally 
associated with social unrest (see: Ponticelli and Voth, 2011), but the latter does not necessarily 
translate into electoral behaviour against the incumbent government, as unrest tends to be more 
associated with particular lobbies such as labour unions (Alesina, Carloni and Lecce, 2011). 
Therefore, although it seems reasonable to conclude that adopting a gradual approach might be 
more effective at ultimately reducing fiscal deficits and set public finances on a sustainable path, the 
evidence does cast a shadow on the political cost of ‘cold shower’ consolidations, as the European 
Commission calls them. After all, Alesina, Carloni and Lecce (2011) do not find that governments 
are more likely to lose power if they undertake ‘large’ fiscal consolidations (i.e. those leading to a 
reduction in the budget deficit of 1.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in a given year).
Assessing the EU’s Response to the Fiscal Crises
From the above, it is clear that any attempt to consolidate public finances among Eurozone member 
states affected by a debt crisis should begin with significant (but probably gradual) cuts in current 
government spending, most especially wages and employment, as well as social welfare 
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entitlements. In addition, structural reforms to make the economy more productive and competitive 
should accompany fiscal adjustment efforts. Whether the EU and the IMF have adopted such a 
framework in the conditionality programs that they have negotiated with Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal in exchange for financial assistance is what this section sets out to assess. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to assess whether the provision of bail-outs themselves made sense for the 
EU.
Were the Bail-outs a Good Idea?
The fact that three Eurozone countries have received financial assistance with their sovereign debt 
is something that will be debated for years to come, and we will only broach the surface of this 
debate herein as it goes beyond the scope of the present chapter. Opinions are certainly divided on 
whether bail-outs are the appropriate way to deal with fiscal crises inside the Eurozone. 
On the one hand, there are arguments in support of core Eurozone member states (e.g., 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) abandoning those on the 
periphery – like Greece, Ireland and Portugal – that are experiencing fiscal difficulties. Without 
financial assistance, the countries on the periphery would eventually be forced to default and, as a 
result, give up the euro and reintroduce their national currencies (or form their own monetary 
union). Proponents of this viewpoint argue that only then would true optimal currency areas exist in 
the EU,241 because periphery economies are not synchronized with those of the core and, therefore, 
should not share a common currency and monetary policy (e.g., Feldstein, 2012). 
On the other hand, there are those who argue that EU institutions and Eurozone leaders did 
the right thing in providing bail-out funds to Greece, Ireland and Portugal and setting up the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM).242 
Otherwise, the Eurozone banking system would have experienced a serious crisis, because 
Eurozone banks hold the majority of the sovereign bonds issued by Eurozone member states. 
Defaults by Greece, Ireland and Portugal would have caused serious losses to the Eurozone banking 
system, creating a panic and credit freeze, such as the one that occurred  in the Fall of 2008, when 
the global financial crisis reached its apex. Investor panic would also spread to Spanish and Italian 
sovereign bonds, as a result of a contagion effect, which would only compound the crisis. The entire 
financial system would be jeopardized, and the EU would face another deep recession, just when 
Member States’ economies were beginning to recover from the previous crisis. As during that crisis, 
EU governments would then have to intervene again by providing financial assistance to their 
banking systems, while the European Central Bank (ECB) would have to provide massive amounts 
of liquidity to the financial system. Given the existing weakness among both financial institutions 
and governments’ fiscal capacities, it would not be at all clear that governments and the ECB would 
have the means to manage the crisis and prevent a great European depression from happening. As a 
result, the Eurozone and the EU would be at great risk of completely imploding, whereby every EU 
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241 For details on the theory of optimal currency areas, see: Kenen and Meade (2008, Chapter 2). In a nutshell, the 
theory aims to identify the conditions that would mitigate the limited degree of synchronicity between economies 
should they adopt a common currency. An optimal currency area is one where either the economies are synchronized in 
terms of their boom-bust cycle or they possess the necessary conditions that mitigate the absence of synchronicity.
242 For details on the EFSF and ESM, see: Leblond and Paudyn (2011).
government would run for the exits and try to save its economy and financial system. History would 
repeat itself, as such behaviour would be akin to what happened during and following the Great 
Depression in the 1930s (e.g., see: Eichengreen, 1992). 
Given these dire prospects, it seems fair to conclude that providing financial assistance to 
only a few Eurozone member states, in order to prevent an economic meltdown, was a less risky 
and less costly option. Furthermore, this approach offered the opportunity to use the bail-outs to 
finally effect much needed reforms in countries like Greece and Portugal, by imposing strict 
conditions for the assistance. Let’s now examine whether the conditionality programs for Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal are appropriate under their particular circumstances. 
Are the Conditionality Programmes Appropriate?
The now infamously named ‘PIIGS’ countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) all faced 
difficult fiscal situations, even if they were in fact not identical (see: Figures 1 and 2). For instance, 
Spain’s public debt has remained well below the Eurozone’s average, and was still within the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s limit of 60 per cent of GDP in 2010; however, its fiscal deficit jumped 
substantially in 2008 and 2009. As for Italy, although its public debt is the second highest after 
Greece’s, its fiscal deficit is the lowest among the PIIGS and has remained below the Eurozone’s 
average since 2008. Consequently, its public debt has increased less rapidly than in other Member 
States. But looking at debts and deficits is not enough to understand the fiscal crises.
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
There are two other factors that need to be considered, in tandem with debts and deficits, in 
order to fully appreciate the extent to which each member of the ‘PIIGS’ quintet was in trouble and, 
consequently, what economic remedies needed to be applied. These two factors are the economy’s 
overall competitiveness, and the degree to which domestic banks made loans to the private sector as 
a function of the size of the economy. According to Figure 3, as the global financial crisis erupted, 
Greece and Italy had the least competitive economies among the PIIGS, but their banks were also 
less exposed to the national economy’s performance. On the other hand, Ireland had the most 
competitive economy but its banks were 2.5 times more exposed to the economy’s performance 
than those of Greece and Italy. As for Spain and Portugal, they stood in between Ireland on the one 
hand and Greece and Italy on the other. Thus, each country’s economic situation at the beginning of 
the financial crisis, when combined with its level of public debt and the trend in its fiscal 
performance, explains in good part the outcomes described earlier.
INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
In the case of Greece, a high public debt with a growing fiscal deficit, owing to uncontrolled 
spending, tax evasion and low competitiveness, made investors panic and refuse to buy Greek 
sovereign debt at a sustainable rate of interest. This is why the solution to Greece’s problems was to 
drastically cut government spending, significantly lower tax evasion and introduce reforms that 
would allow the economy to become more competitive. In Italy’s case, the deficit has remained 
relatively low and the public debt stable; consequently, investors have not forced a bail-out by 
asking for very high yields. Nonetheless, investors have signalled concern about the low 
competitiveness of the Italian economy and the associated lack of economic growth by requiring 
higher yields to buy Italian sovereign debt. Without a decent rate of growth, it has been difficult for 
the government to see fiscal revenues increase while justifying cuts in welfare spending to balance 
the budget. This is why Italy’s public debt has remained stable throughout the first decade of the 
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21st century (see: Figure 1) and why it is likely to remain so without appropriate structural reforms, 
which are needed to make the economy once again competitive.
With regards to Ireland, the problem has not been competitiveness or the government’s 
fiscal performance; it has been a banking crisis caused by the bursting of a major real estate bubble. 
In Figure 3, we observe that Irish banks had the highest level of exposure to the domestic economy. 
In addition, their lending had served to fuel a housing boom. According to Hibers et al (2008, p.13), 
real house prices in Ireland experienced the second largest increase in Europe since 1985, after 
Spain, with the majority of the increase occurring after 1995. So when the banks went bust, the Irish 
government had to bail them out to save the financial system, which added close to 50 per cent of 
GDP to the public debt. This means that the formula for Ireland to bring public finances back to 
health has been, first, to get the banking system on its feet as quickly as possible, so that it no longer 
needs the government’s help, and, second, to reduce the deficit by cutting government spending 
and, where possible, increasing tax revenues. These measures are meant to help stabilize the public 
debt, so that it can begin to decrease again once economic growth returns. In the Irish case, only 
minor structural reforms should be necessary to make the economy even more competitive.
For Portugal and Spain, as already mentioned, their situation is in between that of Ireland on 
the one hand, and Greece and Italy on the other. As opposed to Portugal, the only reason why Spain 
has not been forced (yet) to request a bail-out from the EU and the IMF is because its public debt 
has remained much lower. The main shadow hanging over Spain has been the continuing weakness 
of regional and local savings banks, as a result of the bursting of a housing bubble, and the extent to 
which the government must offer them additional financial assistance and, therefore, add to the 
public debt. Although Portugal did not have a housing bubble as in Spain (see: Hibers et al, 2008), 
its banks were similarly exposed to the national economy, and the latter’s weakness could force the 
government to intervene. Since the public debt is about 20 percentage points of GDP higher than in 
Spain, such intervention could be problematic. Moreover, since the Portuguese economy is less 
competitive than that of Spain, the fiscal consolidation effort must be greater. Therefore, in the 
absence of a political consensus on fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms, sovereign bond 
investors simply panicked – by demanding very high yields for buying Portuguese debt – as they 
could not see how Portugal’s government would achieve fiscal sustainability. The EU-IMF bail-out 
put the necessary pressure on Portuguese politicians to achieve a political consensus on necessary 
economic adjustments. 
Let’s now examine the conditions imposed by the EU and the IMF on Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal in exchange for receiving bail-out funds and assess whether the content of these economic 
adjustment programs has in fact been appropriate given each country’s circumstances. The Greek 
program has both short term and medium term commitments to restore fiscal sustainability 
(European Commission, 2010a). In the short run, the program’s aim involves a number of fiscal 
measures to shrink the country’s fiscal deficit in order to stabilize public indebtedness and restore 
confidence in financial markets. On the expenditure side, the Greek government has committed 
itself to cutting government expenditures by seven per cent of GDP over the rescue package’s 
duration (i.e., between 2010 and 2013).243 This reduction in (over)spending is to occur mainly 
through cuts in public sector wages, employment and pensions. Social programs are also to be 
reviewed in terms of their appropriateness. On the revenue side, the most important measures 
98
243 In late June 2011, the Greek rescue package was extended to 2015 and beyond, if necessary.
adopted by the Greek government were immediate increases of the value-added tax (VAT) rate, 
from 21 per cent to 23 per cent, and of excise taxes on fuel, alcohol and cigarettes, by ten per cent. 
Moreover, the government undertook to aggressively tackle tax evasion, which is notorious in 
Greece.244
The adjustment program also includes several structural reforms to the Greek economy, in 
order to render the latter more competitive in the medium term. These reforms focus on the labour 
and services markets. For instance, regulations are to be made more flexible so that high 
unemployment groups, like the young and women, may more easily enter and stay in the formal 
labour market. In terms of services (e.g., tourism, education, retail, transportation, energy, and 
professions), regulations are also to be made more flexible through liberalisation, in order to 
increase competition and to lower prices. For example, Greece was the only country in the EU that 
restricted entry into the national trucking transportation market and fixed freight rates (Barnard, 
2010). The adjustment program also envisages cutting government red tape, in order to reduce the 
administrative burden that Greek businesses face as they go about their operations and 
investments.245
 According to reviews conducted jointly by the European Commission, the IMF and the 
ECB, the Greek government generally complied with its Economic Adjustment Program in the year 
that followed the bail-out agreement (see: European Commission, 2010b, 2010c 2011a). This good 
performance allowed Greece to receive a total of €65 billion in financial assistance as of July 2011. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the significant progress achieved by the Greek government, the latter has 
been pressured to do more in terms of fiscal consolidation, since fiscal deficits were higher than 
expected in 2009, 2010 and 2011 because of deeper recessions than originally anticipated. As a 
result, the government had to agree to additional fiscal measures of 2.5 per cent of GDP for 2011, 
over and above those already agreed in May 2010. For the period 2012-14, it had to find an extra 
six per cent of GDP in new revenues and/or lower spending in order to meet the May 2010 
adjustment program’s targets for fiscal deficits. This new wave of austerity, in a context of growing 
unemployment and continued negative economic growth, has only served to enhance an already 
deep sense of resentment among the Greek population, which makes the implementation of reforms 
even more difficult. Consequently, sovereign bond investors became increasingly convinced that 
Greece would not be able to stabilize its fiscal situation and that a restructuring of its debt (or 
outright default) was the only option. In June 2011, Greece’s credit rating was again downgraded, 
making it the lowest sovereign rating in the world (Oakley and Spiegel, 2011), with a negative 
outlook towards default (which is the lowest possible rating: D). In response, Eurozone member 
states and the IMF agreed on a new rescue package that would add more than €100 billion to the 
existing one, which would allow Greece to meet its public debt commitments until 2015, if not 
beyond. This package eventually came to be associated with a restructuring of Greece’s sovereign 
debt, whereby private sector investors were asked (with incentives) to voluntarily accept to extend 
the maturities of their Greek bond holdings, as well as decrease the nominal rates of interest on 
those bonds. This restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt amounted to about a 50 per cent loss in 
the value of the holdings of Greek bonds by private sector investors. In spite of this agreement with 
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244 Greece’s informal economy is estimated to range between 20-25 per cent of GDP (Katsios, 2006).
245 According to the World Bank, Greece ranked 109th out of 183 countries in terms of the ease of doing business in 
2010 (http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings). 
private-sector investors, there remained, at the time of writing (January 2012), much uncertainty 
surrounding the ability of the Greek government, now led by former central banker Lucas 
Papademos, to stabilize Greece’s fiscal situation given the depth of the ongoing recession and the 
heavy political opposition by labour unions and other industry groups to fiscal and structural 
reforms. In spite of significant accomplishments in terms of fiscal and structural reforms, progress 
remained insufficient and it was evident that Greece would not be able to meet the medium term 
objectives set in its adjustment program. The adjustment process and the bail-out period were likely  
to be extended beyond the current 2015 deadline.
 In Ireland’s case, in exchange for receiving financial assistance from the EU and the IMF in 
November 2010, the government unveiled a new four year fiscal consolidation plan,246 which aimed 
to reduce the fiscal deficit by €15 billion by 2014, in order to bring it back to a more sustainable 
three per cent of GDP (Ireland, 2010). The largest part of this deficit reduction exercise was to come 
in the form of cuts to public spending. This is because government revenues were already hurting, 
not only owing to the general slowdown of the economy, but also due to the particular difficulties 
experienced by the financial and construction sectors.247 For 2011 and 2012, the government 
planned to cut spending by €6 billion, through reductions in social welfare payments, public service 
employment and pensions, general purchases of goods and services, and lower capital expenditures. 
In addition, the Irish government undertook to continue reforming its financial sector, as well as 
introducing structural reforms to its labour market and domestic services sector (e.g., legal and 
pharmacy professions). For instance, the national minimum wage was set to be cut by €1 per hour, 
in order to facilitate hiring by firms. Unemployment and social assistance benefits were also 
expected to be restricted, in order to create stronger incentives for people to seek paid work, while 
decreasing pressure on the public purse. In a sense, the idea behind the cuts seemed to be that the 
Irish welfare state should go back to what it was before it became unduly generous along with the 
real estate bubble (Alderman, 2010). Overall, the Irish adjustment program appears to have been 
successful, since economic growth returned in 2011, aided by strong exports. In addition, in spite of 
lower tax revenues, the Irish government managed to bring its budget deficit for 2011 below the 
target set by the program. Although Ireland’s economic growth forecast was lowered for 2012, as a 
result of an expected global economic slowdown, most especially in Europe, the European 
Commission and the IMF remained confident that the Irish government would reach its fiscal 
deficit target of three per cent of GDP by 2015 (European Commission, 2011b). There were even 
expectations that the Irish government would return to the financial markets to raise funds by the 
first half of 2013.
 As with Greece and Ireland, the Portuguese bail-out package included a series of 
undertakings that the government had to commit to in order to receive the promised funds at various 
intervals over the program’s three year duration. These ‘conditions’ were based on the same general 
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246 The Irish government had already adopted €14.5 billion worth of spending cuts and tax rises in order to quell the 
mounting deficit. In spite of these measures, the deficit was still slated to reach 12 per cent of GDP in 2010, not 
including bail-out funds to the banking sector (The Economist, 2010, p.79).
247 Tax revenues dropped by €14 billion between 2007 and 2009 (The Economist, 2010, p.81).
approach (or strategy) as the one applied to Ireland: fiscal consolidation, economic competitiveness, 
financial sector stabilization; however, in Portugal’s case, the relative emphasis was on 
competitiveness, rather than on financial sector stabilization, with fiscal consolidation playing the 
same role as in Greece and Ireland (see: Portugal, 2011). Just as in Greece, Portugal’s economy had 
been suffering from a lack of competitiveness for quite some time, making for sluggish economic 
growth, which in turn led to repeated fiscal deficits and a growing public debt (see: Figures 1 and 
2).
In terms of fiscal policy, the goals were to reduce the deficit to three per cent of GDP in 
2013, from 9.1 per cent in 2010 (see: Figure 2). Such a deficit reduction was to be achieved through 
both spending cuts and revenue increases. On the expenditure side of the ledger, savings were to 
come from a freeze in public employee wages, improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the public administration (including the healthcare system and state-owned enterprises), as well as 
reductions in government services, transfers to public bodies and local/regional authorities, 
subsidies to private producers, public service employment and benefits (including pensions), and 
capital investments. On the revenue side, gains were to come from reductions in corporate tax 
deductions and special regimes, as well as personal income tax benefits and deductions. Additional 
revenues were also to be generated by increases in the VAT as well as excise taxes on cars and 
tobacco. 
In terms of structural reforms to make the Portuguese economy more competitive, the 
conditionality program envisaged reforms to the labour market, as well as to the good and services 
markets. With respect to improving the competitiveness of Portuguese labour, the government 
committed itself to, for instance, revising unemployment benefits so as to cap their duration at no 
more than 18 months, while their value would decline over time, except for certain categories of 
self-employed workers. The government also planned to make it easier for firms to hire and fire 
employees, while ensuring that severance payments were in line with the EU average. In addition, 
the government was required to improve the quality of its secondary and vocational education 
system, as well as its training and support schemes for the unemployed. As for goods and services 
markets, the Portuguese government was tasked with, inter alia, liberalizing its energy (gas and 
electricity), telecommunications, transport, postal and professional sectors, in accordance with 
existing EU legislation. Finally, it was deemed necessary for the government to improve the overall 
business environment, namely making public administration more efficient and effective and 
removing any special protection from competition accorded to certain sectors or (public and 
private) enterprises. 
According to the European Commission (2011c), the Portuguese adjustment program was 
generally going well, although significant challenges remained. The main challenge pertained to 
achieving the targeted fiscal deficits in 2011 and 2012, as it was proving more difficult than 
expected to rein in government spending. Moreover, it was expected that the Portuguese economy 
would fall into recession as a result of a slowdown in global economic activity, which would hurt 
exports. However, the arrival in June 2011 of a new centre-right government strongly committed to 
fiscal and structural reforms was expected to make it easier to achieve the program’s medium term 
objectives. Based on the new government’s budget, the Commission expected that Portugal would 
meet its targeted deficit of 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2012, in spite of a recession projected to be more 
pronounced than originally forecast by the program. 
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Conclusion
The economic adjustment programs imposed on Greece, Ireland and Portugal by the EU and the 
IMF are generally in line with the lessons offered by past fiscal consolidations, where deep cuts in 
current government expenditures and structural reforms to make the economy more competitive are 
deemed essential to a successful outcome. These are certainly the main elements contained in the 
Greek and Portuguese programs, although tax evasion is a major issue for the Greek government on 
the revenue side. In the Irish case, deep cuts in public spending are at the core of the adjustment 
program; however, structural reforms are less predominant than in Greece and Portugal, since the 
economy is already quite competitive. Cleaning up the financial system to make it self reliant again 
is much more important. It is important to note that, although they set yearly targets for fiscal 
deficits, the programs in fact aim to achieve medium term objectives, which are the expected results 
to be achieved once the program is completed. Furthermore, assumptions about forecasted 
economic growth and external demand for exports are also revised on a biannual basis. Hence, in 
line with Mauro’s (2011) conclusions, the adjustment programs have flexibility built into them.
The main issue that the adjustment programs are facing are not so much popular opposition 
to the required fiscal and structural reforms – after all, new governments were elected in Ireland and 
Portugal on the basis of their commitment to implementing the programs – but deeper than 
anticipated recessions, which then make achieving the fiscal deficit targets more difficult and, as a 
result, create a demand for greater austerity, potentially pushing growth further downward. One of 
the main reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that many EU governments have adopted 
austerity measures at the same time, something that the literature on fiscal consolidation does not 
address. As a result, there is less opportunity for governments to get out of their fiscal mess through 
strong external demand for exports, which is what has happened in many successful consolidations 
in the past (see: Mauro 2011). 
This is why some analysts of the euro crisis have argued that the German government 
should do more to stimulate its economy so that it can act as a locomotive for other Eurozone 
countries that have to stabilize their debts and reduce their deficits (e.g., Matthijs and Blyth, 2011). 
The problem, however, is that it is politically difficult to convince German voters that they should 
not only provide financial assistance to governments of countries facing fiscal crises, but they 
should also spend more and, in a way, indebt themselves collectively to stimulate economic growth 
in the Eurozone. The alternative for Germany, on the other hand, is to provide financial assistance 
to these countries for longer than originally anticipated as they take more time to reduce their 
deficits, given that overall economic growth in the euro area is slower to revive.
This is why an intergovernmental approach, as described by Ross in this volume. is 
ultimately counterproductive. What is needed is a more integrated or supranational approach to 
fiscal policy in the Eurozone, if not the EU. Such an approach includes not only coordinating 
national fiscal policies (e.g., through approval of budgets by the Council of Ministers on a 
recommendation of the Commission), but also creating commonly issued eurobonds. In the latter 
case, to be effective at keeping interest rates low for all, the eurobonds would have to be issued by a 
supranational agency that would only issue them for a Member State if fiscal sustainability of the 
public debt had been ascertained. This is the only way to deal with the moral hazard problem of 
jointly-guaranteed bonds by all Member States; Member States would thus be prevented from free 
riding on the system by issuing too many bonds (similarly to the ‘tragedy-of-the commons’ problem 
as originally identified by Garrett Hardin [1968]).
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Although important steps were taken in this direction at the December 2011 meeting of the 
European Council, namely in terms of greater fiscal policy coordination, more needs to be done, 
especially with respect to eurobonds. In spite of Ross’ (this volume) scepticism that the EU can 
move positively in such a direction, we can expect that sovereign bond investors will continue to 
put pressure on EU/Eurozone governments to achieve a greater degree of fiscal integration at the 
EU or Eurozone level. The bail-outs may have been successful in preventing outright sovereign 
defaults and keeping the euro intact, but at the time of writing the ‘PIIGS’ countries were still 
facing major fiscal and economic challenges that financial markets were bound to react to for the 
foreseeable future. The euro’s ‘fat lady’ has yet to sing.
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Figures
Figure 1: General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP)
Source of data: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?
tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teina225 [accessed 15 March 2012])
Figure 2: General Government Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP)
Source of data: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?
tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb080 [accessed 15 March 2012])
Figure 3: Economic Situation of the ‘PIIGS’ at the Beginning of the Financial Crisis
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*2008-2009 **2008 (end of year)
Sources of data: Global Competitiveness Index: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2008-2009, p. 10 (https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCR08/GCR08.pdf [accessed 15 
March 2012]); Banking Claims on Domestic Private Sector: International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics (Claims on other Sector/GDP, Line 22s.u/Line99b)
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End Notes
1 It is true that cutting social welfare benefits is likely to have a negative impact on economic growth as individuals’ 
consumption is reduced; however, if unit labour costs decrease and it leads to greater employment in the private sector, 
then the negative impact on consumption will be nullified. Moreover, lower labour costs are likely to stimulate 
investment in the national economy, which will be beneficial to growth. The real issue is one of timing, in terms of the 
time lag between the removal of social welfare benefits and the positive private sector employment impact following 
reduced labour costs (see below for a discussion of the this issues).
2 There are instances where taxes can actually improve competitiveness, especially if they replace more inefficient 
taxes. According to a study by Widmalm (2001), some taxes have a negative impact on economic growth while others 
can have positive effects.
3 For details on the theory of optimal currency areas, see: Kenen and Meade (2008, Chapter 2). In a nutshell, the theory 
aims to identify the conditions that would mitigate the limited degree of synchronicity between economies should they 
adopt a common currency. An optimal currency area is one where either the economies are synchronized in terms of 
their boom-bust cycle or they possess the necessary conditions that mitigate the absence of synchronicity.
4 For details on the EFSF and ESM, see: Leblond and Paudyn (2011).
5 In late June 2011, the Greek rescue package was extended to 2015 and beyond, if necessary.
6 Greece’s informal economy is estimated to range between 20-25 per cent of GDP (Katsios, 2006).
7 According to the World Bank, Greece ranked 109th out of 183 countries in terms of the ease of doing business in 2010 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings). 
8 The Irish government had already adopted €14.5 billion worth of spending cuts and tax rises in order to quell the 
mounting deficit. In spite of these measures, the deficit was still slated to reach 12 per cent of GDP in 2010, not 
including bail-out funds to the banking sector (The Economist, 2010, p.79).
9 Tax revenues dropped by €14 billion between 2007 and 2009 (The Economist, 2010, p.81).
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Jacquelyn MacLennan, ‘Recent Developments in EU Competition Policy & 
Competitiveness: Outline of Remarks & Slides for Presentation’
1. What is competition policy?
• The “Founding Fathers” of the Coal and Steel Treaty  in 1951 and the Treaty  of Rome in 
1957 had a fundamental aim: to bring long lasting peace to Europe.  How? By prosperity, 
leading to economic growth and political stability.  The mechanism? The internal market 
would be the engine for growth.
• Competition policy  was seen as a key tool to achieve the internal market.   The intention 
was that the EC would be governed by a system with fair and open markets, seen as 
essential for the well-being of the economy and society.  In a market economy 
competition policy  promotes the efficient  operation of markets. Competition law 
complements regulation. The original goal of EC competition policy was to ensure that 
companies were not undermining the drive to eliminate government barriers to trade. The 
focus first was on vertical agreements sealing off international markets.  There developed 
an understanding that horizontal market sharing agreements were pernicious as they 
allowed the protection of national champions.  This lead to the “fight against cartels”.  So 
the objective laid down in the Treaty of Rome was in Article 3 (g): The authorities of the 
Community shall include a system ensuring that  competition in the internal market is not 
distorted.
• The theory is that competition law should ensure that the market is working properly, on 
the basis that in such a market:  prices decrease, innovation increases (in how product and 
services are delivered, and in goods and services themselves) and choice increases, so 
overall, the consumer benefits.  
• There is now an emphasis on the structural effects of competition law in achieving an 
undistorted market, on the basis that  this encourages the necessary restructuring of 
declining industries, and correspondingly encourages the creation of globally competitive 
companies
• The “purist” (ordo-liberal) view that the sole goal of competition enforcement should be 
the promotion of economic efficiency is gaining increasing acceptance in policy making. 
Competition agencies around the world have become increasingly  sceptical about the role 
of industrial policy considerations in competition law enforcement.  This can be seen in 
the treatment of “hardcore” competition law infringements, such as fixing prices or 
production. 
2. What is EU competition policy in particular?
• Anti-competitive agreements - cartels, vertical agreements (Article 101); 
• Abusive conduct by dominant companies (Article 102, Article 106);
• Control of mergers and acquisitions (Regulation (EC) No 139/2004) and
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• State aid (Articles 107, 108, 109). 
3. How does competition policy fit with the Commission’s policies on competitiveness?
Europe 2020 – “Europe’s growth strategy”
• Europe’s industrial policy  for the present decade – “smart, sustainable, inclusive growth”. 
The EU has set five ambitious objectives - on employment, innovation, education, social 
inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached by 2020. Each Member State has adopted its 
own national targets in each of these areas. 
• Commission President Barroso: “these measures will create jobs in the short term and 
make the European economy more competitive in the longer term.”248
• Competition policy is a complement to the Europe 2020 policy.  Need for flagship 
competition law initiatives and robust enforcement to be part of it. 
Examples of competition policy initiatives which are expressly intended to increase 
competitiveness?
(1) Financial services 
a. Commission actively investigating electronic payment services
e.g. Electronic Payment Council’s process of standard setting to ensure access for 
new service providers. 
b. Investigation into CDS market
Commission looking, in particular, at investment banks’ behaviour.
c. Investigation into financial derivatives markets linked to LIBOR, TIBOR and 
EURIBOR
Many countries, including the EU, looking into allegations of manipulation of 
these rates by banks as well as other traders.
d. Investigation into Thomson Reuters/ S&P licensing of financial information
e. NYSE/Deutsche Börse 
Commission said: not prepared to allow “quasi monopolies”, and blocked the 
proposed merger on the grounds it  would have controlled 90%  of the market for 
exchange traded financial derivatives and would have harmed competition and 
consumers. 
(2) Telecoms
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248 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/
12/181&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
• The telecoms market has been a focus for the Commission since 1990s.  It remains a 
focus, and also a focus of national competition policies.
• Eg Commission recently fined Polish Telecom; many incumbent operators accused of 
abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty by to restricting access of 
competitors to the market  (currently investigations in Slovakia, Spain, Portugal) 
(3) Standard Setting / IP
Patents are essential monopolies granted to reward innovation and encourage invention, but 
they can be used to block competitors from the market and restrict competition. 
• The Commission has looked particularly  at  standard setting procedures to ensure markets 
are open to new competitors, e.g. Intel acquisition McAfee: Commission cleared on basis 
McAfee open system working with other competitors focusing also on telecoms networks 
e.g.
• Google acquisition of Motorola Mobility
• Mobile “patent-wars”:
• Samsung: potential abuse of “standard essential patents” and refusal to license on FRAND 
terms
• Follow on from Rambus and Qualcomm cases
• complaints from Apple and Microsoft against Motorola 
• Mathworks – complaint that it has refused to license software for inter-operability  in ABS 
sector (seems to be a re-run of the Microsoft case).
• Huawei complaint against Interdigital: 3G patent licensing injunction sought by 
Interdigital to get Huawei to pay increased loyalties.
(4) Energy
EU Commission policy here is now very advanced.  In summary: regulatory effort through 
1990s to create EU market  for gas and electricity instead of insular national markets.  In 
2005 it  was evident that despite the effort, markets were not fully open so DG COMP began 
energy sector enquiry investigations.
Incumbent supplies have now opened up markets with commitments – see:
ENI, GDF, Suez, E.On – gas; E.On, RWE -  electricity
Result – greater competitiveness, achieved with a combination of regulation and 
competition law enforcement.  
Conclusion:  can poin to many examples where competition policy  is being used as a tool to 
achieve a more competitive economy and growth in the EU.
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4. The effect of the economic crisis on EU competition policy 
• The global financial crisis had its roots in the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2007 – 
but only  became apparent in the EU in 2008,  in particular the fall out from the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  The crisis was first seen playing out on the banks. 
The trickle down into the “real economy” was rapid however.  
• What did the crisis mean for EU competition law?
o First - there is no provision to suspend EU competition law.
o Second - there has been no change to the substantive competition Articles in the 
EU Treaty since 1957, although there have many Treaty changes.
o There has been a change to the “big picture” Article setting out the goal of the 
EU regarding competition policy – but this was not related to the financial crisis. 
Compare Article 3(g) of the Treaty  of Rome with its “replacement” - Article 3 
TEU: “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement 
of the quality of the environment.” Concept of free and undistorted competition 
lost.  
o In June 2007, in the heat of the final negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon, 
President Sarkozy  of France succeeded in his demand of having this language 
moved into Protocol No 27 to the consolidated Treaty on EU, which states “… 
the internal market…includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted”.   Sarkozy: “Competition as an ideology, as a dogma, what has it done 
for Europe? It has only brought fewer and fewer people who vote in European 
elections and fewer and fewer people who believe in Europe”…. “This 
amendment gives the EU more humanity.”  The Protocol to the TFEU says “…
recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in 
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition”. 
What is the effect?  Moving the furniture. The house is still the same.
o Since the crisis struck, have the words of the Treaty been interpreted differently 
in light of the changed external circumstances?  Has there been a change in how 
the law is enforced, even if the principles remain the same?  It is clear that 
different Commissioner’s responsible for competition policy have had different 
priorities.  Has that situation simply continued? 
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This presentation looks at three areas of competition policy to see the impact of the financial crisis, 
concentrating on cartel policy.
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(1) Cartels 
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• Looking at the statistics on the evolution of the number of EU cartel cases where the 
Commission has taken decisions, and the volume of fines, it is easy to see that there has 
been a certain drop in the number of cases in the last year or so where decisions have been 
imposed.  In my view, this cannot be attributed to the financial crisis, but to other  factors. 
However, the crisis can be seen to a certain extent in the drop in the level of fines imposed 
at EU level. Aggregate fines249 in 2008: were €2.3 billion, in 2009: €1.5 billion and in 
2010: €2.9 billion,  But in 2011: 0.6 bn.  
• Why?  Result of:
o change of Commissioner, 
o understanding of the impact of the crisis  
o initiative by companies before national parliaments and the European Parliament 
to challenge the dogma of enormous fines
o Increase in acceptance of inability to pay claims, 
o increase of defaults on fines (deferment of payment schemes) even after fines 
upheld by Court:
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249 Adjusted for changes following judgments of GC and ECJ.
o In addition, companies are just not paying and there appears to be little 
enforcement of the payment of fines by DG Budget.  
• However, there is no abandoning of the "fight against cartels": In particular, no 
overall justification for relaxing the rules.  In fact, the Commission showed particularly 
scepticism when faced with such an approach: 
 Director General Italianer, 14 March 2012: “As competition law enforcers, cartel 
behavior is not something we can tolerate.  I can assure you that our strict enforcement 
policy will not change, especially in these difficult economic times when cartels impose 
an extra cost on consumers and on the companies that play by the rules”.
• The Commission and Member State competition authorities were strongly influenced by 
the OECD, which argued that suspension of the cartel rules in the US after the Great 
Depression had slowed down the process of recovery.
• Examples of Commission approach to competition which has not eased because of crisis:
o Pharma enquiry continues
o Telecoms focus continues
o Energy focus continues
o Financial services focus continues – even against banks
o Food supply chain: Commission and national competition authorities working 
together to tackle unfair trading practices resulting from contractual imbalances 
and differences in bargaining power between suppliers and buyers. These 
practices, which must be distinguished from anticompetitive practices, normally 
fall under national contract or commercial laws. (source: http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/annual_report/2010/part1_en.pdf - p. 37, 2.11; see 
also .)
o New distribution rules – modernised for the internet.
o Commission still opening new investigations in airline sector (SkyTeam 
investigation  January 2012, to probe cooperation among three members of 
SkyTeam Alliance: AirFrance-KLM, Alitalia and Delta;  investigation February 
2011 into code-sharing agreement between Brussels Airlines and Transportes 
Aeros Portugueses.
• What about real crisis cartels – where there is a situation of oversupply in a particular 
sector, and a need for radical restructuring?  How do the competition rules apply? 
o In the 1980s-90s, the Commission was prepared to permit agreements aimed at 
eliminating overcapacity in industries affected by structural crisis (Synthetic 
Fibers250 Stichting Backsteen251), but only under certain conditions: limited to 
particular sector only, no price or quota discussion and only  on a temporary 
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250 Commission Decision of 4 July 1984 (Synthetic Fibres), OJ [1984] L 207/17.
251 Commission Decision of 29 April 1994 (Stichting Baksteen (Dutch Bricks)), OJ [1994] L 131/15.
basis. Some further bilateral examples of crisis agreements given an exemption 
under the competition rules in the chemical sector e.g. BPPL/ICI; ENI.  Would 
the same approach be adopted now? 
o Unlikely – the ECJ is now much clearer on the scope of Article 101, saying that 
non-competition matters (e.g. employment considerations) should not  be taken 
into account where there is a clear detriment to competition, and even casting 
doubt on the application of Article 101(3). See Irish Beef252: the ECJ held that an 
agreement aimed at reducing production capacity in a crisis-ridden industry  is a 
restriction “by object”, reasoning that  industrial policy  considerations (the need 
to eliminate structural overcapacity in the Irish beef industry which was in crisis) 
were irrelevant for the purpose of applying Article 101(1) TEFU.  Such 
considerations could be relevant in the context of applying Article 101(3) TFEU, 
but the Court noted that agreements restricting competition “by object” are 
unlikely to fulfill the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU.  
o Bottom line: (1) now much more severe enforcement culture; (2) exemption 
under 101(3) harder in light of case law (3) after Regulation 1/2003, there is no 
notification procedure so a company has to take the risk.  It might get informal 
advice from the Commission – but there is no longer provisional immunity  or the 
possibility of a comfort letter.
o A good guide to the Commission’s likely approach is the Report which the 
Commission prepared for an OECD 2011 study  on crisis cartels253  – the 
intervention reads as if the financial crisis is not there.
o The general approach is expressed e.g. in 2009 by the Commission:
"From a substantive point of view, it was important to maintain a rigorous enforcement of 
the merger and antitrust rules in order to preserve the competitiveness of European business 
and facilitate its emergence from the crisis."254
The response of the COM was more about adjusting the level of fines in cartel cases and the 
need for state aid control measures.
• There are only very  exceptional examples of cases where some softening of approach has 
been permitted.  Annual report on Competition Policy 2010, p. 37 (http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/annual_report/2010/part1_en.pdf):
"Special attention was devoted to the dairy sector in light of the difficulties faced by dairy 
farmers during the recent milk crisis. Following the High-Level Group on Milk 
recommendations, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal163 in December 2010 on 
contractual relationships in the milk sector. The proposal allows collective bargaining 
negotiations by producer organisations of milk farmers subject to certain limits based on their 
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252 (Case C-209/07, The Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd, Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats [2008] 
ECR I-8637)
253 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/61/48948847.pdf
254 Annual report on Competition Policy 2009, p. 16 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2009/en.pdf).  
share of EU-wide and national milk production volumes. The proposal also provides for a 
"safety clause" allowing the competent NCA or the Commission to decide that the negotiations 
by a producer organisation may not take place where they would limit competition severely or 
where they would inflict a serious prejudice to dairy processors, in particular SMEs."255
But this is not a general justification for crisis cartels.   Illustrative of this: the Greek 
Competition Authority refused such a justification and imposed a fine on fish farms in a crisis 
cartel situation.  True that in such a situation fines are likely to be substantially lower. 
(2) Merger control 
• The fear at the time of the crisis was that the “failing firm defence” would mean “anything 
goes”. Crisis gave rise to procedural changes: need for fast clearance decisions. 
However, merger decisions do not  reveal that the Commission's analysis substantively 
changed or that concentrations are more likely to be accepted these days.  
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255 See also the Belgian NCA "In 2009 we focussed also on a more proactive involvement, in particular in respect of the crisis in the 
agricultural sector, and especially the dairy sector. In consultation with the 
European Commission, another national competition authority and other departments of the 
Fod/Spf Economie, we have helped to define what was compatible with the rules of 
competition in respect of the provisional arrangement between the Agrofront and Fedis 
regarding the support by the distribution sector in favour of the milk producers. Equally in 
consultation with the Boerenbond, with het Algemeen Boerensydicaat, and two other 
organisations, we offered guidelines concerning projects for contractual agriculture and 
quality labels." (http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/Annual_Report_E1_2009_tcm327-100091.pdf)
o There are still very few blocked mergers, but not because of crisis justification. 
There have always been few Article 8(3) prohibitions (only 22 from 1990 – April 
2012)256.  Since 2008, there has been 1 prohibition in 2011 (Olympic/Aegean) 
and 1 in 2012 (Deutsche Börse/NYSE).
But a key point must be remembered: mergers are generally cleared with conditions 
i.e. structural or behavioural remedies (usually  structural as easier to enforce 
divestitures).  Knowing this, companies may  offer remedies at an early stage of 
discussion with the Commission, in order to preempt problems. 
• A truism: decisions taken at national level might be more prone to political pressures than 
European Commission. Industrial policy  considerations more likely  to figure in the 
equation.  Can see this in a few examples:
o Compare Olympic/Aegean Airlines 2011 reviewed by European Commission at 
EU level with Alitalia /AirOne reviewed by  Italian Antitrust Authority in 
December 2008.  The Commission blocked the merger  on grounds that it would 
have created quasi-monopoly on certain national routes;  the Italian merger went 
through, even though the transaction led to similar competition concerns, 
because at the time, Alitalia on brink of bankruptcy  and the Italian government 
adopted laws effectively preventing the IAA from reviewing transaction, by 
raising public policy issues.  See also: IAG(group which owns BA)/BMI which 
was approved with conditions in March 2012 by the Commission.  Due to the 
losses it was incurring, BMI faced closure should the EC have initiated a phase II 
investigation.  The EC pushed IAG to agree to surrender 14 of the 56 pairs of 
daily take-off and landing slots at London held by  BMI.  Additionally, IAG 
committed to allow rivals operating on long-haul flights out of London Heathrow 
to use its network of connecting flights.
o Lloyds/HBOS257  – very exceptional times – September 2008 – a real fear of a 
run on the bank in the UK.  Concerns about the stability of the financial markets 
led the UK government to intervene in the merger review process. The 
transaction was not notifiable to the Commission as the turnover requirements 
were not met.  The government effectively  manipulated the legal process to 
ensure that the transaction was cleared on public interest grounds despite the fact 
that it  was capable of giving rise to competition concerns, so that no competition 
clearance was necessary.  At the time, the OFT informally threatened a sectoral 
enqurity in the banks in the UK.  Some of the concerns were however addressed 
by the European Commission in its decision regarding the approval of the aid (in 
a form of a state recapitalization) to the ailing banks.  The Commission required 
divestments with the view to facilitate the entry of a new competitor or the 
reinforcement of a smaller existing competitor on the UK retail banking market. 
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256 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf
Generally  Commission unsymphatic to arguments based on restructuring need: ICI, Svkerunie, Tokai Carbon. FNC BV: agreement 
between French beef farmer federations post mad law. Court said had to find 101 (i) infringement but bigger reduction of fine 
justified (2006)
257 Lloyds/TSB GroupPLC/HBOS case (Case ME/3862/08)
Again shows that industrial policy concerns can be highly  relevant in the context 
of national merger control.
Conclusion: At EU level, the failing firm defence has not been a panacea to approve all 
mergers with no remedies.  
(3) State aid 
• Without doubt, this is the area where the impact of the crisis has been most pronounced. 
• When national banks were in crisis, the only  possible reaction in terms of a bail out at the 
time was national.258  So it was to be expected that the Member States took the immediate 
steps they considered necessary.  The question was how should the EU apply the state aid 
rules in such a situation? 
• The Commission had some – but very limited – experience from the accession process for 
the Czech Republic, and other acceding Member States in 2004 and 2006.  Article 107(3)
(b) TFEU provides that aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a member 
state may be considered to be compatible with the common market. The Commission 
considered that the crisis that  hit the financial markets in 2008 and its potential overall 
impact on the economy of member states, justified the use of Article 107(3)(b) as a legal 
basis for aid measures to address this systemic crisis. 
• The Commission in fact responded very quickly.  Particularly in relation to aid to banks. 
Commission Kroes put in place an EU emergency regime.  The Commission considered 
43 banks and is still discussing the restructuring of more than 20.  Officials were available 
day and night, and decisions were taken with unprecedented expediency.
• In addition to the procedural “re-tooling”, in 2008 and 2009 4 communications were 
issued to create  framework for the approval under Article 107(3)(b) of aid in favour of 
banks and financial institutions hit by the financial crisis: 
(1) Communication on the application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (the Banking 
Communication) 
(2) Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis (the Recapitalisation Communication) 
(3) Communication on the treatment of impaired assets in the banking sector (the Impaired 
Assets Communication) 
(4) Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures 
in the financial sector in the current crisis (the Restructuring Communication)
• 1 December 2011 – Commission extended State aid crisis framework for banks to take 
account of sovereign debt crisis.
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258 The Spanish Govenment has just been pressurised to agree to a Eurozone bail out for its banks, rather than try to rescue the 
situation using its own funds.  
• Further major changes have just been announced by Commissioner Almunia.
• When look at  the Commission statistics for crisis and non-crisis aid over the past years, 
can see that there is no substantial increase, and even a slight reduction of state aid, if 
leave aside sector-specific crisis aid.  Aid to the financial sector is now said to be about 
€1.6 trillion. 
5. Conclusions
• The OECD view that history shows that the relaxation of anti-trust enforcement prolongs 
and worsens impact of crisis, and prevents healthy recovery,  has been very influential on 
approach of EU Commission and NCAs.  
• Overall, with exception of State aid to banks, the crisis has had a limited impact on EU 
competition policy.
• Has been certain impact in area of cartels: Commission recognizes that business 
delinquency  is more likely in times of crisis so (i) fight against cartels remains the key 
priority (ii) fines are still used as the basic tool to ensure deterrence but there is some 
moderation in the amounts and the approach to applications of inability  to pay  (iii)  but 
crisis cartels are unlikely to be accepted.
• Mergers: business as usual
• Change of Commissioner & Director General -  both of whom are economists, not 
lawyers, not generalists - has shifted focus of EU competition law to tackling the structure 
of competition in the market, with less interest in individual agreements unless they cover 
a very  major market or have highly important implications. This approach has been 
exacerbated by the background of the economic crisis. 
• The Commission has become very proactive in explaining how competition benefits 
consumers and achieves economic growth by aiding competitiveness: see website, 
speeches etc. Preemptive justification? 
• Apart from state aid - where it’s a now a different world from 2008 – the conclusion as 
regards EU competition policy is: crisis, what crisis?
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Georg Menz, ʻEmployers and Migrant Legality: Liberalization of Service 
Provision, Transnational Posting, and the Bifurcation of the European 
Labour Marketʼ
The grabbing hands grab all they can. All for themselves, after all: It is a competitive world. 
Everything counts in large amounts.”
Depeche Mode, Everything Counts [July 1983]
1. MAPPING THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN LABOUR 
MARKET 
 European labour markets have undergone epochal transformations over the course of the 
past fifteen years. This is particularly true for continental Europe, where relatively strong unions, 
organisational coherence amongst employers, and sophisticated juridical regulation led to fairly 
regulated labour markets with low degrees of wage dispersal. However, this assessment of unified 
and regulated labour markets, already somewhat inaccurate during the era of Fordism and the long 
postwar boom, no longer adequately captures the dynamics of contemporary labour markets, due to 
the gradual structural transformation of labour market regulation. This transformation is driven by 
the transnationalization of production strategies, neoliberal policy reform, and changing 
commitments amongst employers. 
 In this process of carefully induced disintegration, migration plays a significant role, which 
is often underappreciated or neglected altogether. Migrants are channelled into new substandard 
tiers of the labour market and are thus used to promote the elaboration and ensure their permanent 
character. Employers proactively use and abuse migration as a tool to achieve more pronounced 
disparity in terms of wages and working conditions. The recent re-discovery of labour migration in 
Europe therefore needs to be assessed in terms of a strategic tool in securing greater differentiation 
of the labour market. Apart from migration from outside of Europe, intra-European mobility is an 
important issue in this respect as well, both in terms of simple labour mobility and regarding the 
transnational provision of services involving the temporary posting of workers across European 
borders. Given the formidable size of the intra-European wage gap, the exploitation of labour 
migration is an important and lucrative strategy in undermining formerly more structured and 
regulated labour markets that is currently not sufficiently appreciated in the existing literature. 
This article submits three chief arguments. Firstly, it demonstrates how debates in 
comparative political economy can be significantly enhanced and improved by taking seriously 
developments in European labour markets induced by immigration. The comparative political 
economy literature does not take migration into consideration and, conversely, there has been a 
dearth of scholarly migration accounts, at least in political science, that focus on the labour market 
implications of the movement of people. This article seeks to address this lacuna, arguing that 
labour migrants, both legal and undocumented, are used to help perpetuate the disintegration of 
European labour markets, both in systems commonly still regarded as subject to considerable 
122
regulation, greater homogeneity and, not least, union influence, such as Germany, and in those 
regarded as much more liberalised and heterogeneous already, namely in the United Kingdom. 
Labour migration can therefore be utilised as a conscious employer strategy in helping to liberalise 
and deregulate labour markets.
 Disintegration of formerly tightly organised labour markets are not caused by, yet arguably 
promoted by labour migration. This argument is substantiated by an in-depth study of sectoral 
labour market developments. Secondly, it is argued that some of this structural transformation ought 
to be understood as being related to structural changes in the role of the state. The modern European 
state has cast off reservations associated with the era of embedded capitalism and is more 
aggressively enabling the pursuit of accumulation, entailing a business-friendly stance towards 
labour migration. Thirdly, and relatedly, employers are active agents in driving forward the 
liberalization of labour migration, including the analytically somewhat distinct, yet related 
liberalization of service provision. Thus, immigration from outside of the European Union (EU) is 
being promoted and supported by active lobbying. In addition, the EU liberalization of service 
provision is being exploited as a mechanism of prying open new access channels to labour markets.  
The agency of employers and it significance are also somewhat underappreciated in the current 
literature. It is also worth noting that this inferior legal status pertaining to labour migrants might in 
some cases even apply to citizens of EU member states.  
2. ORDERLY DISINTEGRATION : THE USE AND ABUSE OF LABOUR MIGRATION
Recent debates in comparative political economy have focused on the implications of 
economic liberalization in Europe, exploring in particular whether domestic factors engendering the 
embrace of neoliberal ideology or more general tectonic shifts often attributed to globalization and 
European integration are primary causes for liberal change (Crouch and Streeck 1997, Streeck and 
Hoepner 2003, Streeck and Hassel 2004, Amable 2005). More recent contributions, especially those 
informed by the varieties of capitalism approach, contest that earlier pessimistic predictions of 
convergence on a minimalist liberal Anglo-American model of capitalism are inaccurate, suggesting 
instead a taxonomy that encapsulates coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market 
economies (LMEs). This framework suggests that notwithstanding the general trend towards post-
Fordist liberalization, significant differences in regulatory style continue to persist across Europe, 
partially driven by highly diverse production strategies that encompass different corporate interests 
in degrees of intra-company cooperation and coordination, skills distribution levels of employees, 
and the regulatory style of the labour market in general terms. However, one obvious point of 
weakness is the relative myopia of attempts to sketch a CME, given the bifurcation of labour 
markets and the more general ongoing steadily proceeding liberalization of these very models 
(Streeck 2009). 
      
The pace and extent of disintegration, by which I refer to the dissolution of formerly more uniform 
and cohesive labour market structures into an atomized multi-tiered structure, is astonishing. The 
resultant dualization entails the segmentation of the labour market not only in the UK and other 
LMEs, where precarization, dualization and atypical forms of employment emerged from the late 
1970s onwards and are well documented (Gamble 1988, Coates 2000), but, more strikingly, also in 
Germany and the CME category. Drawing on the UK Labour Force Survey, Goos and Manning 
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(2003: 77) show that though the proportion of top paying jobs in the UK increased between 1979 
and 1999 (by 25% and 70% respectively in deciles 9 and 10), the same period also saw a significant 
rise (40%) in the proportion of jobs in the lowest paying decile. Concomitantly, between 1979 and 
1993, the poorest decile experienced a real income decrease of 18 percent, whilst the richest decile 
expericned an explosive 61 percent rise (Macnicol 1998). The received wisdom of the German 
economy as being dominated by well-regulated and highly unionized industrial relations needs to be 
re-evaluated in light of the now readily apparent impact of labour market reforms and ongoing 
union weaknesses. Hassel (2011: 16-17) documents the use of marginal employment and fixed term 
contracts, especially in the service sector, which accounts for 80 percent of such marginal 
employment. Drawing on government data, she suggests that more than 20 percent of all jobs in the 
service sector are fixed-term contracts. With income inequality rising, nearly one third of recipients 
of long-term unemployment benefit are also in employment, spawning the phenomenon of the 
working poor. Part-time employment has doubled between 1991 and 2007, whilst the number of full 
time jobs has decreased by 20 percent. Fixed term contracts and contracts secured through work 
agencies amount to under 10 percent of the total labour force, though there are striking recent 
increases in absolute terms (Eichhorst and Marx 2009: 14). However, 22.4 percent of all employees 
received less than EUR 9.19 as a gross hourly wage in 2007. The percentage of employees thus 
covered by minimal wages only has risen from 14.2 percent in 1998 (Kalina and Weinkopf 2009: 
2-3). Worryingly, not all poorly paid jobs are necessarily appropriately to be classified as low skill 
and many are held by clearly overqualified individuals, with 70.8 percent of employees in this 
category having undergone vocational training and 8.4 percent having obtained a tertiary education 
degree. 11.3 percent of all employees are foreign citizens. Between 1995 and 2007, real average 
wages in the low wage sector have actually decreased from EUR 6.03 to EUR 5.77 in West 
Germany and marginally increased from EUR 4.66 to EUR 4.69  (Kalina and Weiskopf 2009: 6).  
Recent scholarship has all but neglected the neo-Marxist works of the early 1970s that 
postulated a link between migration and the “reserve army of labour” (Castles and Cusack 1973, 
Castells 1975). Engels had written in 1844 that 
With such a competitor the English working-man has to struggle with a competitor upon the 
lowest plane possible in a civilised country, who for this very reason requires less wages 
than any other.  Nothing else is therefore possible than that, as Carlyle says, the wages of 
English working-men should be forced down further and further in every branch in which 
the Irish compete with him.  And these branches are many.  All such as demand little or no 
skill are open to the Irish.  For work which requires long training or regular, pertinacious 
application, the dissolute, unsteady, drunken Irishman is on too low a plane.  To become a 
mechanic, a mill-hand, he would have to adopt the English civilisation, the English customs, 
become, in the main, an Englishman.  But for all simple, less exact work, wherever it is a 
question more of strength than skill, the Irishman is as good as the Englishman. Engels 
(1844 [1943] : 94)
 Inspired by the claim that migrant labour was consciously (ab)used to feed into substandard 
jobs, Michael Piore (1979) argued that the capitalist economies of the late 1970s were characterized 
by “dual labour markets” inasmuch as there was a permanent tier of poorly remunerated jobs 
attracting little or no prestige, often subject to bad or even hazardous working conditions. The 
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contemporary term “dirty, dull and dangerous” aptly summarizes the conditions found in this 
bottom tier of the labour market. According to Piore, this sector was a permanent structural 
component of the labour market, not a transitory or temporary phenomenon. 
Drawing on the concept of the dual labour market, I argue that there is indeed a strong correlation 
between the manufactured disintegration of the labour market and migration. Labour migration is 
thus used both as an axe to crack open tightly regulated and homogenous labour market structures, 
permitting new substandard forms of employment and to people such new substandard tiers. The 
trend towards tertiarization, already evident in the 1970s, certainly dovetailed with this 
development, as newly emergent service industries proved more difficult for both unions and labour 
authorities to police effectively. 
Concomitant with disintegration is the disproportionate effect of economic restructuring on settled 
immigrants, especially those working in relatively unskilled jobs (Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel 
2009). This is borne out by the relatively high unemployment rates amongst UK ethnic minorities, 
as documented in the UK Labour Froce Survey. Whilst in 2005-6 the rate was 3.8 for the white 
majority, it stood at 12.8 for Pakistanis, 19.4 for Bangladeshis, 11 percent for Black Caribbean and 
11.8 percent for Black Africans. Though no similar data is available for Germany, 2007 EU Labour 
Force Survey data indicate that 19.24 percent of all resident non-EU citizens are unemployed as 
opposed to 7.76 native born (quoted in Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2010). Similarly, in 
2009, the rate of economic activity for white Britons was 75.0 per cent, whilst for other ethnic 
groups this was 59.4 per cent (ONS 2010).
The disintegration of the labour market is accompanied by the (re-)creation of different groups 
entitled to different rights. Legality of employment, a common theme in the contributions to this 
special issue, obviously matters greatly, but less immediately apparent is the inferior status of EU 
citizens seconded transnationally under the auspices of the liberalization of service provision or 
“self-employed” as de facto subcontractors in this context. The transnationalization of production 
and corporate strategies and legislative changes aimed at reducing trade union influence and 
workfarism that links the receipt of transfer payments to generally poorly remunerated work 
activities are all important factors in the fundamental change of the legislative and political 
landscape. Such legislative measures were informed by an ideological shift towards neoliberalism, 
although the extent to which this ideology was embraced obviously varied across Europe.
3. THE CHANGING ARCHITECTURE OF THE EUROPEAN STATE
The architecture of the European state has changed radically when juxtaposed with the form 
and functions carried out by the postwar Keynesian welfare state. It was always misleading to 
conceive as the state as a neutral umpire between conflicting societal interests, but equally 
important is a clear understanding of what the internalization of neoliberalism and the embrace of 
authoritarian etatisme entail for the nature of the state and its population control policy. Such 
analytical confusion might be attributable to neoliberalism being conceived of as an ideology 
limiting the scope of the state: 
A new ideology…must give high priority to limiting the state’s ability to intervene in the 
activities of the individual. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that there are positive 
functions allotted to the state. […] neoliberalism argues that it is competition that will lead 
the way. The state will police the system, it will establish the conditions favourable to 
competition…. Citizens will be protected against the state, since there exists a free private 
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market, and the competition will protect them from another.” (Friedman 1951, cited in Peck 
2010: 3–4).  
It is more helpful, however, to consider on the one hand, the more punitive elements of the 
neoliberalized state and it increasingly authoritarian nature. Earlier state theorists, including 
Poulantzas (2002), forecast a dichotomy between a liberalised economy and an increasing control 
and surveillance regime aimed at those considered deviant or somehow ill fit to contribute to the 
accumulation process.
  “(I)t seems to be precisely this incapacity to make a clear distinction between 
‘threats’ and ‘resources’, between the ‘dangerous’ and the ‘laborious’ classes or, to follow 
another sociologically successful dichotomy, between ’social junk’ and ’social dynamite’, 
which compels the institutions of social control to regroup whole sectors of the post-Fordist 
labour force as ‘categories at risk’, and to deploy consequent strategies of confinement, 
incapacitation and surveillance.” (De Giorgi 2006: 76).
  Wacquant makes a similar argument that stresses the rise of the disciplining penal state, 
which renders what are often mere survival strategies into pathological and deviant behaviour, thus 
‘penalising the poor’ (Wacquant 2009). But the state does not only contain a newly reinforced 
repressive role, it also contains an important ideological apparatus, which is involved in 
“ideological inculculation and transmission” (Martin, 2008: 183). Thus understood, the basic 
architecture of the European neoliberalized state becomes clearer. “[…] the state must not be 
considered as a n intrinsic entity, but, as is also true for ‘capital’ itself, it must be considered as a 
relation, more exactly as a material condensation (apparatus) of a relation of force between classes 
and fraction of classes…” (Martin 2008: 307). 
 Three important arguments follow from this Poulantzian understanding of the state. The 
state is not captured by capitalist interests, but nevertheless strongly shaped by the ‘power bloc’, a 
congregation of influential political, social and economic actors. The state does retain a certain 
degree of autonomy, but it needs to be understood as the expression of economically driven 
struggles over political influence. Therefore, predominant and hegemonic classes will strongly 
influence public policy concerning population control and labour market regulation, with 
immigration policy presenting an obvious confluence of the two fields. In order to understand 
changes in migration policy, it is thus much more fruitful to study the position of economically 
dominant actors than to remain wedded to an ultimately short-sighted liberal pluralist paradigm. 
Secondly, though this article empirically focuses primarily on employers, not unions, the latter in 
part play a role in representing the labour aristocracy and acting as part of the ideological apparatus 
(Martin 2008: 186-219). It is thus misleading to assume either a highly active or an anti-immigrant 
status on the part of the unions, but more instructive to understand their interests as being shaped by 
defending the interests of their core clientele. This might entail accepting disintegration of the 
labour market as a lesser evil. Thirdly, the state needs to ensure its own underlying material 
resources and hence assure its reproduction over time. Immigration policy is thus always driven by 
the sometimes conflicting prerogatives of seeking to ensure a steady supply of a taxable labour pool 
and arresting costly demands by the new migrant population to services proffered and financially 
underwritten by the state. This includes directly repressive measures by the police, border police 
units and social services aimed at migrants and migrant populations. From this last point arises the 
interest in recruiting an easily manageable migrant population that can easily be slotted into existing 
production strategies and fit into either end of a bifurcated labour market.   
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 If the reorganisation of the contemporary state has thus led to a gradual re-discovery of 
economic migration, this should come as little surprise. Weakening unions, more aggressive 
employers, labour market deregulation, and new corporate production strategies have red-drawn the 
contours of the labour market. Employers perceive of a need to solicit migrant labour, both because 
this helps promote and solidify a bottom tier of the labour market and because it broadens the size 
of the labour pool more generally and thus keeps wage increases in check. Indeed, real wages in 
Germany have stagnated since 1995, between 2004 and 2008 they have even declined slightly 
(Brenke 2009). In the UK, recent EU A8 immigrants earn 18% less than non-immigrants, 
suggesting a slight negative impact on wages in the bottom tier of the labour market (Blanchflower 
et al. 2007). The consolidation of a bottom tier in the labour market through liberalized labour 
migration is proceeding apace, yet it cannot simply be deduced from employer preferences.
 In the following section, it will be empirically illustrated how the renaissance of 
labour migration in Europe since the mid-1990s (Menz 2008) and the rhetorical link between the 
“need” for such labour migration due to demographic pressures and labour market shortages thus 
needs to be understood as part of an active strategy by employers to created downward wage 
pressure, and establish and strengthen substandard tiers of the labour market. Understandably, such 
political activities by employers are not necessarily particularly popular. Consequently, political 
demands for liberalized labour migration are couched in terms of “competitiveness”, “labour market 
shortages”, or are portrayed as inevitable and without alternative in light of declining birth rates and 
rising life expectancy at birth throughout Europe. 
4. LIBERALIZATION THROUGH THE EUROPEAN BACKDOOR: SERVICE 
PROVISION
 Though originally already contained in Art. 59-66 of the Treaty of Rome and one of the 
“four freedoms”, considerable legal uncertainty clouded trans-European service provision and it 
remained of little practical significance well into the 1980s. Historically relatively homogenous 
wage levels meant that transnational service provision was limited to instances of highly specialized 
niche providers. De facto, European service sectors remained well within the legal remit of national 
regulatory authorities and the often highly technical nature of applicable regulation deterred 
transnational service provision. 
 The Commission grew increasingly frustrated with this state of affairs. At the same time, the 
1990s had witnessed a massive increase in transnational service provision, especially in the 
construction sector. The substantial wage gaps across Europe in this sector, which were first 
exploited by a Portuguese subcontractor of French construction conglomerate Bouygues in 1986 
and reached epic proportions in booming Berlin in the mid-1990s.  
 Such transnationally active service provision, spawning “posted workers” from low wage 
countries such as Portugal and Greece to high wage destinations in northern Europe were welcomed 
by economic liberals, whilst critics perceived the emergence of islands of foreign law that imported 
Portuguese wages into Germany as a neoliberal nightmare. The posted workers were subject only to 
statutory laws of an ordre public character. This notably did not include wages in many countries, 
esepcially in the absence of a statutory ninimum wage. The Single Market was spawning the 
bifurcation of the laboru market in service industries, creating a bottom tier inhabited by EU 
citizens not entitled to standard national wages. A 1990 ECJ decision (Société Rush Portuguesa Lda 
vs. Office National d’Immigration 27 March 1990; C-118/89) opened up the way to national 
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response strategies. National re-regulatory strategies in a number of countries sought to establish 
some form of legally binding lowest wage tier, although in the Netherlands and Germany the re-
regulation was so non-intrusive as to fail in arresting labour market bifurcation.
 However, EU eastward enlargements in 2004 and 2007 re-ignited this problématique. 
Despite the imposition of temporary bans on labour mobility and service provision in all but three 
of the EU-15, the potential for competition via the wage factor re-emerged. Political debates 
focusing on social dumping very quickly were met by a number of practical developments that 
juxtaposed national regulatory regimes in wages and working conditions with European 
deregulatory tendencies. Companies availed themselves of new opportunities for transnational 
service provision with the explicit aim of lowering wages. In some cases, this entrepreneurial 
exploitation of wage gaps generated legal battles, but generally a predictable conflict between 
profit-driven companies and trade unions concerned with wage dumping and a downward spiral in 
remuneration and social protection levels ensued. 
Thus, in Ireland, shipping company Irish ferries incorporated a Cypriote subcontractor, 
replacing existing employees with new staff from Latvia, remunerated at Latvian wage levels. In 
Sweden, a Latvian construction company active in Växholm applied its home country regime in 
terms of wages and working conditions offered to posted employees in Sweden. In Germany, meat 
processing plants and construction companies found enterprising avenues for circumventing the 
temporary ban on service provision by employing nominally self-employed workers from Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) remunerated also at home country levels. In the absence of a statutory 
minimum wage, it proved possible to circumvent standard German wages, legally applicable only to 
businesses with membership in the German employer association, but not pseudo-inedepndent 
subcontracotrs, of course. 
Most controversially perhaps, the 2004 draft directive named after former Commissioner Frits 
Bolkestein (Commission of the European Communities, 2004. Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Services in the Internal Market. COM(2004) 2 final/3) would have enshrined 
the home country principle for transnational service provision, while forcing member states to open 
up significant segments of their economies to foreign competition, including areas traditionally 
regarded as service public such as health and education (Barnard 2008). While economic liberals, 
notably EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, warmly welcomed the, critics perceived of the 
“Frankenstein” directive as an incarnation of run-away neoliberalization, undermining fair wages 
and working conditions and pushing forward the doctrine of privatization by stealth. Such fears 
were nourished by the practical implications of the home country principle for host country wages, 
setting in motion a downward spiral. However, vociferous protest from the trade unions and a 
number of member state governments neuters the directive considerably. 
Three recent ECJ judgments resurrected concerns regarding the clash between an essentially liberal 
Single Market project and national safeguards to protect labour markets (Höpner and Schäfer 2007). 
The 2007 Viking case centred on a strike by the Finnish Seaman’s Union against a Finnish company 
that operated its ferry services under the Estonian flag and labour legislation. This industrial action 
was considered by the court undue interference with the company’s rights under Art. 43 EC, 
preventing restrictions on the right of establishment. The 2007 Laval case mentioned above, 
involving Swedish union action against a Latvian company posting Latvian workers to a Swedish 
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building site and reimbursed at 40 percent below standard local wage rates was judged unlawful 
under Art. 49 EC on restrictions on the freedom to provide services. Finally, the 2008 Rueffert case 
overruled a decision by the German state of Lower Saxony to end a contract with a German firm 
employing Polish subcontractors. These employees received 46 percent less than the standards 
wages and the practice violated state law requiring contractors to adhere to regionally applicable 
collectively bargained wages. Nevertheless, the ECJ considered this decision a violation of Art. 49. 
In all three cases, the ECJ argued the regulations being sought by national actors were 
‘disproportionate’ and ‘unjustified’.       
5. EMPLOYERS AS ACTIVE ADVOCATES OF IMMIGRATION     
Notwithstanding the political impediments to resuming labor recruitment (Messina 1990) and the 
obvious shortcomings of the guestworker concept of the postwar decades, European governments 
rediscovered labour migration in the early 2000s. Thus, between 1999 and 2006, the annual net 
flow of foreign workers into the UK rose from 42,000 to 62,700; in Germany it rose from 304,900 
in 1999 to 380,300 in 2004 (OECD 2008: Table A.2.1.). This general trend holds true across 
European OECD members. There is no tangible sign of this course being abandoned, 
notwithstanding the changing economic fortunes evident from 2008 onwards.    
But who drives this change? Debates in migration studies seek to account for the “gap” between 
restrictionist rhetoric and slightly more permissive practice (Hansen 2002).  This paradox has 
previously been partially accounted for by the activities of liberal courts (Hollifield 1992, 
Guiraudon 2000), though generally “prevailing scholarship…has been inconclusive with regard to 
the role and nature of domestic actors on national immigration policy-making.” (Lahav and 
Guiraudon 2006, 207).  
 Little scholarly attention has been paid to the role of employer associations (an exception is 
Cerna 2009), though organized business played a pivotal role in earlier Marxist-inspired analytical 
contributions (Castles and Kosack 1973, Castells 1975, Piore 1979). This is surprising, for it would 
seem prima facie fruitful to explore the role of these actors in understanding how and why national-
level labor migration policy has come to be liberalized across Europe from the mid-1990s onwards, 
abandoning the previous restrictive approach introduced after the oil shocks of the mid-1970s. 
While the “gap” puzzle is still unresolved, it is worth noting that with respect to labor migrants, 
official discourse is strikingly less restrictive then regarding “undesirable” migrant groups.
   Developments in Germany 
 German employers re-discovered labour migration in the late 1990s. 
Especially influential was outspoken late 1990s BD! president Hans-Olaf Henkel. 
The employers saw the liberalization of labour migration both as a useful tool in 
securing greater competitiveness and as a mechanism of addressing alleged shortages 
of skilled employees, expressed particularly by the largest sectoral employer 
Gesamtmetall. Henkel himself was part of two government expert commissions on 
immigration and harshly criticized the Christian Democrats' rejection of explicit 
labour migration quotas geared exclusively at highly skilled migrants (Manager 
Magazin 16 October 2000). Convinced of the necessity to "compete for the best 
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brains" and "internationally mobile high flyers" to address "labour market shortages" 
and to ensure the continued "competitiveness of Germany as place to do business", 
BDA suggested changes to regulation, liberalizing economic migration, permitting 
both temporary and long-term migration flows, with minimal discretion for local and 
regional administrative interventions (BDA 2002) . 
Not content with voicing their demands for liberalized labour migration through 
the expert committees, the employers also launched a vociferous and financially well- 
endowed public relations vehicle to popularise their demands for a general 
liberalization of the economy, including migration. Founded in 2000 by 
Gesamtmetall, the New Social Market Economy Initiative aims to influence public 
opinion and media reports (Leif 2004), drawing on an annual budget of 10 million 
euros. Immigration of "highly qualified foreigners" is one of its many proposals based on the "know 
how" and "contribution to economic growth" and "the future" that 
skilled migrants make (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft 2004, 2006). 
These lobbying activities started bearing fruits in the 2000s. In 2000, the Red- 
Green government launched a temporary labour recruitment program for 20,000 
highly skilled migrants, particularly in IT (the so-called "green card" initiative). The 
following year, Minister for the Interior Schily commissioned a report from an expert 
commission composed of academics, legal experts, the social partners and politicians 
from all parties, headed by moderate Christian Democrat Süßmuth. The "Law on the management 
and limitation of inward migration and the regulation of the residence and integration of EU citizens 
and foreigners" was finally accepted by the Bundestag on 1 July and by the Bundesrat on 9 July 
2004, and came into effect as of 1 January 2005 (BGBI Part I No. 41 1950 of 5 August 2004). Art. 
18 specifies that in processing an application for a work permit (henceforth linked to a residency 
permit), consideration should be given to the labour market situation, the fight against 
unemployment, and the exigencies of securing national competitiveness. 
The employer association had been consulted throughout the drafting of the bill 
(interviews BDA, MinInt). Both BDA representatives within the commission strongly 
lobbied in favour of more "demand oriented managed migration" and less 
bureaucratic leeway for regional labour market administrations in the context of more 
"competition for the best brains", coupled with faster asylum decisions and more 
rigorously enforced deportations to "avoid any signal that could be understood in 
countries of origin that immigration for non-labour market related reasons will be expanded" (BDA 
2002). Employers were particularly interested in highly skilled 
migrants, not least due to the positive experiences with the IT sector program, and 
contributed to the demand for an annual migration quota, based on a points system 
(interview BDA). Consistent lobbying led to the creation of migration channels for 
highly skilled high wage professionals in the new immigration bill, namely 
entrepreneurs investing at least one million euros and creating at least ten new jobs 
and carefully delineated categories of highly skilled migrants were permitted access, 
including teachers, scientists, and skilled managers earning in excess of 100,000 euros 
(all defined in Art. 19). In addition, foreign graduates of German universities were 
permitted to remain in the country for one additional year to search for employment. 
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By contrast, no categories were created for graduates of foreign vocational training 
schemes or labour migrants with general skills. 
Following a meeting of ministers in Meseberg in August 2007, further business- 
friendly concessions were made effective as of November 2007, including facilitated 
access for highly skilled engineering graduates from central and eastern Europe, three 
year work permits for foreign graduates of German universities and the creation of a 
working group within the Ministry of Labor and Education charged with developing 
"a labour market-oriented management of migration", including the examination of a 
points-based system measuring qualification levels, age and language skills (Berliner 
Zeitung 6 and 25 August 2007). Vicechancellor and Minister of Labour Müntefering 
announced that there was no need for low skill labour migration, echoing the position 
of BOA. The employers enthusiastically welcomed the liberalization of access (BDA 
2007a), and continued their advocacy of the "long overdue introduction" of such 
points-based system (BDA 2007b), pointing to Britain as a possible model (BDA 
2007c, 2007d). 
The Ministry of Labour drafted a bill on the "management of the migration of 
the highly qualified" during the summer of2008. The key changes entailed were 
further reducing the annual income required for highly qualified migrants eligible for 
"fast-tracking" from EUR 86, 400 to EUR 63,600, permitting labour market access 
for university graduates from the EU-8 accession countries, and creating a permanent 
council advising and evaluating labour market needs for skilled employees which 
would include a representative of the employers. It also facilitated labour market 
access for already resident temporarily "tolerated" refugees if they could demonstrate 
successful completion of a three year tertiary training program. The bill was accepted 
by the Bundestag on 17 November, by the Bundesrat on 19 December 2008. 
Complaints over minor details notwithstanding and the absence of a comprehensive 
points-based system, the project was warmly welcomed by the employers (BDA 
2008). The employers were successful in rhetorically linking competitiveness with the 
need for liberalized labour migration and in thus influencing public policy design. 
   Developments in the United Kingdom 
In the UK, discourse that rhetorically framed migration as a vital in ensuring 
competitiveness played an important role in ushering in more liberal policies. Whilst 
employers played an active role in this process, the New Labour government of Tony 
Blair was active on its own. It wrapped its policy initiatives into the language of 
competitiveness, demonstrating that the discourse of linking migration with 
competitiveness was used by both business and governmental actors. 
The beginning of this new turn towards "managed migration" and the discourse 
accompanying it, can be traced to 2000 (Balch 2009). The very phrase was used no less than 11 
times in parliament by David Blunkett during his tenure as Home Secretary. That year, a major 
governmental review of international migration and its impact on the economy was conducted, 
influenced by pro-liberalization Minister for Immigration Barbara Roche, but also a Department for 
Trade Industry 1998 White Paper which first raised the possibility of lowering entry barriers for 
skilled migrants (Somerville 2007: 29-30). 
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A 1998 White Paper entitled "Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge- 
Driven Economy" by the Department for Trade and Industry questioned restrictive 
policy towards highly skilled migrants and entrepreneurs. The skill range covered by 
the work permit scheme was broadened beginning in 2000, at the same time formal 
requirements were relaxed to possession of a tertiary degree rather then a degree and 
work experience. Consequently, the numbers of work permit holders rose from 62,975 
in 1997 to 137,035 in 2005. That same year, an "Innovator's Scheme" was piloted, 
supported by Minister of Immigration Roche who declared in an influential speech on 
11 September 2000 that the "UK was in competition for the brightest and best talents 
- the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology specialists who makes the 
economy tick" (Somnerville 2007: 29-31). The December 2001 Highly Skilled 
Migrants Programme (HSMP), complemented by the Innovators Scheme, first 
introduced an explicit point system, taking into consideration formal level of 
education, work experience, salary level, overall qualification and qualification of the 
spouse. Additional points were added for applicants in sectors with shortages - 
especially medicine - and, unlike the previous procedure, applicants themselves filed 
the application rather than their employer. 
This rhetorical link between liberalised migration and enhanced competitiveness 
was to be found not only in employer pronouncements, but also in elite government 
circles. The Home Office's 2002 "Secure Borders, Safe Havens" argued that on 
balance the UK stood to benefit from global mobility, given that "our strong labour 
market acts as a magnet for those seeking better jobs for themselves ... Migrants bring 
new experiences and talents that can widen and enrich the knowledge base of the 
economy" (Home Office 2002, para. 1.13). Meanwhile, prime minister Tony Blair 
argued during an April 2004 speech at the CBI that "recognition of the benefits that 
controlled migration brings not just to the economy but to delivering the public and 
private services on which we rely" was needed. 
Given the power vested in the executive in Britain's political system, the 
discourse produced was largely directed at the policy elite itself and successfully so 
(Balch 2009). The critical voices in the media and amongst the Conservative Party 
focused on alleged deficits in the control of asylum, but no signs of critical discourse 
regarding labour migration emerged, not even amongst the political opposition 
(Boswell et al. 2005: 21-23). The 2005 White Paper, its logic already apparent in its 
subtitle "Making Migration Work for Britain", based on a "flexible, employer-led" 
logic (Home Office 2005, 9), is highly representative of this rhetorical justification of 
relaxed immigration rules. "Managed migration is not just good for our country. It is 
essential for our continued prosperity", the paper claims, and proceeds to emphasize 
on 12 occasions that employers will be consulted or that the scheme is employer-led. 
In mid-2005 then CBI president Digby Jones stressed the advantage Britain 
enjoyed thanks to its flexible labour markets and pragmatic labour migration schemes, 
having earlier proclaimed that "capital can't afford to be racist for lots of reasons" 
(CRE 2003). A 5 January 2006 CBI policy statement (CBI 2006) similarly suggests 
that there was virtually no difference in opinion between government and employers: 
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 "The CBI believes that migration is beneficial to the UK. Migrants have made an 
important contribution to the UK economy - bringing valuable and scarce skills that have 
benefited UK business and helped contribute to economic growth. Migrant workers are an 
integral part of the UK workforce and the CBI shares the Government's belief that a 
carefully managed migration policy can bring further benefits to the UK." 
The employers welcomed this new turn towards liberalized labour migration due to 
concerns over labour shortages in a variety of economic sectors and in both high and 
low skill positions (CBI 2005). They assumed an active stance in advocating 
immigrants considered of economic utility (interview CBI). An interest in economic 
migrants pervaded all sectoral associations (interviews CBI, BHA). There was a 
particular interest both in very highly skilled service sector jobs, especially in finance, 
law, health, natural science research, and in low skill jobs in food processing, 
agriculture, gastronomy and construction and both regarding generalist and sector- 
specific skills (interviews CBI, BHA). In an interview, a CBI representative 
confirmed sectoral and firm concerns over poor "employability" of domestic workers 
in some sectors and highlighted the advantages of hiring "better trained" graduates of 
"continental vocational training schemes" and universities, despite their marginally 
higher average age (interview CBI). In 2005, CBI together with the union federation 
TUC and the Home Office published ajoint position paper, emphasizing that "the 
skills and enthusiasm" (TUC 2005: 1) of new migrants was welcomed by all parties. 
Along with the unions and certain NGOs, the CBI is invited to the bi-annual "user 
panel" planning sessions of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in the Home 
Office. Its representatives are also part of the employer taskforce group, which is 
responsible for providing policy suggestions to the Home Office's Border and 
Immigration Agency. Recommendations from this group have fed into the 
establishment of an Australian-style high skill migration program in February 2008 
and the illegal working stakeholder group (interview CBI). Within this taskforce 
group, along with a trade union delegate, major internationally oriented businesses 
such as Shell, Ernst & Young, Tesco, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs are represented as 
well as sectoral employer associations in engineering, hospitality and employment 
services, alongside NASSCOM, the Indian IT sector chamber of commerce. Both 
formal responses to government initiatives and informal avenues to the Home Office 
are fairly well received (interview Home Office) and the CBI has positioned itself 
well to influence governmental deliberations. It is also part of the stakeholder panel of 
the Migration Advisory Committee, an academic expert body convened by the Home 
Office. 
The turn towards liberalized labour migration, a policy stance embraced both by 
the New Labour government and employers, was supported by a discourse that 
portrayed migration as part of an inevitable attempt to retain international 
competitiveness. Whilst the 2010 Liberal Democrats-Conservative coalition 
government announced plans to reduce the numbers of non-EU highly skilled 
migrants immediately after coming to office in July 20 10, internal dissent has already 
surfaced, with outspoken Liberal Democrat Business Secretary Cable sharply 
criticizing such cap as "damaging" (The Independent 18 September 2010), suggesting 
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an eventual compromise outcome. Though the temporary cap put in place may be 
extended, it seems unlikely that there will be complete reversal of previous migration 
liberalization initiatives. There was and is virtually no ideational difference between 
government and organized business in this process. 
 6. CONCLUSION: DISINTEGRATION AND BIFURCATION 
 Labour migration can be used as a strategy to establish and enhance the 
bifurcation of labour markets. In the bottom tiers of the labour market, substandard 
wages and working conditions apply. Consequently, labour migration can also be 
used as an efficient tool to pry open more homogeneous labour markets. This article 
has analysed such (ab) use of labour migration by employers, arguing that change 
from within even in coordinated market economies leads to a multi-tiered labour 
market structure, which holds obvious appeal to employers. Only the members of the 
core labour market still enjoy standard wages and working conditions. In the bottom 
tier, this is simply no longer the case. By marrying insights from migration studies 
and comparative political economy, this article demonstrates how labour migration, 
even if technically legal, can be utilized as a political tool based on power resources. 
It is striking that employer associations have re-discovered an appetite for 
labour migrants. The need for liberalized labour migration is portrayed rhetorically as 
being pivotal in securing and maintaining "competitiveness" and thus crucial to 
national security. Both in the UK and Germany employers enjoyed privileged access 
to policy-makers and succeeded in having their demands heard and incorporated into 
more liberal policy. However, considerably less efforts was required to convince the 
particularly economically liberal British government to take action. Privileged access 
to decision-makers by business interests in part reflects the changed architecture of 
the contemporary European state. Labour migrants are used in helping ushering in the 
disintegration and bifurcation of labour markets. This is true even of formerly 
organized and more coherent continental European labour markets, such as the 
German one. Though this article focused exclusively on legal forms of immigration, it 
is striking how limited access rights apply even to "posted" EU citizens, thus 
suggesting a mismatch between legal entitlement to employment and eligibility to 
standard wages and working conditions. 
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Charlotte Rommerskirchen, ‘The Difficulties of Fiscal Policy Coordination in 
Times of Economic and Financial Crisis’
Ever since the emergence of the democratic welfare state with its unprecedented borrowing 
capacities  and incentives, fiscal policy making has been haunted by a deficit and debt bias. It is this 
underlying assumption about the nature of those in charge of fiscal policy, which make the 
coordination of fiscal policy in a common currency union desirably. First, in order for monetary 
policy to be efficient and second to avoid exactly the beggar-thy-neighbor policies, both in a fiscally 
frugal and proficient sense, witnessed in the eurozone for the past  decade. Moving to 1997 these 
concerns informed the blueprint for EMU’s fiscal rules, specifically the Stability and Growth Pact, 
short SGP.
The poor performance of the Pact to curtail deficits has been notorious. Given the past record the 
European Commission was weary when the economic and financial crisis erupted. How to achieve 
fiscal policy  coordination during the worst recession since the 1930ies if this has not even been on 
national agendas during the comparatively sunny period first  decade of EMU? Unsurprisingly as 
soon as the scope of the crisis emerged, calls were heard to suspend not only the SGP rules, but also 
Competition policy which is a further potentially potent tool of the Commission to constrain public 
spending. With the majority  of member sates announcing considerable stimulus programmes ahead 
of any EU wide agreement, a EU level crisis action plan was agreed upon in December; the 
European Economic Recovery Plan, or short EERP. The plan essentially gives a carte blanche to 
national policy  makers to spend their way out of recession Keynesian style, something that arguably 
most were set to do anyway. The guidelines how and when to spend it  were purposefully  vague, 
preferably ticking the boxes of timely, targeted and temporary in an official language that is 
reminiscent of consultancy speak. Notably, disagreements between member states over an EU-wide 
stimulus programme hampered attempts to forge a consensus for fiscal policy coordination. This 
discord did stem from the different national evaluations of the nature and scope of the crisis, as well 
as from widely differing fiscal stances which left national policy-makers with varying margins of 
maneuver.
Given that  fiscal policy coordination was not working when it was concerned with curbing deficits 
prior to 2008, how then would it fare when all of sudden the message emerging from Brussels was; 
now you may actually increase your debt burdens? For the first  time in EMU member states were 
faced with a situation where guidelines were vague, the SGP suspended, and national policy-makers 
expressively encouraged to run deficits. As a result member states spent as they pleased, some 
implementing substantial stimulus policies, others barley engaging in discretionary fiscal policy 
spending at all. This is one of the key  lessons for fiscal policy coordination during the Great 
Recession of 2008-2009; fiscal policy coordination in EMU did not work, and it did not matter 
whether coordination was concerned with consolidation, or stimulus policies. 
To understand this one has to look at an additional bias to the deficit and debt bias of contemporary 
policy making, - the hypocrisy bias. Virtually all member states like to sing the hymn of low deficit 
and debt burdens from the spreadsheet of stability  culture. And if the economic climate and the 
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political one for that matter, seems opportune they might also act  accordingly. Or at least pretend 
they do. 
In a classic collective actions setting the two disagreements, first how to actually do fiscal policy 
and secondly how to talk about it, pose considerable problems. EMU states are heterogenous as far 
as resources (in other words respecting the SGP and related rules is costlier for some member states 
than for others) as well as their interests (e.g. in France right now austerity is not de rigger whereas 
it is very much so in Germany and Austria). This makes the success of collective action unlikely. 
Given the difference in thought or actual production and allocation functions of the cost and 
benefits of fiscal policy coordination, member states display a high degree of group  latency, 
according to Mancur Olson (1963) one of the key feature of collective action failure. The architects 
of EMU, saw this a long way  coming and had the SGP purposefully set up to provide this very 
selective and separate incentive that is thought to induce group oriented behavior. Except for the 
fact that it was a weak instrument. 
So how then to motivate this latent  group and jolt  it into collective action in the post-crisis context 
of fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic reform? Arguably the first answer is already becoming 
apparent and it is not found in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, which is just 
the old rules dressed up  in the sterner robes. Instead the real separate and selective incentive is 
exerted by ‘market discipline’ as bond market  participants have awoken to the fact  that EMU 
member states are very different indeed. In the turmoil of the Sovereign Debt Crisis with markets 
engaging in what some might describe as ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller 2000), consolidation of 
public finances in all EU member states has witnessed a tentative turnaround with an projected  EU 
average deficit of 1.4 in 2014 (COM 2012).
Market discipline refers to the signals from the financial markets that - so the theory goes - can 
deter a borrower from maintaining an unsustainable path of borrowing, it is a police man against 
moral hazard problems described by the political economy of public deficits (Lane 1993). Looking 
at the development of long-term interest rate in the eurozone, the forces of market discipline seem 
to have been put into hibernation once states joined the euro which came to an abrupt end in 2009.
By eliminating currency risk and reducing transaction costs within the eurozone, the introduction of 
the new European currency has considerably strengthened European financial market integration. 
Not to bailout another eurozone member state is hence not also politically but also economically no 
longer an option. This poses a challenge; for market discipline to work, a modified Art. 125 has to 
stay in place. That means that muddling through towards fiscal union by agreeing on one bail-out 
after another, has the dangers of putting market discipline back into a slumber while not setting up 
binding rules and considerably taking fiscal policy making, and more to the point macroeconomic 
management, out of the hand of national policy makers. 
Instead of relying solely on peer pressure and consequently intergovernmental agreements, market 
pressure may  be the best sanctioning system available to achieve at least a minimal form of fiscal 
policy coordination. Notably  coordination problems are not limited to the direction of fiscal policy 
(spend or save), but concern all agreements that constrain public spending. Unless EMU member 
140
states converges in terms of their fiscal preferences, both in terms of political culture and economic 
reality, there is need to jolt this latent group via separate and selective incentives, and these are 
unlikely to come from within the group itself. 
As a matter of course market pressure is not a panacea. The architects of EMU were skeptical of the 
effectiveness of market  discipline in the first place and whether it could really induce member states 
to pursue sound fiscal policies. Not because they would not believe in the seriousness of the no bail 
out clause but because ‘market  perceptions do not necessarily  provide strong and compelling 
signals. The constraints imposed by  market forces might either be too slow and weak or too sudden 
and disruptive’ (Delors 1989). Looking at the devastating effects of the current Sovereign Debt 
Crisis the evaluation of the Delors groups reads like a writing on the wall. In this light, the various 
proposals (e.g. Favero & Alexandra 2012, Schelkle 2012, Curzio 2011, Phoebus 2011, Delpa & 
Weizsäcker 2010) to mitigate the ‘irrational exuberance’ of market participants whilst  retaining their 
disciplinary function should be mandatory reading for all interested in the future of EMU.
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